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RESUMO 
 
 
A presente dissertação examina de que forma a desintegração de um país e o 
processo de transição podem afetar o mercado de trabalho. Será dada especial atenção 
aos determinantes da desigualdade e à regressão no mercado de trabalho na Sérvia no 
contexto da crise contemporânea.  Para isso, analiso os processos pelos quais esse país 
passou e como eles o influenciaram. A Sérvia fazia parte da Iugoslávia, país comunista 
– produto complexo de uma história complexa, mosaico de povos, línguas e religiões. 
Dissolveu-se no início dos anos 1990. É uma tarefa extremamente difícil determinar por 
que isso aconteceu.  Este trabalho procura identificar as teorias mais populares e 
famosas e fatores que procuram explicar esta situação e destacar os aspectos mais 
relevantes de cada uma delas. 
Depois da Guerra Civil nos anos noventa, as forças políticas neoliberais 
tomaram o poder na Sérvia e a transição começou. A transição implicou reestruturação e 
liberalização econômica. Isso causou mudanças consideráveis no mercado de trabalho, 
tais como: redução da proteção ao emprego, redução do emprego no setor público e do 
nível salarial; aumento rápido do desemprego e, consequentemente, aumento da 
desigualdade e da pobreza.  
As questões relacionadas com os problemas de emprego e desemprego são 
cruciais para todos os países, porque o nível de emprego, além do nível do produto 
interno bruto per capita, é um dos indicadores mais importantes da eficiência de uma 
economia. A análise dos determinantes da desigualdade implica a análise de diferentes 
áreas. No entanto, este estudo analisou apenas aquelas relacionadas ao mercado de 
trabalho e à política social. Três determinantes do aumento da desigualdade na Sérvia: 
redução dos salários, queda do emprego e desemprego. 
 
Palavras-chave: Desintegração. Mercado de trabalho. Transição. 
Iugoslávia. 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines how the disintegration of one country, and transitional 
process can affect labour market. Special attention is on the determinants of inequality 
and regression of the labor market in Serbia in the context of the contemporary crisis. In 
order to do this, I analyze the processes through which this country has passed and how 
they influenced it. Serbia was part of Yugoslavia, communist country - complex product 
of a complex history, mosaic of peoples, languages, and religion.  It dissolved in early 
90’s. It is extremely hard task to declare why this happened. This work also, driving for 
to link the most popular and famous theories and factors concerning the issue and to 
separate the most relevant aspects of each of them.   
After the Civil War in the nineties, neoliberal political forces took power in 
Serbia and transition started. Transition implicates economic restructuring and 
liberalization. This cause considerable changes in the labour market, such as: declining 
employment protection, reductions in public sector employment and wage level, rapid 
unemployment increases, and consequently increased inequality and poverty.  
Issues related to the problems of employment and unemployment are one of the 
crucial issues for each country, because the level of employment, in addition to the level 
of gross domestic product per capita, is one of the most important indicators of the 
efficiency of an economy. Analysis of inequality determinants implies analysis of 
different areas. However, this study analyzed only those related to the labor market and 
social policy. Three determinants of increasing inequality in Serbia: slashing wages, a 
slump in employment and unemployment.  
 
Keywords:  Disintegration.  Labour market. Transition. Yugoslavia. 
  
LIST OF GRAPHS 
 
Graph 1 – External Debt of Yugoslavia, 19661-1980 in Billions of Dollars ............................. 32 
Graph 2 – Cumulative Trade Deficit and Total External Debt of Yugoslavia, 1970-1980 ......... 33 
Graph 3 – Gross National Product (GNP) by Sector, 1975 ....................................................... 43 
Graph 4 – Gross National Product (GNP) by Sector, 1988 ....................................................... 43 
Graph 5 – Employment in Serbia  2000-2004. ........................................................................ 92 
Graph 6 – Employment rates (in %) ........................................................................................ 94 
Graph 7 – Unemployment in Serbia 2000-2004 ...................................................................... 95 
Graph 8 – Wage trends – real growth ...................................................................................... 99 
Graph 9 – Labour force participation rate of Serbia in 2016 ................................................... 118 
Graph 10 – Labour force by occupation 2015 ........................................................................ 119 
Graph 11 – Unemployment rate of Serbia in 2016 ................................................................. 121 
Graph 12 – Volume indices of GDP and AIC per capita, 2016 (EU-28=100) ......................... 141 
Graph 13 – Serbia GDP per capita PPP, 1990-2015 ............................................................... 142 
 
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 – Main performance indicators of the Yugoslav economy (average annual growth, rates, 
% except*) .............................................................................................................................. 20 
Table 2 – Employment in Selected Enterprise Categories, 1975, 1985 and 1988 (in thousands of 
workers) ................................................................................................................................. 39 
Table 3 – Regional unemployment  disparities ........................................................................ 40 
Table 4 – Value of Selected Exports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 (in billions of dinars) ................... 45 
Table 5 – Value of Selected Imports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 (in billions of dinars) ................... 46 
Table 6 – Principal Trading Partners, 1988 (in billions of dinars)............................................. 47 
Table 7 – Government Budget, 1980 (in billions of dinars) ..................................................... 49 
Table 8 – Former Yugoslavia. Total Population in republics and autonomous provinces 1991 . 66 
Table 9 – Former Yugoslavia Ethnic composition of republics and autonomous provinces 1991 
(percentage) ............................................................................................................................ 67 
Table 10 – The Mosaic of Peoples ........................................................................................... 68 
Table 11 – Disparities between republics 1990(by percent) ..................................................... 69 
Table 12 – Basic macroeconomic indicators of transition ex-Yugoslav countries (1999) .......... 81 
Table 13 – Unemployment rates in Serbia 2000-2004. ............................................................. 96 
Table 14 – Unemployed by length of unemployment (in %) .................................................... 97 
Table 15 – Growth in gross domestic product, productivity and real wages in transition 
countries, 2003, in percentage ............................................................................................... 100 
Table 16  – Employees to whom wages have not been paid 2005 ........................................... 101 
Table 17 – Milestones in EU – Serbia Relations .................................................................... 106 
Table 18 – Unemployment Rate of the Working Age Population 2011-2015 ......................... 119 
Table 19 – Unemployment rates (persons aged 15–64), 2008–2015 (% of labour force) ......... 120 
Table 20 – Youth unemployment rate in EU28 and former Yugoslav countries in 2015 ......... 122 
Table 21 – Long-term unemployment rates (persons aged 15–74) by sex, 2015 (% of labour 
force) .................................................................................................................................... 124 
Table 22  – Levels of collective bargaining summarized ........................................................ 131 
Table 23 – Employee representation at establishment level summarize .................................. 138 
 
  
LIST OF MAPS 
 
Map 1 – Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia showing neighboring countries 19 
Map 2 – Former Yugoslavia during the war .......................................................................... 71 
Map 3 – The Front Lines and the Dayton Peace Agreement, November 1995 .......................... 75 
Map 4 – Western Balkans and the EU ................................................................................... 103 
 
  
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIC Actual individual consumption 
ALMPs  Active labor market programs  
AREC Adriatic Regional Employers’ Center 
ASME Association of Small and Medium-Sized Entrepreneurs 
B&H Bosnia and Herzegovina  
BOAL  Basic Organization of Associated Labour 
CATUS Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia  
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency  
CLDS   Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies 
Cominform   Communist Information Bureau 
CPI  Consumer price index  
EC  European Community 
ECSC   European Coal and Steel Community  
EEC   European Economic Community  
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation 
EU  European Union  
EUR  Euro  
FRY   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
FSA  Financial Social Assistance  
FYR Macedonia    Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia  
GDP Gross domestic product   
GNP   Gross National Product 
HDZ  Croatian Democratic Union 
ICT Information and communication technology 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia  
ILO   International Labour Organization  
IMF   International Monetary Fund  
IOE   International Organization of Employers  
ITUC          International Trade Union Confederation 
K&M        Kosovo and Metohia 
LCY    League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
LFS        Labor Force Survey 
MOP Material Support for Low Income Households  
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NEAP National Employment Action Plan  
NES  National Employment Service 
NGO    Non-governmental organizations  
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PERC  Pan-European Regional Council  
PES  Public employment services 
RSD  Serbian Dinar  
RSO        Republic Statistical Office 
RZS   Republic Statistics Office of Serbia  
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement  
SAE  Serbian Association of Employers  
SAWPY Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia 
SEE  South- East Europe  
SFRY  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SMEs  Small and medium size enterprises 
U.S.      United States 
UBCCE 
Union of Black Sea and Caspian Confederation of 
Enterprises  
UGS United Branch Trade Unions  
UN    United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
USA   United States of America  
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
WBG  World Bank Group  
YBA Yugoslav Banking Association 
YBIEC   Yugoslav Bank for International Economic 
YNA      Yugoslav National Army 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION   15 
2 DETERMINANTS OF YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION   188 
2.1 Post-war years and adjustments in the 1970s ............................................................. 21 
2.2 Organizations in communist Yugoslavia during the 1980’s ....................................... 26 
2.2.1 League of Communists of Yugoslavia   26 
2.2.2 The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia and Trade Unions   27 
2.2.3 Youth League of Yugoslavia and Veterans' Association   29 
2.3 Decline of the Yugoslav economy in the 80s and early 90s ......................................... 30 
2.4 Structure of the Economy ........................................................................................... 36 
2.4.1 Characteristics of the labour market, unemployment and regional development 
policy   36   
2.4.2 Industry   42 
2.4.3 Foreign Trade   43 
2.4.4 Banking, Federal Revenue and Spending   48 
2.5 A critical assessment of the main arguments for the breakup of Yugoslavia ............ 50 
2.5.1 The Economic Argument   50 
2.5.2 The 'Ancient Ethnic Hatred' and the Cultural Argument 52 
2.5.3 The Nationalism Argument   54 
2.5.4 The Role of Personality Argument   55 
2.5.5 The International Politics Argument   56 
2.6 Summary of the chapter..................................................................................................62 
3 FROM YUGOSLAVIA’S DESINTEGRATION TO ITS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
– THE CASE OF SERBIA   65 
3.1 Background on Yugoslavia  in the 1991……………………………………………….66 
3.2 War years .................................................................................................................... 69 
3.3 Transition of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY) ............................................... 77 
3.3.1 First transitional years   78 
3.3.2 Beginning of the new millennium   81 
3.4 Labor market transition .............................................................................................. 86 
3.4.1 Labor Relations in the 90s   87 
3.4.2 Legislative Changes 2001-2005   91 
3.4.3 Chief Labour Market Indicators   92 
3.5 Accession to the European Union ............................................................................. 102 
3.6 Summary of the chapter ............................................................................................ 109 
4 SERBIAN LABOR MARKET, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL 
CONDITIONS   112 
4.1 Overview of the situation at Serbian Labour Market .............................................. 114 
4.1.1 Labor market trends   117 
4.1.2 Wages and gender wage gap   126 
4.2  Industrial relations ................................................................................................... 128 
4.2.1 Collective bargaining system   130 
4.2.2 Industrial Conflicts, mediation, arbitration and tripartite concertation   132 
4.2.3 Workplace representation   133 
4.2.4 Trade union density, Trade unions   134 
4.2.5 Employer's organization density, Employer representation   136 
4.2.6 Employees's representation   137 
4.3 Working conditions ................................................................................................... 138 
4.4 Social conditions.............................................................................................................140 
4.4.1 Social policy in Serbia   144 
4.4.2 Poverty in Serbia   147 
4.5 Summary of the chapter  ........................................................................................... 150 
5 CONCLUISONS 152 
REFERENCES   156 
 
 
15 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),"the land of the 
South Slavs”, was country located in the Balkans, very important geopolitical region. 
Six republics and two autonomous provinces composed this federation. Leaded by Josip 
Broz Tito, it existed from the end of the Second World War, until the early 1990s. 
Unlike other European socialist countries, the SFRY had never been a member of the 
Warsaw Treaty, and had maintained close ties with Western governments. The SFRY 
was the founder and one of the most important members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. It was a country of self-managing socialism, with a one-party delegate 
system of representation, a planned economy and a specific system of the so-called 
workers' self-management.  
There are many reasons why this topic is important. This country was the 
political framework for most southern Slavs during the 50 years’ period.  It played a 
vital international role both regionally and globally in the context of the Cold War. All 
former Yugoslav successors still present critical issues for policy-making for the 
European Union, the United States, other OECD countries, and Russia. Slovenia is 
example of a successful economic transition. Croatia is a good example, but still has to 
learn. Other countries, unfortunately, serve as a study for a bad example of transition 
from one system to another. Why this is so, especially in the case of Serbia, will be 
explained in the second part of this paper. 
In the 1990s, Yugoslavia had become an international metaphor for ethnic strife. 
By the start of the 1990s, Serbia was arguably in a relatively advantageous position 
among Communist economies, as a country with relatively high levels of per capita 
income and deep integration with the West. The disintegration of Yugoslavia disrupted 
many of Serbia’s most important trading relationships. During the Yugoslav wars, the 
international sanctions were imposed on Serbia. Living standards collapsed and 
inflation was extremely high.  It provoked totally economic chaos and triggered the 
emigration of hundreds of thousands of people, including many of the professionals 
whose skills would have been vital and used in a more normal Serbia. A tentative 
recovery that began in the mid-1990s was abruptly halted by the NATO bombing of 
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Serbia in the 1999. The damage was huge. In October 2000, Serbia’s economy was 
perhaps three-fifths of its size in 1990.  
In the 2000s serious reforms started but unfortunately remain incomplete and 
have been further delayed because of global economic crisis. Indicators like weak 
business environment, an inflexible labour market and a large and inefficient public 
enterprise sector, have persistently blocked competitiveness and growth. Also, all these 
factors have also delayed Serbia's social transformation. In the past, the country's social 
policy was based 'less on social rights' and more on the care of the state, which had a 
major role in the provision of social security. The state remained for a long time a 
'dominant service provider' in the area of the labour market, education and social 
protection (pension and disability insurance, social assistance to vulnerable groups and 
social welfare). Since the latest stage of reform began in late 2001, job losses have been 
large, as Serbia has embarked on a program of restructuring and privatization. At the 
same time, job creation in the private sector has been slow, despite strong economic 
growth in recent years. The result is a weak labor market transition, especially when 
judged by the standards of the more successful transition countries.  
The key problems in Serbia and all former Yugoslavia republics are; 
unemployment, poorly handled privatization (sale of the companies for nothing to local 
and foreign tycoons,  national debt of all former Yugoslavian countries individually is 
bigger that during the Yugoslavia, IMF (debt bondage), deprivation of the workers’ 
rights,  destruction of pension and health fund, mass migration after the civil war 
(around 2 million people ), insufficient exports, insufficient foreign direct investments.  
One of the main characteristics of Serbian economy nowadays is the high 
unemployment rate and low employment rates. This is not only the problem what 
Serbian society has been facing for many years it is also one of the most stressing 
problems of the world economy. High and persistent long-term unemployment has 
become a salient feature of the Serbian labor market. Substantial informal sector 
activities are another prominent feature. Serbia is also facing an aging and shrinking 
population due to low birth rates and high emigration. Those and many other 
characteristics make the Serbia of today an unfinished state.   
For Serbia and all former Yugoslav countries accession to European Union has a 
powerful symbolic significance.  Certainly, it can be argued that competition to join the 
17 
 
European Union was a factor in the disintegrative process. Better developed republics as 
Slovenia and Croatia, tried to separate themselves from those one that are more 
backward. They are already EU members. The current political situation in post-
Yugoslav nations it is difficult to imagine the acceptance of liberal democracy without 
accession to the EU. To be part of EU, Serbia has had to undertake reforms to shift 
away from its centralized social policy model. The state sector remains significant in 
certain areas. The economy relies on manufacturing and exports, driven largely by 
foreign investment. Trade liberalization should extend towards both the EU and all the 
other countries of the region. Because of the very high level of unemployment in the 
region, labour market policies will be essential. They will need to bring down barriers to 
employment, legalize black market employment wherever possible, and focus on 
training and development activities. Prime consideration should be given to tackling 
long-term and youth unemployment. 
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2 DETERMINANTS OF YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION 
 
The idea of creating a Slovenian state in the Balkans began in 1700 with Serbian 
and Croatian intellectuals and writers. They claimed that the only way for the South 
Slavs (Slovenians in the Balkans) to end their oppression under Austrian or Ottoman 
rule was to establish a unique Slovenian nation. They were inspired by the revolutions 
of 1848 but also with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. This time period was where 
the Pan-Slavic movement really took a step. After the Berlin Congress, the Ottoman 
Empire was weakened. Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece finally became strong after the 
centuries of slavery. Also, there was a new hope for the sovereignty of the South Slav 
people in Austria-Hungary. This finally led to a great chance of unification. The 
Yugoslav Committee, composed of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who identified 
themselves with the movement towards a single Yugoslav state, was formed in 1915 in 
London. They began to raise funds to achieve this goal. The expelled Yugoslavs who 
lived in Britain and North America were the main supporters of this committee. The 
committee members had excellent contacts with allied governments. Those contacts 
helped them a lot in the moment when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy began to 
disintegrate. In 1917, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was given a plan to end the 
system of a dual monarchy and establish a system of triple monarchy for the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, divided and divided by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This was rejected, 
but the London Conference of 1915 did a lot to politically prepare for the fall of the 
Austrian and the unity of the political goals of the Southern Slavs, and in 1918, when 
the Habsburg Monarchy was dissolved, Yugoslavia was proclaimed as a nation. The 
idea was finally realized. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was created, which existed 
during the interim period 1918-1943. Slovenes and Croats have greatly improved their 
dominant status by entering a new country. The Serbs finally could be ethnically united 
within one state, while they were previously scattered and divided. The state was 
dominated by the Serbian dynasty of Karađorđević, which previously ruled the 
Kingdom of Serbia.  
After the Second World War King Peter II Karađorđević, was overthrown and 
expelled in England. The Communists came to power and created the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (further in the text Yugoslavia). It existed from it foundation in 
the aftermath of the Second World War until 1991. It was a socialist state and a 
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federation consisting of six socialist republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. In addition, there were two 
autonomous provinces in Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina. A single communist party 
ruled Yugoslavia. Power became strongly centralized, based on the Soviet model of 
state socialism, and order firmly kept in place by Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s Communist 
Party. He was a great revolutionary and a Yugoslav political leader for almost 40 years. 
He had various roles during his reign. He was the leader of the Yugoslav Guerrilla 
Movement (Partizani) during the Second World War and Secretary General of the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia. After the war, he was prime minister, president 
(later president of life from 1953 to 1980). He also held the rank of Marshal of 
Yugoslavia and Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army. While his presidency has 
been criticized as authoritarian, and concerned about the suppression of political 
opponents, some historians consider him as a benevolent dictator. He was a popular 
public figure both in Yugoslavia and abroad. 
 
Map 1 – Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia showing neighboring 
countries. Available in: <http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia> 
Access in: 26 May 2017. 
 
In forty-five-year period, the country's political structure evolved in four major 
stages. Apart from the short period of highly centralized planning and excluding the 
three final years of Yugoslavia’s existence, it is possible to identify four distinct periods 
in terms of efficiency performance, three of which can be identified with major systemic 
changes. These are: 
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- 1953-64: the period of self-management, supported by only limited market-
oriented reform; 
- 1965-73: the period of full-scale market socialism; 
- 1974-79: the’ contractual economy’ period, during which collective control 
was reasserted; and 
- 1980-89: the period of economic crisis, not associated with any key changes 
in the system. 1 
Table 1 – Main performance indicators of the Yugoslav economy (average annual growth, 
rates, % except*). Source: DYKER, David A.; VEJVODA, Ivan. Yugoslavia and After: A 
Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, 1996, p. 31.  
 
*The unemployment rate is calculated in the Yugoslav statistics as a percentage of the 
non- agricultural active population. 
The former Yugoslav federation dissolved in early 90’s. The break-up of 
Yugoslavia came at a time of radical change across the whole of the socialist part of 
                                                             
1 DYKER, David A.; VEJVODA, Ivan. Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and 
Rebirth, 1996, p. 31. 
  
Main performance 
indicators 
 
1953-64 1965-73 1974-79 1980-89 
GNP 8,6 5,3 6,3 0,7 
Industrial output 12,7 6,9 7,6 2,4 
Agricultural output 7,2 1,8 2,4 0,5 
Employment 6,3 2,0 4,5 2,0 
Labor productivity 2,3 3,2 1,7  -1,3 
Unemployment rate* 6,6 8,0 13,0 15,1 
Personal consumption 7,3 5,1 5,8 0,1 
Gross fixed investment 11,4 3,4 8,9 -5,1  
Retail prices 4,0 14,1 18,2 108,7 
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Europe, a time, which also witnessed the dissolution of two other federations: The 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 
 Most analyses of the causes of disintegration in these countries emphasize 
fragmentation internal factors in particular political factors that found expression in the 
shift from a one party to a multiparty system and the revival of nationalism in historical 
context, with the role of economic factors relegated to the background.  The literature 
review offers a wide range of explanations for the causes that led to the breakup of the 
Yugoslav federation. There are many theories that are trying to explain why this 
happened. However, it is extremely hard task to declare which of those theories is the 
most relevant. This thesis is making attempt to combine the most popular and famous 
theories concerning the issue and to separate the most relevant aspects of each of them. 
Especially controversial are some conspiracy theories.  In this chapter, I focus on the 
particular way in which the complex interaction between economic and political factors 
limited the development potential of semi-command economies, making them 
extremely vulnerable to any process of change. In my view, although specifically 
political elements played a pivotal role in the saga of dissolution, a process of economic 
disintegration conditioned by underlying political factors that had evolved over decades 
played the decisive part.2 Its main novelty is in presenting new sources and offering an 
original interpretation of the events, which happened in the analyzed period. It also 
corrects some misconceptions in the debate on the collapse of Yugoslavia, such as the 
'ethnic hatred' argument and various mono-causal explanations focused on economic 
crisis, international politics, ethnic structure, etc. The main fallacy is in neglecting the 
subjective, i.e., the perceptions of political actors in politics. The thesis demonstrates 
that institutions that were created on ideological grounds found it ultimately impossible 
to survive the collapse of the ideological narrative whose products they were.3 
 
2.1 Post-war years and adjustments in the 1970s 
 
                                                             
2 MAROLOV, Dejan. The Reasons for the Collapse of Yugoslavia. International Journal of Sciences: 
Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR), Republic of Macednia, v. 12, n. 1, p. 250, 2013.  
3 JOVIC, Dejan. The breakdown of elite ideological consensus: The prelude to the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia (1974-1990). 2000. 378 p. PhD Dissertation Department of Government the London School 
of Economics and Political Science University of London, 2000, p. 46 
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The occupation and liberation struggle in World War II left Yugoslavia's 
infrastructure devastated. Tito immediately began to implement programs to rebuild its 
broken post-war state. The property was transferred from its former private owners to 
the communist-run state. The financial capital was expropriated from formerly being 
privatized, and the means of production were converted to public ownership. Large 
financial institutions, such as the banks, were nationalized to control the money supply 
and the flow of financial capital. Large industries were then overtaken by state control 
to promote industrialization. Finally, the smaller transport, commercial, and agricultural 
industries were also nationalized to increase production.4 The first postwar years 
witness huge reconstruction of the country through massive voluntary work. Also, one 
of the main characteristics of this period is implementation of five-year plans (Soviet-
model). The countryside was electrified and heavy industry was developed. The youth 
work actions were organized on local, republic and federal levels by the Young 
Communist League of Yugoslavia.5 The actions were used to build public infrastructure 
as well as industrial infrastructure. An essentially agrarian society was industrialized 
and urbanized. A national health care system was developed. Standards of living rose 
dramatically in most regions until 1970. The literacy rate increased steadily, and the 
university system expanded.  
Despite common origins, the economy of  Yugoslavia  reversed significantly 
different from the economies of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist  
states, especially after the Yugoslav-Soviet break-up 1948 between Tito and Stalin.6  
Moreover, Yugoslav theoreticians began to formulate their own strains of Marxist 
thought and began to criticize the internal political and economic structure of the Soviet 
Union. Egalitarianism and populism became more of a principle rather than a political 
tool, contrary to the Soviet Union.7 It was at this point Yugoslavia began to 
economically develop differently than its socialist counterparts creating a unique form 
of decentralized market socialism based on workers’ self-management. Welcoming the 
Yugoslav-Soviet rift, the West commenced a flow of economic aid in 1949, covered 
                                                             
4 CEBALO, A. A Brief Economic Analysis of Yugoslavia. Blog Into the Rose Garden, 2013. Available 
in: <https://antoncebalo.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/a-brief-economic-analysis-of-the-yugoslav-
experiment/#comments> Access in: 04 Jun 2017. 
5 They were voluntary labor activities of young people in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
6 The Tito–Stalin Split, or Yugoslav–Soviet Split, was a strife between the two leaders.  Because of this 
conflict Yugoslavia, in 1948 was removed from the Communist Information Bureau. 
7 CEBALO, A. A Brief Economic Analysis of Yugoslavia. Into the Rose Garden, 2013. Available in: 
<https://antoncebalo.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/a-brief-economic-analysis-of-the-yugoslav-
experiment/#comments> Access in: 04 Jun. 2017 
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much of Yugoslavia's trade deficit for the next decade.8 After the death of Stalin and 
coming Khrushchev to power in 1953 relations were better but Yugoslavia was tried to 
be neutral. Many an East European citizen and communist apparatchik envied the 
Titoist, Yugoslav regime.  
In the 1950s, socialist self-management was introduced. "Factories to  workers" 
was the slogan of the decade. The basic law on the management of state-owned 
economic enterprises by the labor collectives was introduced to determine the 
participation of workers in the management of their own companies. This had reduced 
state-owned enterprises. The basic law decentralized planning, transforming it into local 
communities and employee advice and incorporating the principles of socialism or 
workers' self-management into all aspects of public life. The state retained control over 
the appointment of the company's director and the distribution of investment funds. It 
also maintained considerable de facto control over the economy. Managers of social 
enterprises were supervised by workers' councils, which consisted of all employees, 
with one voice. The Communist Party was organized in all companies, and the most 
influential members were members of the party, so managers were always appointed 
only with the consent of the party. 
While isolated from the superpowers, Yugoslavia strove to forge strong ties with 
Third World countries similarly interested in avoiding an alliance with East or West and 
the hard choice between communism and capitalism. Tito found common ground with 
Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser and India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 
and they worked together to organize a movement of Third World nations whose 
collective statements on international issues would carry greater weight than their 
individual voices. In 1961, Belgrade hosted the first major conference of the world's 
nonaligned nations. Tito gained further international attention as the chief leader of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. The NAM was the organization founded in Belgrade in 
1961 by India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; Indonesia's first president, 
Sukarno; Egypt's second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser; Ghana's first president 
Kwame Nkrumah; and Yugoslavia's president, Josip Broz Tito. It is a group of states, 
                                                             
8 Yugoslavia experienced the greatest per capita GDP growth out of all the Eastern Bloc economies in 
1950 despite GDP is not technically applicable or designed to measure planned economies.  
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which are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc.9 Due to 
Yugoslavia's non-alignment, Yugoslav companies carried out construction of numerous 
major infrastructural and industrial projects in Africa and Asia. Yugoslavia also 
established and maintained commercial relations with a large number of Third World 
countries. But trade with the underdeveloped countries never approached the level of 
trade with Western Europe or the Soviet Union (it will be further explained in 2.4.3 
Foreign Trade). In the 1980s, Yugoslav energy and machine-building industries were 
especially active in construction of electric power plants and hydroelectric stations, 
power transmission lines, irrigation systems, and other major construction projects in 
selected Third World countries.  In 1988 Yugoslav construction services abroad were 
valued at US$1 .4 billion. 
Urbanization was the most important trend in the post War Yugoslavia. The 
second one is the emigration. In the 50s, it was illegal. Economic expansion in Western 
Europe in the 1960s created a demand for labor that domestic labor supplies could not 
fil. Yugoslavia lifted emigration restrictions. Many Yugoslav guest workers and their 
dependents went to work in Western Europe, especially Western Germany. At the same 
time, Yugoslav industries could not absorb all the workers in the country's labor pool, 
including educated. The emigration was mainly caused by force deagrarization, 
deruralization and overpopulating of larger towns. 
By the early 1970s, Yugoslavia had Europe's second-highest emigration rate, 
and 20 percent of the country's labor force was employed abroad. In 1973 about 
1.1million, workers and dependents were living and working outside Yugoslavia's 
borders; 900,000 of these were living in Western Europe. In 1985, about 600,000 
Yugoslavs were working abroad, accompanied by about 400,000 dependents. Higher 
wages in West European countries at first attracted mostly city-dwelling, mature male 
Yugoslav workers with specific job skills. By the mid-1970s, the attraction had spread 
to peasants, unskilled workers, and women in rural areas. The out- flow of skilled 
workers slowed growth in a variety of Yugoslav industries. Hotels and restaurants in 
Yugoslav resort areas often faced seasonal shortages of trained caterers and waiters. 
About one-third of all guest workers were women, a proportion that corresponded to 
their share in Yugoslavia's overall domestic work force. However, striking disparities in 
                                                             
9 SUDETIC, Charls. Historical Settings, Postwar Yugoslavia. In: CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.). Yugoslavia: a 
country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 1990, p. 50.  
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the rates at which women emigrated from Yugoslavia's various regions reflected the 
influence of the country's ethnic diversity. Slightly more than 40 percent of all 
emigrants from Vojvodina and Slovenia were women, as were over a third of those 
from Serbia proper and Croatia. Women from Kosovo emigrated least; accounting for 
less than 5 percent of all emerges from that region. When former peasants and 
agricultural workers returned from abroad, most of them found new employment in 
nonagricultural sectors of the economy that demonstrates that they had acquired other 
skills and job experience during their years abroad. Returning guest workers unable to 
find work were entitled to some unemployment compensation if they paid into an 
unemployment compensation fund during their stay abroad.10 
In the 1970s, the economy was reorganized according to Edvard Kardelj‘s11 
theory of associated labour, in which the right to decision making and a share in profits 
of socially owned companies is based on the investment of labour. Large and medium-
sized enterprises were dissolved into smaller self-contained units called basic 
organizations of associated labor (BOALs). All industrial companies were transformed 
into organizations of associated labor. The smallest, basic organizations of associated 
labor, was roughly corresponded to a small company or a department in a large 
company. The basic organizations of associated labour were also introduced into public 
services, including health and education. The workers were organized into trade unions, 
which spanned across the country. Any worker or any group of workers could call 
strikes. Strikes for clear genuine grievances with no political motivation usually resulted 
in prompt replacement of the management and increase in pay or benefits.12 
One more very important thing what happened in the 1970s was the new 
constitution.  In the Yugoslavia proclaimed new constitution. It was the fourth and final 
constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With a new constitution it 
introduced a concept that the federal units exercised sovereign rights.  The federation 
had only the authority specifically transferred to it by the constitution. Each republic has 
                                                             
10 SUDETIC, Charls. The Society and its environment. In: CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.). Yugoslavia: a 
country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,1990, p. 104-105  
11 Edvard Kardelj was a Slovenian journalist, leading members of the Communist Party and main creator 
of the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management. 
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA Britannica. Available in: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Basic-Organization-of-
Associated-Labour> Access in: 01 Jul. 2017. 
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its own power and possibility of borrowing! 13The Socialist Republic of Serbia was 
unique among the six republics in having within itself two autonomous provinces 
Kosovo and Vojvodina (which received substantially increased autonomy, including de 
facto veto power in the Serbian parliament). They could change their own constitutions 
without the Republic’s consent. The result of this de facto confederalisation was a 
weakening of central federal power. This constitution is very important because it was 
later used as the legal basis for the breakup of Yugoslavia! 
In the end of that decade, the economy was hit by a severe increase in world 
petroleum prices. This advancement provoked existing inflation and foreign debt 
because Yugoslavia depended heavily on imported petroleum products. Still, 
Yugoslavia tried to overcome its balance of payments problems. The accent was put on 
stronger emphasis on output growth, foreign borrowing and increased spending 
(particularly on nonproductive investment and consumption). The result was a dramatic 
decline in living standards and rise in foreign indebtedness and inflation.  When 
petroleum prices rose again in 1979 and the world entered an economic recession, 
Yugoslavia could no longer afford to maintain its debt burden. Foreign loans became 
inaccessible, and inflation continued to climb.  Real earnings dropped 25% from 1975 
to 1980, further crushing the poorest regions. 14  In an effort to curb the domestic crisis, 
Yugoslavia began to take loans from all sides to boost infrastructure development and 
bring back production levels to their pre-crisis levels.15 
 
2.2 Organizations in communist Yugoslavia during the 1980’s 
 
2.2.1 League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
 
                                                             
13 It is one of the longest constitutions ever written anywhere. There is designated that Tito is President of 
the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia for life. All federal units were empowered to have 
presidents, collective presidencies, parliaments, ministries (including of foreign affairs), and wide 
competences in economic policy, social welfare and education. 
14 GOODRICH, Malinda K. The Economy. In: CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.). Yugoslavia: a country study. 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,1990 p. 131 
15 CEBALO, A. A Brief Economic Analysis of Yugoslavia. Blog Into the Rose Garden, 2013. Available 
in: <https://antoncebalo.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/a-brief-economic-analysis-of-the-yugoslav-
experiment/#comments> Access in: 15 Jun. 2017.  
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The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was established as the opposition 
party in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1919. In some periods it was 
acted illegally. It was also banned from 1921-1941. After the Second World War, it 
became the dominant and largest party in the country. It still exists in every former 
republic of Yugoslavia. The procedures and structure of the LCY remained largely 
unchanged during the 1980s. From 1983 until 1988, however, the number decreased 
slightly every year. About 5 percent of party members left voluntarily in the 1980s, and 
the percentage of worker and peasant members declined. In 1987, workers constituted 
only 30 percent of the total membership and 8 percent of the Central Committee, while 
peasants made up only 3.5 percent of total party membership. Increasing party elitism 
was indicated by the stable percentage of the intelligentsia, who depended on party 
membership for upward professional mobility. In the mid-1980s, some 95 percent of top 
managers and 77.6 percent of professionals in Yugoslavia were party members. In 1980, 
only 25 percent of party membership was younger than twenty-seven. Studies and 
surveys in the 1980s showed that most Yugoslavs, whether party members or 
nonmembers, viewed the LCY as a practical avenue to success, not as a leading force in 
the ideology or ethics of the nation. Many LCY members did not participate in political 
activities, and power positions remained in the same hands for long periods. Slobodan 
Milosevic used the presidency of the Serbian presidium in the late 1980s as a platform 
to advocate Serbian nationalism and recentralization of party and state institutions. 
Approval by the Slovenian and Croatian central committees for multiparty local 
elections in 1990 signaled a major breakthrough toward a true multiparty system in 
those republics and the purging of provincial party leaders in Vojvodina and Kosovo 
under pressure from the Serbian party in 1988 marked a turning point in Serbia's 
struggle to reassert control over its two provinces. Thus in 1990 the LCY was 
decentralized in exercising authority but increasingly elitist in terms of who occupied 
positions of power in the party organizations.16 
 
2.2.2 The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia and Trade Unions  
 
                                                             
16 CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.) Yugoslavia: a country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress,1990, p. 192-193 
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The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia was the largest and 
most influential mass organization in Yugoslavia from 1945 through 1990. In 1990, its 
membership was thirteen million. The political purpose of this national organization, 
sponsored by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, was to involve as many people 
as possible in activities on the party agenda, without the restrictions and negative 
connotations of direct party control. SAWPY also was chartered as a national arbitration 
forum for competing cross- regional interests.17 Like the LCY Central Committee, the 
SAWPY conference established departments to formulate policy recommendations in 
areas such as economics, education, and sociopolitical relations. Coordinating 
committees were also active in interregional consultation on policy and mass political 
action. In Slovenia, the Socialist Alliance of Working People became an umbrella 
organization for a number of nonparty organizations with political interests, beginning 
in 1988. On a lesser scale similar changes occurred in other republics.18  
The Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia was a party-dominated mass 
organization. It had the constitutional directive of protecting the rights of workers and 
preserving the self- management system. Beside that it role was also to inspect selection 
of delegates to the Federal Assembly from economic enterprises and of delegates to the 
management bodies of those enterprises. The structure of the confederation was the 
same as that of the party and SAWPY, but the ruling body was different. 19 The national 
heads of the Yugoslav trade unions and the presidents of regional trade union councils 
held seats on the presidium of the council.  
In the 1980s, membership in trade unions was officially voluntary, but most 
workers were members and had dues deducted directly from their pay. Trade union 
officials usually were LCY members and because the self-management system had no 
evident division between employers and employees, officials had relatively little 
responsibility. Their one official function was to nominate members of workers' 
councils.20 
                                                             
17 The committee incorporated members from the party, trade unions, the armed forces, the Youth League 
of Yugoslavia, and other national organizations. 
18 CIA. The World Factbook, 1999. 
19 The Council of the Confederation did not allot positions according to ethnic or regional quotas. 
20 CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.) Yugoslavia: a country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress,1990, p. 192-193 
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The idea of a strike in a self-management system was theoretically 
contradictory, because technically workers would be striking against themselves. Strikes 
were relatively rare until the late 1970s, and they were figurative called "work 
stoppages” and officially were neither legal nor illegal. The reforms introduced in 
January 1990 officially declared the workers' right to strike. In 1987, 1988, and 1989, 
government-imposed income freezes set off waves of major strikes, each lasting several 
weeks. In the first nine months of 1987 alone, 1,000 strikes were called, involving over 
150,000 workers. The 1989 strikes involved over 900,000 workers. Demands usually 
included higher pay and often the replacement of management as well. Traditionally, 
trade union officials opposed strikes; but in the late 1980s, they modified this stand. In 
1985, some union leaders broke tradition by suggesting that when workers' demands 
were justified and no other solution existed, the trade union should take the lead in 
organizing a strike. As of early 1990, no union had taken such action, however, and 
many union officials remained on record as opposing strikes.  
 
2.2.3 Youth League of Yugoslavia and Veterans’ Association 
 
The Youth League of Yugoslavia was the training organization for future 
members of the LCY, SAWPY and the trade unions. It was patterned after the Soviet 
model of youth indoctrination organizations. In the 1980s, it experienced divided 
leadership, poor support from the party, and dwindling membership. The very high 
youth unemployment rate of the late 1980s made the indoctrination of young socialists. 
The proportion of nonparticipating members doubled between 1981 and 1986. Slovenia, 
where only five per- cent of youth expressed a desire to become party members in 1986, 
had the lowest figure for the period. The youth league exerted little influence on state or 
party politics. However, in 1989 the Slovenian branch of the organization announced 
plans for transformation into a new political party with mass support, in time for the 
1990 Slovenian parliamentary elections. It was actually a transitional election leading to 
the country's first fully democratic election on 6 December 1992, by which time 
Slovenia had already gained its independence.  
The Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War was 
an aging, dwindling group of former World War II Partisans. The assemblies of local 
and republic governments designated seats for its representatives.  They always used 
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Tito as a prestigious lever for centralizing party control.  In the 1980s, The Federation 
of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War espoused the view that 
modern Yugoslavia had degenerated since the early days of struggle and that new 
leadership was needed.  Although by 1990 few figures of its generation and viewpoint 
remained in national politics, this federation retained considerable influence in the first 
post-Tito decade. 
 
 2.3 Decline of the Yugoslav economy in the 80s and early 90s 
 
The inefficiency of the national political system was masked until 1980 by the 
charisma of Tito, who tried to equalize the political power of the republics, minimizing 
the potential for domination by one republic that might stimulate others to secede from 
the federation. On fourth of May 1980 Tito died. The 1980s was the decade of the 
culmination of the crisis, when Yugoslavia’s internal economic and sociopolitical 
problems and changes in the global environment reached the point. In 1982, the new 
Yugoslav government was faced with a serious economic crisis. In 1983, the national 
sense of crisis was very strong.21 In the 1980-1990 period, the average rate of growth of 
national income was 0.7 per cent, one of the worst performance in Europe. Labour 
productivity started to fall sharply. Investment declined by between 6% and 7% 
annually. All this was happening against the background of the country’s rising 
international debt and as the conditions in international financial markets significantly 
changed, compared to the 1970s. When it comes to the other economic indicators, such 
as household income, inflation, or unemployment, the situation was not rosy in the last 
ten years of Tito's rule either. Despite the pumping of huge amounts of foreign funds 
into the country, household income declined sharply in the second half of the 1970s. 
Two-digit numbers measured the annual inflation rate, and a few years before Tito’s 
death, it accelerates and reaches 40% per year. Despite the departure of over 1.1 million 
(or 20% of the workforce) Yugoslavs to temporary work abroad, the unemployment rate 
                                                             
21 About the Sergej Kraigher Commission Report from 1983: “It was evidence that even in 1983 most 
Yugoslav politicians agreed in theory that development of a market economy was necessary to 
restimulate growth throughout the country. However, in practice this would have meant a drastic 
reduction in the policy-making role of the LCY, hence a total repudiation of the Tito legacy. Free 
enterprise also would mean that government agencies at all levels would lose their control of economic 
affairs. For these reasons, market reform met strong institutional resistance”. Available in: 
<http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-14884.html> Access in: 01 Aug. 2017. 
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climbed from slightly below 8% to about 13% from 1970 to 1980. 22  Such growth rates 
of unemployment and economic emigration are characterized as a sign of a deep 
recession in economic literature.  
The crisis of the 1980s is usually referred to as a ‘debt’ crisis. The collapse of 
the Yugoslav economy was partially caused by its part in non-aligned movement that 
had resulted in access to loans from both superpower blocs. The first sign that the 
robustness of the Yugoslav economy was an illusion appeared immediately after Tito's 
death. The 1980s were marked by constant delays of the beginning of the repayment 
period for Yugoslavia's maturing external debt due to the financial weakness of the 
economy.  
In 1991, Yugoslavia had about $20 billion of external debt. Before that, the 
International Monetary Fund reduced Yugoslavia’s total debt by $1.8 billion because 
the country simply did not have the means to return the interest, let alone the principal. 
What preceded this outcome? This outcome was preceded by several decades of 
building an economy whose structure was such that its survival depended on a constant 
increase in foreign debt an addict economy.  The graph below shows the total debt of 
Yugoslavia from 1961 to 1980 and the line that approximates the trend in total debt. 
The line has an exponential shape and it approximates the actual debt in the period 
1961-1980 quite well. According to this trend, the total debt increased by about 17.6% 
annually in the twenty-year period. That this growth trend continued after 1980, the 
total debt would now be around $6 trillion. When we consider that the total annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) of all the former Yugoslav republics together is now around 
$200 billion, the astronomical size of that potential debt becomes clear. This also clearly 
shows that the growth of debt that was recorded between 1961 and 1980 was simply 
unsustainable. This, of course, does not mean that the current debt of the former 
Yugoslav Republics is favorable and that their state economic policies are in good 
shape. It just means that it was unrealistic to hope that the Yugoslav debt could have 
                                                             
22 RAJSIC, P. The Economy of Tito's Yugoslavia: Delaying the Inevitable Collapse. Mises.ca, Mar. 2014. 
Available in: <https://www.mises.ca/the-economy-of-titos-yugoslavia-delaying-the-inevitable-collapse/ > 
Access in: 14 Jul. 2017.  
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remained at the level of $20 billion without serious structural changes and reductions in 
consumption.23 
 
Graph 1 – External Debt of Yugoslavia, 1961-1980 in Billions of Dollars. 
Available in : <https://www.mises.ca/the-economy-of-titos-yugoslavia-
delaying-the-inevitable-collapse/> Access in : 14 Jul. 2017. 
 
While these numbers offer a potential explanation for the collapse of the 
Yugoslav economy in the 1980s, an exponential growth in total debt would not 
necessarily lead to a collapse, if the borrowing period was limited and its purpose was 
investment in projects that would bring about increased productivity in the future and 
thus facilitate successful repayment of the debt. Unfortunately, this was not the case in 
the former Yugoslavia. The mere fact that the Yugoslav economy spent at least twenty 
years under the conditions of external debt growth of over 17% per year, suggests that 
the structure of the economy had formed in such a way that the future survival of the 
economy depended on the future enlargement of the debt. To understand why the 
Yugoslav debt rose at an increasing pace and why it was unsustainable, it is necessary 
to analyze the chronology of the trade balance and productivity indicators of the former 
                                                             
23 RAJSIC, P. The Economy of Tito's Yugoslavia: Delaying the Inevitable Collapse. Mises.ca, Mar. 2014. 
Available in: <https://www.mises.ca/the-economy-of-titos-yugoslavia-delaying-the-inevitable-collapse/ > 
Access in: 14 Jul. 2017. 
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Yugoslavia. 24 If we look at the overall Yugoslav trade deficit during the 1970s, we find 
that it was growing rapidly between 1970 and 1980. Moreover, the deficit was growing 
even faster than the Yugoslav foreign debt. 25A part of this difference was covered by 
remittances of Yugoslav emigrants. For example, the total remittances of 
emigrants were $1.3 billion in 1971, while they amounted to $2.1 billion 1972. 
However, even the inflow of foreign currency through foreign loans and remittances of 
emigrants was not enough to cover the entire trade deficit and prevent the outflow of 
foreign currency from Yugoslavia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
24 The trade balance is a macroeconomic indicator of the relative size of imports and exports of a country. 
If the trade balance is close to zero, this means that the imports and exports are approximately equal. If 
the trade balance is positive, the country exports more than it imports, and we say that there is a trade 
surplus, and if the balance is negative, the imports are higher than exports and the country runs a trade 
deficit.  
25 When the economy of a country is in a trade surplus, foreign currency (which the importers use to buy 
those exports) accumulates in the exporting country. On the other hand, there is an outflow of foreign 
currency (used to pay for the imports) from a country whose economy is in a trade deficit. Countries that 
have consistently negative trade balances must borrow from foreign lenders to compensate for the lack of 
foreign currency. It is not hard to see why this situation is unsustainable in the long run, that is, it is 
sustainable only as long as foreign creditors want to lend money to the debtor country.  
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Graph 2 – Cumulative Trade Deficit and Total External Debt of 
Yugoslavia, 1970-1980. Available in : <https://www.mises.ca/the-
economy-of-titos-yugoslavia-delaying-the-inevitable-collapse/> 
Access in : 14 Jul. 2017. 
 
Measured as a percentage of the GDP, the total trade deficit of Yugoslavia 
between 1970 and 1980 increased from just below 10% to around 50% of GDP. The 
figure of 50% is not necessarily worrying in itself, but the growing trade deficit in 
relation to GDP with no signs of slowing down indicates a worrying trend. This is 
another indication that the structure of the Yugoslav economy was such that the stability 
of the whole economy depended on the inflow of foreign funds for which there was no 
coverage in the domestic production! The structure of the Yugoslav trade deficit was 
such that the imports were mainly oil and raw materials. This structure of production 
does not promise an increase in productivity in the future, which would cover the past 
trade deficit and that could be used to pay off debts. Moreover, although the total 
volume of production at the level of the Yugoslav economy grew because more 
resources were used, the productivity per unit of invested resources was decreasing in 
most industries during the sixties and seventies. With such reduced productivity, the 
chances of a successful repayment of the foreign debt in the future were nil.  The 
structure of production in which money for buying raw materials and fuel is borrowed 
ceases to be viable when the source of credit dries up, and, in the case of Yugoslavia, 
this happened in the early 1980s. The Yugoslav economy was then left without external 
"fuel" and, over the next decade, which was marked by postponing the repayment of 
foreign debts, this became painfully evident. Not only that the Yugoslav economy did 
not have the capacity to repay existing debts, but also its capacity to function in an 
undiminished size was dependent on new borrowing. 26 
Another important indicator of decline beside the very high external debt was 
inflation. Inflation continued to rise during the 1980s. In 1987, it had reached 150 
percent annually and by early 1989, it had reached 1,000 percent. In the same period, 
foreign debt rose, unemployment remained high, living standards fell, and regional 
economic disparities widened. In May 1988, the Yugoslav government response to the 
deteriorating economic situation has been, firstly, a series of economic reforms designed 
                                                             
26 RAJSIC, P. The Economy of Tito's Yugoslavia: Delaying the Inevitable Collapse. Mises.ca, Mar. 
2014. Available in: <https://www.mises.ca/the-economy-of-titos-yugoslavia-delaying-the-inevitable-
collapse/ > Access in: 14 Jul. 2018. 
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to transform the system of social ownership, and self-management, and to improve the 
operation of both labor and capital markets; and secondly, an IMF-style anti-
inflationary program designed to enforce a hard budget constraint and reduce 
inflationary wage pressures. The government signed an agreement with the IMF that 
provided new foreign loans and rescheduled the debt, in return for which the 
government agreed to cut inflation by carefully limiting expansion of domestic bank 
credits. This was the first attempt in Yugoslavia when government used monetary 
policy to control inflation.27 
A new government in March 1989, was headed by Ante Marković28. He was 
known as a pragmatic reformist who “favor market-oriented reforms.” The same year he 
went to Washington to meet with President George H. W. Bush. The plan was to 
negotiate a new financial aid package. In return for assistance, Yugoslavia agreed to 
even more sweeping economic reforms, which included a new devalued currency, 
another wage freeze, sharp cuts in government spending, and the elimination of socially 
owned, worker-managed companies. Big industrial companies led to several large 
bankrupt (mostly of large factories), which only increased the public perception that the 
economy is in a deep crisis. It was the end to the self-management system and 
associated labor. The IMF-style austerity program stood little chance of success.  Its 
immediate effect was a sharp drop in demand and imports, which further lowered the 
levels of output and aggravated the economic and political crisis. The impact was 
particularly severe in the less-developed parts of the country. There were significant 
implications for the overall social and political atmosphere. Mutual recriminations 
among republics over alleged exploitation and growing ethnic and cultural intolerance 
within populations faced with severe economic hardship beyond anything experienced 
thus far. By the end of 1989, inflation reached 1,000%. Yugoslavia entered a period of 
hyperinflation.  It soon began printing large amounts of Yugoslav dinar banknotes, 
created a new note of 2,000,000 Yugoslav dinars in 1989. On New Year's Eve 1989, 
Ante Markovic introduced his program of economic reforms. Ten thousand Dinars 
                                                             
27 BARTLETT, Will. Economic reform, unemployment and labour market policy in Yugoslavia. MOCT-
MOST Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, n. 3, 1991.  
28 Ante Markovic was the last Prime Minister of Yugoslavia. He became prime minister in March 1989. 
He owed his popularity to his image of a new, modern Western-styled politician. He had become popular 
among those who wanted Yugoslavia to be transformed into a modern, democratic federation. He 
remained in office even after the start of the war, only to resign in December 1991, isolated and without 
any authority. 
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became one "New Dinar", pegged to the German Mark at the rate of seven New Dinars 
for one Mark.  The sudden end of inflation brought some relief to the banking system. 
Ownership and exchange of foreign currency was deregulated which, combined with a 
realistic exchange rate, attracted foreign currency to the banks. However, by the late 
1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear that the federal government was effectively 
losing the power to implement its program.  In this last stage of Yugoslavia’s existence, 
it became obvious that the long process of economic disintegration and fragmentation of 
the federal administrative structure had left in place very little in the way of any 
functioning mechanism that could keep the country together.29 
 
2.4 Structure of the Economy  
 
 
2.4.1 Characteristics of the labour market, unemployment and regional development 
policy  
 
Despite the pioneering attempts by Yugoslav policy makers to introduce 
elements of a market system into a planned economy, the socialist "market" in 
Yugoslavia had its own specific system. Five main features which have been 
characteristic of the Yugoslav labour market are: 1)  a high degree of employment 
security in self-managed firms; 2) an excessive reliance on the development of an 
industrial structure based upon large firms as the main unit of employment and an 
absence of a flexible small scale sector; 3) over-industrialization and a comparative 
neglect of services; 4) a distorted wage structure combining excessive egalitarianism in 
some dimensions with a high degree of wage dispersion in others and 5) high and 
increasing levels of unemployment especially among  young, educated entrants to the 
labour market!30 
Self-management was the first characteristic of the labour market. The system 
has been built on a structure of social ownership, and self-managed firms. A job 
security was guaranteed to employed workers. Employment policy has been geared 
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30 BARTLETT, Will. Economic reform, unemployment and labour market policy in Yugoslavia. MOCT-
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towards the artificial stimulation of employment through the planned imposition of 
employment growth targets for social sector enterprises. This has operated through self-
management planning agreements between enterprises and the local and republican state 
authorities, and has led to widespread overemployment and a large surplus labour force 
within enterprises, estimated at between 20% and 50% of the workforce.  At the same 
time, the system of social ownership has led to a widespread alienation of the 
workforce, as the system of "social ownership" has left property rights ill-defined and 
has largely failed to provide workers with a clear sense of identity with their own firms. 
Over-employment, alienation of the labour force, and the absence of a capital market 
have all contributed to the steady decline in labour productivity which has been 
experienced since the mid-1970s, and contributed to the persistent nature of the 
economic crisis. The second characteristic of the Yugoslav labour market is that most 
workers have been employed in very large firms. In 1981, for example, the largest 50 
industrial firms in Yugoslavia accounted for 31% of employment and 53% of industrial 
sales. An international comparison shows that the industrial market structure has been 
highly concentrated: the largest 100 firms in Yugoslavia in 1981 accounted for 43% of 
industrial employment, compared to 23% in the United States and 17% in West 
Germany.31 The third characteristic of the Yugoslav labour market has been the skewed 
structure of economic activity, with an over-emphasis on industrial employment and a 
relative neglect of services. Of particular importance has been the neglect of the 
development of "knowledge-intensive producer services", in which less than 5% of the 
social sector labour force were employed in 1989. The low level of development of the 
service sector is at the same time one of the causes of the poor performance of the 
Yugoslav economy and a potential source of future economic development and 
employment opportunities. Fourthly, low levels of labour mobility have been brought 
about by the inflexibility of employment contracts, which make it hard for enterprises to 
shed redundant labour. There was also a low level of inter-republican labour migration 
and contributed to the increase in national tension within Yugoslav society. At the same 
time, wage differentials within firms have been very narrow; leading to claims that 
excessive egalitarianism has dissimulated effort, and contributed to the overall decline 
                                                             
31 SACKS, Stephen R. Self-management and Efficiency: Large Corporations in Yugoslavia. London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1983 
38 
 
in productivity.32  Finally, and perhaps most spectacularly for an avowedly socialist 
economy, high and increasing levels of unemployment especially affecting young, 
educated entrants to the labour market! The large surplus labour force has contributed to 
the political pressure on firms to adopt indiscriminate programmes of job-creation, 
which have maintained employment growth in the social sector. These policies have 
not, however, succeeded in reducing unemployment, but have induced a great increase 
in the number of workers prepared to wait in the wings for a job opportunity to be 
created for them, and has contributed to rural-urban migration and an exodus of the 
most enterprising sections of the labour force from the countryside.33 
In the late 1980s, unemployment was a major problem for Yugoslavia.  Certain 
factors interacted to raise unemployment in that period. After World War II, peasants 
made up about four-fifths of the population. Most of them increasingly were forced into 
the cities to seek jobs. They wanted improved earning potential, better health care, and 
pensions. Two government policies stimulated this movement.  Like other communist 
countries, which followed traditional Marxist development patterns, Yugoslavia 
concentrated investments in heavy industry. The capital was directing away from 
agriculture and further impoverishing the peasants and the policy of discouraging 
nonfarm private business. Marxist ideology obliged social sector enterprises to absorb 
extra labor, even if it meant redundancy and decreases in labor productivity. Between 
1975 and 1988, labor distribution remained relatively stable among the major enterprise 
categories (see table 2). During that period, over 1 million Yugoslavs worked abroad, 
and up to 25 percent of the workers employed in the productive social sector at home 
were classified as surplus labor; nevertheless, more than 1.2 million people were 
registered as unemployed in 1988. This was about one-sixth of the total working-age 
population of Yugoslavia that year. Several factors caused inaccuracies in such figures, 
however. Deficit Yugoslav enterprises often were supported by the government and 
prevented from going into bankruptcy; workers in the social sector rarely lost their jobs 
before the reforms of 1990.  Yugoslav unemployment statistics were based on the 
number of people who registered with the government as job seekers in the social 
sector.  Therefore, a large proportion of job seekers in the 1980s were young people. In 
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1988, over 92 percent of the unemployed were under age forty, and nearly 57 percent 
were under age thirty. Yugoslav unemployment also tended to be long term: according 
to official statistics for 1988, although almost one-quarter of the unemployed were able 
to find work in less than six months, almost 62 percent were without a job for over one 
year, many for more than three years. A third characteristic of Yugoslav unemployment 
was the large regional difference in unemployment rates. In 1986, Slovenia was at 
virtually full employment while the underdeveloped province of Kosovo had more than 
one job seeker for every two workers employed in the social sector. 34 
Enterprise  Category  1975  1985  1988  
Manufacturing and mining 1,819  2,529  2,716  
Agriculture and fishing  177  233  246  
Construction 492  608  584  
Transport and communications 346  441  459  
Commerce 476  641  676  
Handicrafts 170  254  278  
Education and culture 354  429  449  
Health and social welfare 239  376  420  
TOTAL 4,758  6,516  6,884  
 Table 2 – Employment in Selected Enterprise Categories, 1975, 1985 and 1988 (in thousands of 
workers) Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1989, Belgrade, 
1990, p. 144. 
 
Unemployment also has an uneven regional dimension in Yugoslavia, with 
comparatively low unemployment rates observed in the more developed northern 
republics where unemployment rates in 1989 were as low as 2.5% in Slovenia and 7.9% 
in Croatia. As can be seen from Table 3, below unemployment rates in other republics 
were already extremely high by 1989, especially in Kosovo where it reached an 
incredible 36.6% of the social sector workforce. To a certain extent, these data reflect 
the uneven regional distribution of social sector employment, which is the base for 
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calculating the unemployment rates. 35  In addition, the variation in the growth of the 
level of unemployment is shown in Table 3 and provides another indicator that the 
regional distribution of unemployment is not quite as favorable to the northern republics 
as appears from the crude unemployment rate data.  Between 1984 and 1989, the 
highest percentage increase in unemployment was observed in Slovenia, where 
unemployment increased by 39.4%, whilst in Vojvodina the level of unemployment had 
actually been falling. Nevertheless, Kosovo, the poorest region in Yugoslavia, has had a 
uniformly bad experience with high growth of unemployment combined with a high 
unemployment rate. 
  1984  
number 
1988  
number 
1988        
(% rate) 
Growth   
  (%) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
220,284 257,271 19.51 16.79 
Montenegro 34,881 43,001 20.88 23.28 
Croatia 114,008 134,555 7.87 18.02 
Macedonia 128,334 140,252 21.40 9.29 
Slovenia 15,309 21,342 2.50 39.41 
Serbia 268,065 311,516 15.38 16.21 
Kosovo 101,178 133,715 36.58 32.16 
Vovodina 92,728 90,112 12.62 -2.85  
Table 3 – Regional unemployment disparities. Source: Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije, 1989. 
 
The regional development policy was a critical factor in disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, it involved a complex interplay of economic, political, 
social, cultural and historical factors, which made the officially declared goal of the 
reduction of the enormous inherited economic disparities and social inequalities among 
the Yugoslav nations very difficult to achieve. The problems of uneven development 
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were presented  not only between ‘North’ and ‘South’ but also between individual 
republics and autonomous provinces and within them which made a coherent regional 
development policy extremely difficult to conceive and implement.36 Slovenia, Croatia, 
and most of Serbia indicate high technology in building production capacity and 
attracting foreign investment. On the other side are the less developed southern regions, 
especially Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia. There are emphasized 
traditional, labor-intensive, low-paying economic activity such as textile manufacture, 
agriculture, and handicrafts. This contrast made sharp differences in employment, 
investment, income potential, and social services among the political units of the 
federation. Principally in Kosovo and Macedonia, poor economic and social conditions 
provoked longstanding ethnic antipathy. In the 1980s there periodically ignited 
uprisings. One of the reasons was, because aver- age personal income per social sector 
worker in Macedonia was half that of a similar worker in Slovenia. In the meantime, the 
federal government still try to direct the earnings of Slovenia and Croatia into its Fund 
for Underdeveloped Regions. The Slovenes were especially disturbed by this. Croatia 
threatened similar action. They had to pay 20 percent of the republic's income to 
sponsor nonproductive enterprises in other republics. This issue was one of the reasons 
for Slovenians secession later. In 1990 Slovenian leaders, announced curtailment of 
their contribution to the Fund for Underdeveloped Regions because they had lost hope 
that the mismanaged central government would ever invest their earnings profitably.  
The lack of coherent regional policy was partly responsible for the systematic 
undermining of the overall productivity performance of the Yugoslav economy. Instead 
of looking at the needs and problems of the less-developed regions, regional policy de 
jure focused on the political center’s notion of what was good for the development of 
the country as a whole and de facto represented little more than a pay-off to keep the 
political bosses in the poorer regions minimally happy. All this reflected the dominant 
political influence of the developed republics at the center. To conclude, regional 
development policy failed to fulfil its goals or indeed provide any force of cohesion in a 
country of pronounced regional diversity.37 
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2.4.2 Industry  
 
As it presented in the 2.1 part of this chapter, Yugoslav development policy after 
the World War II emphasized growth in the industrial sector. In the First Five-Year 
Plan, the accent was on high rate of investment in industry. At that time, there was 
famous a slogan "heavy industry at any cost." All means of production were completely 
nationalized. That lasted until 1990 when privatization began. The industry was 
concentrated in the traditional manufacturing regions.38 The industrial branches like oil 
and gas extraction and refining and manufacture of machinery for electric power 
generation, transport equipment, chemicals, and electric power were the fastest growing. 
These branches received high priority because their production levels were very low at 
the end of World War II. In the beginning of the 1960s s, industrial policy stressed 
greater national investment in the underdeveloped economies of Montenegro and 
Macedonia (locating new manufacturing facilities closer to sources of raw materials. 
This caused discontent in much richer northern republics especially Slovenia and 
Croatia, because they contributed large shares to the national investment program.39 
From 1976-80 lasted the fifth five-year plan what promoted primary production. 
In all energy production sectors, the development and exploration of oil and gas 
accelerated. This was intensified in order to reduce the dependence of country on 
imported fuels and reduce the effect of the oil crisis in the seventies. This step was also 
a prerequisite for further growth in high-energy industries, such as iron and steel, non-
ferrous metallurgy and chemicals. In the late seventies, the renewed commitment to 
self-sustainability in black and non-ferrous metallurgy was based on the exploitation 
and processing of domestic raw materials. Greater attention is paid to the machinery 
industry that produced the capital equipment necessary for the development of heavy 
industry. 
The cost was a serious unequal in economic development (see graph 3 and 4). 
This the Yugoslav government was still trying to fix in 1990.  
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Graph 3 – Gross National Product (GNP) by Sector, 1975. Source: Based on information 
from Yugoslavia, Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije, 1989, Belgrade, 1990, p. 101. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4 – Gross National Product (GNP) by Sector, 1988. Source: Based on information 
from Yugoslavia, Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije, 1989, Belgrade, 1990, p. 101. 
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Unlike other East European countries, Yugoslavia had no centralized foreign 
trade plan, nor was trade controlled by a central foreign trade ministry or a small 
number of state trading organizations. As early as 1961, new foreign exchange and 
foreign trade policies stressed liberalization and decentralization. The driving 
motivation of the reform of 1965 was to bring Yugoslavia into the world market. 
Although the government encouraged production for export, enterprises themselves 
took part in making trade policy.  The Law on Associated Labor of 1976 established 
self-managed communities of interest for foreign economic relations in each republic 
and province. Those organizations determined what goods their jurisdiction should 
import. This meant removal of foreign trade barriers and open economic competition 
with foreign enterprises.40  
Trade in the 1970s was greatly influenced by Yugoslavia's dependence on oil 
imports and a worsening balance of payments. The Yugoslav Bank for International 
Economic Cooperation YBIEC was established in 1979 to provide financial support for 
foreign transactions. Owned by over 300 major capital goods and services exporters, the 
YBIEC’s main responsibility was to extend export credit and insurance to exporters and 
joint ventures. 41 Increases in world oil prices in 1973 and 1979 accelerated import 
costs, whereas export growth was slow. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) failed to 
transfer emphasis to technologically advanced industries able to replace imports and 
expand exports. Balance of payments constraints slowed domestic activity in 1972- 81. 
In addition, the world recession at the end of the 1970s caused net interest payments on 
foreign debts to increase considerably, net receipts from Yugoslavs working abroad to 
decline, and foreign lenders to withdraw. Because the only way to shift the debt was to 
increase exports, the slogan adopted for trade policy in the 1980s was "export by any 
means." Exports accelerated, and prices for them dropped. By 1986, the Yugoslav trade 
deficit with the EEC had dropped to US$1 billion from its 1980 level of US$4 billion.  
However, this drop was more a function of decreased non-oil imports, required to 
conserve hard currency reserves, than of increased exports. Trade with the industrialized 
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West dropped sharply in the mid-1980s, from a 55.6 percent share in 1978 to 43.3 
percent in 1984. During this period, debt owed to Western Europe reached 60 percent of 
the total Yugoslav debt. Yugoslavia's exports in the late 1980s consisted mainly of 
manufactured goods and simple processed goods. Over one quarter of goods sold 
abroad were machinery and transportation equipment (see table 4).42 
 
Commodity 1986 1987 1988 
Food and live animals  341 680 2,455 
Nonfuel crude materials 171 435 1,801 
Mineral fuels and lubricants 80 170 520 
Chemicals 478 996 2,982 
Textiles 151 326 1,326 
Iron and steel  153 524 2,014 
Nonferrous metals 189 519 2,113 
Machinery and transport equipment  1,381 2,683 5,127 
Table 4 – Value of Selected Exports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 (in billions of dinars). Source: 
Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1990. 
 
This was a relatively high proportion of sophisticated exports, considering that 
among European nations Yugoslavia ranked low in per capita income. Main export 
customers were Italy, the Soviet Union, France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the United 
States, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Live horses and meat 
products were Yugoslavia's most important agricultural exports. The largest single meat 
export, veal, was shipped primarily to Greece. Meat export declined in the late 1970s 
because of EEC trade barriers, a rise in domestic meat consumption, and feed shortages; 
but between 1985 and 1987, total meat product exports more than doubled, rising well 
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beyond the 1980 level. Yugoslavia ran trade deficits in merchandise of US$1.5 billion 
in 1985, US$2.2 billion in 1986, US$1.4 billion in 1987, and US$619 million in 1988.43 
Throughout the postwar period, Yugoslavia was a net importer of raw materials, 
fuels, iron and steel products, and capital equipment (see table 5).  
Commodity 1986 1987 1988 
Food and live animals  296 529 2,126 
Nonfuel crude materials 483 877 3,765 
Mineral fuels and lubricants 925 1,659 6,055 
Chemicals 707 1,553 5,958 
Textiles 152 363 1,087 
Iron and steel  292 508 1,650 
Machinery and transport equipment  1,483 2,904 9,340 
Table 5 – Value of Selected Imports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 (in billions of dinars). Source: Based 
on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1990. 
 
Chief suppliers of petroleum products were the Soviet Union, Iraq, Libya, and 
Algeria. Machinery and transportation equipment, also imported in large amounts, came 
principally from West Germany, Italy, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and 
Czechoslovakia. In the category of raw materials other than petroleum, Yugoslavia 
bought oilseeds and coal from the United States; wool from Australia; cotton, coal, and 
iron from the Soviet Union; and cotton from Egypt.  
Yugoslavia's trade policy followed the complete realignment of its foreign 
policy after expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. By the 1960s, structural reform and 
entry into the international market had broken down many economic and social barriers 
between Yugoslavia and the outside world. Although the Soviet Union remained 
Yugoslavia's largest trading partner throughout the 1980s, the emergence in 1986 of 
West Germany as Yugoslavia's top source of imports typified increased emphasis on 
trade with Western Europe (see table 6). Beginning in the 1980s, Yugoslavia traded 
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with developing countries more selectively than it had in previous decades, when the 
Yugoslav economy was abler to absorb the commercial losses associated with such 
ventures. Yugoslavia's growing trade deficit greatly influenced its trade with Western 
industrialized nations in the 1980s. Many measures were adopted to cut all but essential 
imports from the West and encourage import-substituting domestic industries. But the 
import of expensive Western technology often was a prerequisite for establishing such 
industries.44 
Country Imports Exports 
Austria 1,569 1,127 
Czechoslovakia 1,183 1,380 
France 1,450 1,281 
Iraq 1,642 1,034 
Italy 3,582 4,922 
Poland 1,134 1,283 
Soviet Union 4,569 6,145 
United States 1,901 1,892 
West Germany 5,898 3,728 
Other 11,449 10,089 
TOTAL 34,377 32,881 
Table 6 – Principal Trading Partners, 1988 (in billions of dinars). Source: 
Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1990. 
As it was presented in part 2.1, Yugoslavia also established and maintained 
commercial relations with a large number of third world countries. Still, trade with 
underdeveloped countries has never been at the level of trade with Western Europe or 
the Soviet Union. One example is trade with Iraq, the largest partner of Yugoslavia from 
the Third World countries. The total volume of trade with this country, in 1987, was 
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about sixty-six in the Soviet Union and one-fifth with West Germany. Between 1979 
and 1987, imports and exports to Third World countries declined slightly as part of the 
total Yugoslav total value.  
In the 1980s, two factors increasingly defined Yugoslavia's trade policy with the 
Third World: the need for hard currency and the need to limit dependency on Soviet oil 
by keeping other channels open. Both considerations encouraged commercial activity 
with oil- rich countries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Algeria, Angola, and Indonesia. 
Because those countries also sold oil to the West, they were able to pay their Yugoslav 
partners in hard currency.45 
 
2.4.4 Banking, Federal Revenue and Spending  
 
Almost all financial assets and savings in Yugoslavia were held in banks or kept 
in cash in the form of dinars or foreign currency. The financial institutions within 
Yugoslavia included the central banking system, which consisted of the National Bank 
of Yugoslavia and the national banks of the six republics and two autonomous 
provinces. The central banking system was responsible for planning and implementing 
monetary policies. The self-managed business or basic banks carried on day-to-day 
commercial banking activities. They were local or regional organizations that were 
nominally controlled by their founding local enterprises or communities of interest. In 
reality, because bank managers were politically appointed, they were heavily influenced 
by local party and government organizations.  All banks were required to be members 
of the Yugoslav Banking Association (YBA). The function of the YBA was to initiate 
and organize cooperation among member banks through self-management agreements. 
The reforms of January 1990, however, gave the National Bank of Yugoslavia more 
control over the operations and policies of commercial banks. Only member basic 
organizations and their workers were allowed to deposit in internal banks.46 
Most federal revenue was collected in the form of turnover taxes and 
assessments by local and federal self-management communities of interest, which had 
                                                             
45 CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.) Yugoslavia: a country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress,1990, p. 220 
46 GOODRICH, Malinda K. The Economy. In: CURTIS, Glenn E. (Ed.). Yugoslavia: a country study. 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990, p. 137 
49 
 
financial management responsibility for social services such as education, health and 
pensions. Because a large portion of the national budget was committed to social 
services, levies by the communities of interest were an important part of the tax 
structure. The republics and provinces and the communes also levied taxes. Their main 
revenue sources were the same as those of the federal government, but they also taxed 
income and personal property. The last two categories provided little income because 
the minimum income level on which income tax was collected was very high. Personal 
property taxes were collected mostly on private homes. Peasants and private businesses 
were taxed on assessed incomes, often at very high rates that discouraged individual 
economic initiative. In 1987, the government purchased 41 percent of Yugoslavia's 
GNP through large expenditures on defense, government administration, and social 
services (see table 7). Social services received an unusually large allotment for a 
country of Yugoslavia's modest resources. Defense took about 46 percent of federal 
outlays budgeted for 1980 because of Yugoslavia's policy of maintaining security and 
integrity as a nonaligned state. Other major federal expenditure categories were 
education and aid to underdeveloped regions.47 
  Republic, Province, and 
Commune 
Federal 
Schools 128 0 
Defense 50 5,247 
Public health and social 
welfare 
334 1,184 
Government 3,234 454 
Other 3,402 712 
TOTAL 7,148 7,597 
Table 7  – Government Budget, 1980 (in billions of dinars). Source: Based on the information 
from The Europa Year Book 1990, 2, London, 1990. 
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2.5 A critical assessment of the main arguments for the breakup of Yugoslavia  
 
The literature review offers a wide range of explanations for the causes that led 
to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation. Why did Yugoslavia collapse? Was its 
disintegration unavoidable? Was it the result of impersonal (objective) factors such as 
economic crisis, social cleavages, complex ethnic structure, changes in the international 
environment, processes of modernization and globalization, etc.? Or was the collapse of 
Yugoslavia in the first place the outcome of actions taken by political elites in 
Yugoslavia itself, thus, of personal (subjective) decisions, beliefs and intentions and if 
the latter, what were these beliefs and intentions? Recent literature on this subject 
identifies six major types of arguments on the reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia: 1) 
the economic argument; 2) the 'ancient ethnic hatred' argument and the cultural 
argument 3) the 'nationalism' argument; 4) the 'role of personality' argument 5) the 
'international politics' argument.48  
All approaches mentioned above bid useful elements for explaining the reasons 
for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There is only one what I reject in entirely, the 
ethnic hatred argument. One big flaw in all these theories is that they also neglect the 
perceptions of the relevant political actors, as expressed through ideology. Only by 
analyzing the perceptions of all these elements by the relevant political actors we can 
understand why Yugoslavia split. 
 
2.5.1. The Economic Argument  
 
In Yugoslavia, it was always possible to see clear division of the federation into 
two parts. Northern part, which is economically developed and the southern part, quite 
behind in its economic development. In the northern section the Republic of Slovenia, 
Croatia and northern Serbia (city of Belgrade with its area and the autonomous province 
of Vojvodina) are placed. In the South Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rest of Serbia (emphasizing the Serbian 
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province of Kosovo) are placed. 49 The economic argument is based on the assumption 
that the economic crisis that occurred in the late 1970s and the widening gap between 
the developed and under-developed regions (republics, provinces) made the further 
existence of Yugoslavia impossible. The most developed republics, such as Slovenia 
and Croatia, demanded independence for reasons of their further development. 50They 
also opposed attempts to limit the achieved level of economic autonomy, as provided by 
the 1974 Constitutional compromise. Many authors characterize the Yugoslav 
Constitution of 1974 as a legal and political failure for the effective functioning of 
federal institutions. This view is very realistic and it has already been mentioned in the 
first part of the chapter. The economic theory is based on the assumption that the 
interests of political participants, which are primarily economic, influence political 
decisions. Kosovo and Slovenia, although being at the two opposite poles on the scale 
of economic development, both came to the point of seeing no incentive for remaining 
further in Yugoslavia. In 1987, for the first time, Slovenian public opinion indicated that 
Slovenia would have better economic chances outside than within Yugoslavia. Kosovo, 
on the other hand, saw no economic benefits for its further remaining in Yugoslavia 
when its GDP, although permanently increasing in absolute terms, when measured per 
capita had fallen from 47% to 26% of the Yugoslav average in the post-war period. 
Accordingly, the conflict begins with the creating a mutual felling for exploitation from 
the system. The north felt that the poor south slows down its economic development, 
while the south complained that the developed north is not doing enough for them and 
always late with the assistance.51 
The economic element, true, played an important role in causing differentiation 
between different parts of Yugoslavia. The economy is the driving force in any society, 
but also is constant issue in the federations in the context of the principle of solidarity. 
This thesis accepts that economic factors played a significant role in creating the context 
to which the narratives of political leaders were forced to respond. 
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2.5.2. The 'Ancient Ethnic Hatred' and the Cultural Argument  
 
Certainly, when we talk about Yugoslavia and thus for the Balkans, it seems 
inevitable to mention explanations under which the reason for the breakup of 
Yugoslavia lies in history. The argument is very popular in not-strictly-academic 
debates, such as in the media, with politicians, soldiers, writers, etc. This perspective 
has its own justification and logic. The territory of Yugoslavia was divided between two 
great empires, the Austro-Hungarian Empire located on the north and the Ottoman 
Empire located on the south of the territory. The different influences and cultures of 
these two empires have left a mark on the peoples of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the 
territory of Yugoslavia was an area where major religions collide, i.e. Catholicism, 
Orthodoxy and Islam. 52 This thesis strongly rejects the 'ethnic hatred' argument in any 
form. Ethnic hatred was not 'ancient' and ever existent. It had to be created before what 
started very far from the level occupied by the average citizen of any of the nationalities' 
was transformed into an ethnic war'.  
As numerous public opinion surveys conducted in the last years of the 1980s 
demonstrate political protests in Serbia and Slovenia were in their first phase primarily 
concerned with 'injustice' and the 'bureaucratization' of the political elite. However, the 
elite successfully redirected them against the new 'others'. The Serb demonstrators were 
worried about the 'disintegration of the country, for which the others (Slovenes, Croats, 
various international institutions, etc.) were made responsible. The Slovenian 
intellectual elite and media also argued that 'the others' were responsible for 'Greater-
Serbian' expansionist demands, for the economic exploitation of Slovenia and for 
'unitarist' suppression of the national identity of the Slovenes. By re-directing popular 
protests towards the others, the political elites in Serbia and Slovenia survived at the 
cost of undermining Yugoslavia.53 
The 'ethnic hatred' argument, therefore, perhaps can explain some of the things 
what happened and how the nationalist political elites benefited in promoting hatred 
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among the population. However, as an explanation of the actual disintegration of 
Yugoslavia it is as irrelevant as it is incorrect. 
The cultural argument on the disintegration of Yugoslavia is an applied and 
broader version of the ethnic argument. In various attempts to explain the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, it has been argued that the diversities of the traditions and cultures of the 
Yugoslav nations (based on the ancient divisions between Eastern and Western 
Christianity, as well as between Christianity and Islam) played the major role in the 
failure to constitute a Yugoslav culture, nation and state. Cultural, religious, economic, 
linguistic and historical differences between the Yugoslav nations were simply too large 
to allow the creation of a Yugoslav nation, which permanently destabilized the 
Yugoslav state. Fragmentation of the country was hence inevitable and somehow 
natural. 54 
Some surveys from the late 80s shows that by 1985 the level of Yugoslav 
identification had further increased, as a form of protest against the political 
fragmentation of the country. A Yugoslav culture was emerging in the young and more 
educated generation. A direct result of this was a significant growth of declared ethnic 
Yugoslavs in the decade between 1971 and 1981: from, 273,000 to 1,219,000. The 
share of 'Yugoslavs' in the total population increased from 1.3 to 5.4 percent in this 
decade, while the share of all 'constitutive nations decreased. Five-fold increase in the 
number of declared Yugoslavs, especially in ethnically mixed areas (Vojvodina, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and among the younger, urban and more educated 
generation, was in sharp contrast to an increasing aversion to the LCY in the same 
segments of the population.55 Some Croatian historians projected that the share of the 
'Yugoslavs' would further increase in the decade between 1981 and 1991 to 
approximately one fifth of the total population. This information worried ethnic 
nationalists in all the Yugoslav nations.   
The cultural analysis is a good but insufficient basis for the analysis of the 
Yugoslav disintegration. 
 
                                                             
54 JOVIC, Dejan. Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University 
Press, 2008, p. 23. 
55 COHEN, Lenard J.  Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. 
54 
 
2.5.3. The Nationalism Argument  
 
While 'ethnic hatred' between Yugoslav nations did not exist to any extent 
greater than within other multi-ethnic states, nationalism was always present as a 
political doctrine in its many forms. Nationalism, here defined as the primacy of the 
national over any other interest in political activities and as a doctrine, which at its core 
has the creation of a nation-state, as homogeneous as possible, does not always develop 
into ethnic hatred towards the other. However, it is difficult to accept the somewhat 
fatalistic conclusion that nationalism and hatred had to prevail over other doctrines. For 
example, a research on social distance between members of Yugoslav ethnic groups 
indicates that Albanians were the only group, which preferred not to enter marriages 
with members of other groups, and vice versa, that members of other groups had a 
problem in marrying an Albanian. In relationships between members of Yugoslav 
constitutive nations, the largest social distance was of Slovenes towards Muslims (not 
vice versa). In all other cases, more than 50% of respondents expressed the view they 
would not have a problem in marrying a member of other ethnic groups, though in all 
cases respondents preferred a member of his/her own group. Most importantly, 74% of 
Serbs said they would not mind marrying a Croat person, while 72% of Croats said the 
same for a Serb. Significantly, neither Serbs nor Croats expressed much problems about 
marrying a Slovene (76% and 72% respectively), while Slovenes hesitated more 
towards these two groups (59% and 60% respectively). The research certainly does not 
confirm any conclusion about high levels of social distance between members of 
Yugoslav nations, with the noticeable exception of Albanians. At the same time as 
Yugoslav nationalism and the Yugoslav state were being weakened, the nationalism of 
the constitutive nations was getting stronger. It is within the Yugoslav political elite, 
therefore, that one needs to look for the seeds of the collapse of Yugoslavia. The lack of 
a single Yugoslav cultural space and of Yugoslav political institutions that would 
represent the citizens of Yugoslavia (especially in the post-1974 period) was the main 
obstacle to creating a Yugoslav nation. Nations are neither fixed communities defined 
once and for all by linguistic, anthropological, political, economic, etc. factors, nor are 
they simply 'imagined' from nowhere by intellectual and political elites. If anywhere, 
then this is obvious in the Yugoslav case. Although it correctly points out the 
importance of nationalism for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the nationalism 
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argument often overlooks the ambivalent relations between communism and 
nationalism. It also tends to underestimate the complexity of the situation in which the 
members of the political elite found themselves in the late 1980s.56 
This view should not be used as the basis for the construction of attitudes 
according to which Yugoslav wars, primarily the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(B&H), will be described as expected events because of the ancient historical reasons 
among the Balkan nations, which by the essence of things have always been at war and 
this is in the blood. In this way, I do not agree with the thesis of some authors like 
Kaplan according to which the nations in the region are guided by historical standing 
intolerance. The work of Malcolm, under which the ethnic conflicts are much more due 
to manipulation of the elites rather than some kind of genetic propensity toward the 
ethnic animosities of the peoples of the region, is far more acceptable.  57 
 
2.5.4. The Role of Personality Argument  
 
Many authors emphasize the role of personality in the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
Two personalities are often mentioned in this context the former Yugoslav President 
Josip Broz Tito and the president of the FRYugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, since 1986 
the leading Serbian politician. In short, the attempts to explain the collapse of 
Yugoslavia focusing on Tito's personality emphasize that Tito was the only real 
decision-maker, the real sovereign in Yugoslavia. As a communist, to whom national 
allegiance was secondary to ideological affiliation; Tito became a supra-national arbiter 
in inter-ethnic conflicts. Legitimized by the internationalist ideology and not in 
parliamentary elections, Tito was not a representative of any existing group, but of a 
specific vision of the future. Religious differences were also abandoned among the 
Communists. Furthermore, unlike King Alexander, Tito was not a member of the ruling 
elite before he became the Yugoslav leader. He identified the state with himself, and 
concentrated all real power in his own hands. During his life, Tito was the key arbiter in 
political disputes.  He was above the law and outside the law. This was especially the 
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case after 1974, when the Constitution declared Tito 'President of the Republic without 
limitation of office', therefore outlawing any attempt to replace him for as long as he 
was alive. 58   He was no longer just the supreme politician, but the state itself. The main 
areas of state politics (such as defense, foreign affairs and state security) were 
considered his personal domains. His cult of personality was never so present as in the 
last couple of years of his life. Furthermore, the Constitution prevented anyone from 
replacing Tito after his death. When he died in May 1980, there was no one to reconnect 
the broken bonds, and to take decisions in the conflicts of interests within the country. 
Yugoslavia, weakened to one person Tito himself died together with its ruler.59 
The other person who influenced Yugoslav disintegration was Slobodan 
Milosevic. Unlike Tito, Milosevic could not have been seen as impartial and because of 
that his aspiration to replace Tito was really impossible. On the contrary he was a 
representative of the Serbian political elite. He introduced the masses into politics. After 
introducing them he using them as a source of pressure in the intra-elite conflicts. He 
did not proclaim an ideology that would make him supranational. Milosevic was hence 
a Tito in reverse. In order to become a real Tito, he needed to turn the whole system 
upside-down. When he attempted to do this, the others decided to leave.  
The subjective factors are enormously important in politics and yet are often 
neglected. Both presidents were very important during their rule. One was central figure 
of Yugoslav post-war history, and another one in the post-Yugoslav drama.  I argue that 
Yugoslavia did not exist or collapse because of one person only even if its politics has 
often in the past been largely determined by the will of a single strong man.  I think that 
is very important to take into consideration the interests of other participants in politics 
and to find a compromise between their own views and interests and those of others. 
The point is the complexity of intra-elite politics should not be neglect when analyzing 
Yugoslav politics. 
 
2.5.5. The International Politics Argument  
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The external reasons are not less important than the internal ones and there is 
some degree of interconnection between them. The international politics explanation of 
the collapse of Yugoslavia insists on the importance of one or several factors on the 
international arena in the rise and fall of Yugoslavia. It is argued that Yugoslavia was 
created (both in 1918 and in 1945) with significant help or even as the creation of the 
great powers, whose balance of power substantially helped Yugoslavia to preserve its 
existence and independence. Yugoslavia's strategic position between the two military-
political blocs in post-war Europe and its politics in both ideological and political terms 
could not survive the collapse of bipolar structures at the end of the Cold War Thus the 
fall of communism in the world, meant a decline of the socialism in Yugoslavia. 
Changing in the international system also meant the end of federations like the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The democratic changes in Europe began to penetrate 
Yugoslavia. The threat from the USSR was no longer there and with this, a good part of 
the geostrategic importance of Yugoslavia was lost in the world after the Cold War. The 
failure of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe undermined the country's (and 
especially the Army's) ideological basis. Yugoslavia was the victim of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. In a strategic sense, it lost its importance when compared with other areas 
of the world, and consequently was no longer able to attract economic and political 
support from the West. The insensitivity of the Western world to the new position of 
Yugoslavia was evident, its failure to support the economic reforms of the Markovic 
government (in 1988-1991). Even worse, the pressure on Yugoslavia from the IMF 
(how is already explained in the first part of this work), already in the early 1980s, made 
the Yugoslav reformist elite incapable of performing its functions and opposing 
growing social disorder. The economic hardship produced constitutional crisis, which in 
turn helped ethnic nationalists to undermine what was even by Western standards a 
rather stable and plausible project. Yugoslavia collapsed neither because of 'ethnic 
hatred', nor because of the break-up of some 'political dictatorship', but because of the 
disintegration of the international order by which Yugoslavia was 'strongly 
influenced'.60 The pressure for changes in the Yugoslav economic policy and political 
reform in 1980th come as in the past not by domestic political forces, but from the’’ 
international system. “According to this logic, the international creditors have requested 
changes. Based on these requests the reforms were made in order to satisfy them. I 
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personally see logic here. At the same time, the Slovenian and the Croatian leaderships 
have demanded these reforms that would by nature be ones of a systemic change. 
Therefore, this situation inevitably led to decentralization and finally dissolution of the 
Yugoslav federation.61  
When talking about the breakup of Yugoslavia and the external reasons of same 
the existence of numerous conspiracy theories cannot just simply be ignoring. The 
common element for the different conspiracy theories is the claim that the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was a consequence of the actions of foreign factors, which consciously 
worked against Yugoslavia. Most of these theories, as the main countries responsible 
for the dissolution of Yugoslavia pointed out primary USA and Germany but also 
sometimes Austria and Hungary. According to the logic of the conspiracy theories, all 
these states had their own interest in the termination of the existence of federal 
Yugoslavia. The question here would be: What was their interest?62 
Why did Germany, a country just rebuilt after the traumatic partition imposed on 
it after World War II, take the active role in the Balkan geopolitical overhaul? Napoleon 
used to say that every nation’s politics stems from its geography. The concept applies 
perfectly to the late 1980ies early 1990ies situation in Europe overall and at the Balkans 
in particular. It should be realized that following the collapse of the eastern bloc and the 
unification of the two Germanies, Berlin saw itself as the strongest player in Europe and 
actively sought European leadership over which it traditionally competed with France. 
US military bases that Germany continued to host in the framework of its international 
obligations after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces presented the main obstacle in the 
way of the country’s aspirations. There were indications that Germany hoped to have 
the problem resolved by shifting the bases to the Balkans, where their existence could 
be based not on Soviet-era international agreements but on a NATO mandate, and 
where Germany could be guaranteed a place among the key players. What it needed to 
make the plan materialize was a serious pretext for the Balkan expansion, and the 
process including the break-up of Yugoslavia and the emergence of several protracted 
ethnic conflicts spread over its former territory conveniently provided one. The 
implementation of the scenario began in Slovenia and Croatia, where, due to historic 
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reasons, the German influence was deeply rooted. In the beginning of the 1980ies, the 
German intelligence service had strong positions in Slovenia and especially in Croatia. 
German advisers, as various émigré nationalist and extremist groups and NGO envoys 
flocked to Croatia in numbers in 1989. 63   
When the conflicts between Serb militias and Croatian forces occurred in the 
summer of 1991, it became clear that in the former Yugoslavia not only violations of 
human rights were concerned, but also peace and stability were threatened throughout 
Europe. The members of the EC were divided about the recognition of the independence 
of the republics what wanted to leave Yugoslavia, especially Slovenia and Croatia. The 
countries that had themselves had problems with the regional movements - France, 
Great Britain and Spain - wanted to preserve the status quo, while Germany vigorously 
advocated for the recognition of independence. Because, Germany so vigorously 
advocated recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Berlin was accused of unilaterally and 
prematurely encouraging the separation of Yugoslav republics. Berlin's decision brought 
Germany great sympathy in Croatia, criticized in the Serbian media as a blow to 
Belgrade. The EC's lack of understanding of events in the former Yugoslavia shows the 
date chosen for the recognition of BiH's independence: April 6. On that day, in 1941, in 
the Second World War, Belgrade bombed and it was the beginning of the break-up of 
the first Yugoslav state.64 Some of these aspects will be further explained in the next 
chapter.  
About Austria and Hungary’s possible interests, most of conspiracy theories 
authors argue that there were similar reasons like in Germany. These are historical and 
geostrategic reasons.  The territories of the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina 
and B&H) are the lands, which historically, have belonged to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, for a long period. In addition to these claims are the statements by certain 
circles in the Austria parliament Representatives of the Christian conservative People's 
Party, members of parliament argued that Slovenia could become a part from Austria.65 
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However, most of the conspiracy theories place blames on the USA as the 
biggest advocates and culprits. In the beginning of 1990 the USA have projected the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia in two phases; the first phase in the time period between1992 
to 1995 and the second period from 1998-1999. These claims find its justifications in 
the reality because of the USA militarily involvement through NATO in the two wars 
(B&H and Kosovo). This will be further explained in the next chapter. In addition, 
according to these theories, the USA interests are often located in the central and 
southern parts of Yugoslavia, i.e. B&H, Serbia (especially Kosovo) and Macedonia. As 
in the most conspiracy theories, where the USA is involved, here too, the USA interests 
are located primly in the oil as very important and expensive resource. Although on the 
territory of Yugoslavia there are no oil platforms, still, according to some of these 
theories, the USA interests go way down in securing the control over the main routes in 
the way of oil. Macedonia, Bosnia and Serbia are on the only route from east to west 
and north to south through the Balkan Mountains along with Romania and Bulgaria. 
Also Turkey and Arab nations form European-Middle East bloc, and it is a territory that 
USA wants to control. Another USA interest, according to the conspiracy theories could 
have been keeping the American-dominated NATO as the only guarantor of security of 
Western Europe after the Cold War. 66 
The conspiracy theories, have their own logic and its own weight, but at the 
same time, they contain numerous inconsistencies that generally cannot be accepted as 
an absolute truth. 
After the review of the combination of the most popular and famous theories 
concerning the reasons for the Yugoslavian collapse it is possible to conclude that the 
reasons should be searched equally in both inside and outside the federation. All 
previous views have their own logic and eligibility, and my opinion is that the previous 
views are not necessarily opposed to one another.  Although all the approaches analyzed 
above (with exception of the ethnic hatred argument) have added some valuable 
contributions to our understanding of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, they have 
sometimes neglected the missing link between the 'objective' factors (such as economic 
crisis, ethnic structure of population, international politics, etc.) and the perceptions of 
these elements by political actors themselves and their resultant actions. It is this 
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missing link that I attempt to establish here. It is very important not underestimation the 
importance of the subjective in politics. The predominant role of the political elite in 
economic matters was never eliminated in Yugoslavia (nor indeed in any of the other 
semi command economies) in spite of all the reforms of the system. The disastrous 
implications of the predominance of politics in economic matters were perhaps most 
obvious with respect to regional policy. The decentralization of power through the 
concept of self-management, combined with federalism was seen as a pragmatic way to 
accommodate the different economic interests of the regions and the legacy of prewar 
Yugoslavia, which was never openly acknowledged by the regime as a cause of possible 
serious discontent. While political stability was at least formally guaranteed through a 
constitution that implied the statehood of all major Yugoslav nations the more concrete 
preconditions of economic equality was less easy to guarantee and achieve. In an 
atmosphere of general shortage of resources to underpin investment ambitions mediated 
through political elites at different levels, the political bureaucracy often resorted to 
populist-nationalist slogans which against the background of growing regional 
discrepancies in levels of economic development between republics, created a breeding 
ground for the rise of ethno nationalism. This was particularly the case in the 1980s, by 
which time the League of Communists had already become caught up in serious internal 
strife and had in practice abandoned its principle of democratic centralism.67 Thus, with 
the political system in disarray and the economy in deep crisis a major impetus was 
given to the rise of the economic and political separatism, which eventually led to the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. It is within the Yugoslav political elite, therefore, that one needs 
to look for the seeds of the collapse of Yugoslavia.  The disintegration of Yugoslavia 
was the result of many factors, but one of the most important was the breakdown of the 
ideological consensus within the Yugoslav political elite who was helped by 
international community.  
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2.6 Summary of the chapter 
 
The question is what happened to Yugoslavia? The solution discovered in the 
years immediately after the split with the Soviet Union 68, turned out to be of critical 
importance for the subsequent economic decline and dissolution of Yugoslavia what 
means that the roots of Yugoslavia’s distorted industrial structure can be traced back to 
the early 1950s. The concept of forced industrialization prescribed that the bulk of 
investment should go into capital-intensive basic industries. They created almost 
insurmountable obstacles to the mobility of labour, capital and technology, thus 
blocking both technological progress and competition and seriously undermining the 
organizational efficiency of self-managed enterprises. The corollary to this process was 
extreme distortion in the pattern of Yugoslavia’s integration into the international 
division of labour. Systemic changes promoted through the application of the associated 
labour concept in the period 1973-79, in combination with the institutions of workers’ 
self-management, significantly contributed to the internal dynamics of disintegration. In 
the event, these industries not only failed to produce adequate results in terms of 
increasing production, productivity and employment, as the ultimate goals of any 
development strategy but proved to be unviable in terms of the limited size of the 
Yugoslav market. Each republic insisted on forgoing its own links with the outside 
world, the consequence of which was profound peripheralization of a country as a 
whole. For that reason, they generated an enormous wastage of resources. The policy of 
decentralization where each republic trying to create its own integrated industrial base, 
provoked the problem of ‘duplicating’ industrial capacities on a regional basis. Also 
final products were favored over raw materials, and that formed another structural 
obstacle to success of the development strategy. They discouraged the development of 
extractive industries and directly induced increasing import dependence in relation to 
inputs. Apart from the general issue of insufficient economic resources, the combination 
of administrative system and political climate created a fertile ground for economic 
regionalism and further aggravated the problem of economic inefficiency and the 
structural inflexibility of the system. Elimination of the regional economic disparities in 
the crucial inconsistency between a non-market economic system and a highly 
decentralized political system against the background of Yugoslavia’s specific regional 
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cum-ethnic issues and deteriorating economy, certainly contributed enormously to the 
acute crisis Yugoslavia entered in the early 1980’s and to its ‘national bankruptcy’ in 
the 1990.  
In this chapter we can see that Yugoslavia`s economy was in a bad condition in 
the late 70s. Government tried to mask this situation by the increase in foreign loans. In 
addition, this as a period when economic emigration increased dramatically. Despite the 
steadily rising influx of foreign funds in the form of loans, foreign currency remittances 
of millions of emigrants and politically motivated U.S. economic aid, the Yugoslav 
economy achieved only a modest growth. However, even this modest growth was not 
sustainable without continued foreign aid. What happened in the eighties and nineties 
was only the revelation of the actual state of the Yugoslav economy? Just as a chronic 
alcoholic must face the reality of his addiction, so did we, eventually, have to face the 
reality of the powerlessness of the Yugoslav economy to function without external 
doping? 69  
It is symptomatic that the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia occurred in about the same time-sequence when Eastern Germany was 
being absorbed into the Bundesrepublik. Political fragmentation on one side became the 
precondition for the globalization of markets on the other side. The rebirth of ethno-
national identities on one side is correlated with the construction of a European supra-
national identity on the other side. It seems that today's second and third world states are 
reduced to flexible productive units, which may be decomposed, downsized and 
recomposed or rearranged according to the economic necessities of global markets. The 
idea is that these remodeled state-entities would fit better into the readjusted 
international division of labor, which is of course characterized by inequalities.  
The collapse of communism worldwide had its influence in Yugoslavia where it 
was difficult to sustain this system in the new international order that was coming. The 
end of the bipolar world, which came with the fall of the Berlin wall, carried much more 
weight for ex-Yugoslavia than the new chance for change to the communist regimes. 
Simply put, at that very moment, two aspects of a lack of legitimacy hit Yugoslavia: one 
from within and one from the outside. The absence of any agreement, on the future 
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design of the common state, was strengthened by the apparent loss of the external 
legitimacy of Yugoslavia. The space the country had kept between the two “blocks” 
because of its successful non-aligned foreign policy, instantly disappeared and 
Yugoslavia until then supported by the existence of the blocks dropped into the abyss 
created when they disappeared. The country’s serious economic crisis, the war-oriented 
strategies of the political elites of former Yugoslavia, confusion in European and world 
politics vis-à-vis the Yugoslav crisis were all additional pushes towards the point of no 
return.70 By giving local governments and political bodies full powers without 
responsibility these changes also exacerbated the major structural imbalances that 
already existed at the level of firms and banks, industrial and services sectors, and at the 
macro level itself. The ascendancy of politics over economics translated itself in 
practice.   
The main message of the Berlin Wall Fall is about the power of the people and 
the difference they can sometimes make. When we talk about Yugoslavia, we see the 
power of the political decisions that elites and people take at “critical moments” in 
history. Consequences of both good and bad decisions, at such junctures, bring huge 
changes. The good ones will make prosperity and the bad ones will haunt the region for 
many generations to come. This is the case with Yugoslavia, what is presented in the 
next chapters. 
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Access in: 12 Feb. 2018. 
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3 FROM YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION TO ITS EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION – THE CASE OF SERBIA  
 
After the period of the political crisis of the 1980s, separation of the  Yugoslav 
republics began. In the early nineties, the Communists lost their power. New parties 
have appeared all over the country. Nationalist rhetoric appeared on all sides. In 1991, 
one after the other republic proclaimed independence (only Serbia and Montenegro 
remained federated under the name of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). The status 
of Serbian minorities outside Serbia has remained unresolved, which has later caused 
many conflicts. For some republics such as Slovenia and Macedonia, dissolution was 
relatively easy, but the separation of Croatia and then Bosnia and Herzegovina caused 
bloody wars. Serbia and Montenegro were not affected by the war in the early 1990s, 
however, conflicts erupted in Kosovo at the end of this decade. These conflicts led to 
the NATO bombing of the country. This entire decade was tragic for Serbia, which 
experienced a real economic collapse. This has contributed to the sanctions of the UN 
and the United States, and then the bombing. By the end of 1999, around 200,000 dead 
and two million displaced persons were estimated in the wars of Yugoslavia. It was the 
darkest period in the history of the region since the Second World War.  
After the 5th October 2000 changes, what will be explained in the part 3.3.2, 
there were institutions that were formally equal to those in market economies 
independent companies, central bank and other banks, stock exchanges, free-trade 
zones, courts, arbitration, chambers, trade unions, etc. The only significant exceptions 
were the non-existence of the formal foreign exchange and labor market. All these were 
not enough to make the Serbian economic system a market system in the standard sense. 
The laws were not good. Also, very often it was problem its implementation. The state 
and policy informally and illegally had crucial influence on all economic flows. 
The situation on the labor market in Serbia during this period is not favorable. Its 
basic characteristics are high unemployment, long-term reduction of employment and 
considerable number of surplus employees in the formal sector, inflexible formal labor 
market, large grey economy, relatively low wages, which are all manifestations of 
serious deviations on both the labor market and the overall economic system. The 
causes of the above what were numerous: overly restrictive government regulations, 
66 
 
excessive taxes, wars, sanctions, blocked transition, weaknesses of government bodies, 
etc.  
In the last part of the chapter is explained process of integration into European 
Union. From the very founding of the EU, some of its states have a bigger influence 
than others. The differences of influence become even more important with ten new 
countries joining the Union in May 2004, the majority of them economically weaker 
former Eastern Bloc states. It will be explained how that process was in Slovenia and 
Croatia (two former Yugoslav republics, already members of EU) and current status of 
other former Yugoslav republics with specific accent on Serbian integration. Serbian 
intentions to be the full European Union member, is very important issue and because of 
that I think discussed this topic require much more attention and efforts to be devoted. 
 
3.1 Background on Yugoslavia in the 1991   
 
Yugoslavia in 1991 had a population of around 24million, has been broken down 
in to five smaller states: Slovenia (2m population); Croatia (4,8m); Bosnia and 
Hercegovina (4,4m) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro 
together 10,5m) and Macedonia (2m). In the midst of the Yugoslav crisis, the 1991 
census was controversial. For example, the Albanians boycotted the 1991 census.  It is 
estimate that they make up nearly 40 percent of the population in Macedonia not 21.5 as 
it presented in the table 9.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Former Yugoslavia. Total Population in republics and autonomous provinces 
1991. Available in : <http://www.arhivyu.govrs/> Access in : 29 Sep. 2017. 
 
Slovenia 2.0 8.5
Croatia 4.8 20.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.4 18.6
Serbia 5.8 24.6
Vojvodina 2.0 8.5
Kosovo 2.0 8.5
Montenegro 0.6 2.5
Macedonia 2.0 8.5
Former Yugoslavia 23.6 100
Country
Population 
(Milion)
Percentage  
(%)
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Table 9 – Former Yugoslavia Ethnic composition of republics and autonomous 
provinces 1991 (percentage). Available in: <http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/> Access in: 29 
Sep. 2017. 
 
(1*) The figures for Albanians may be understated. Albanians generally boycotted the 
1991 census and the figures have been calculated from births and deaths statistics. (2*) 
Yugoslav indicates those who consider themselves to be in this category rather than another 
ethnic group. They are usually the offspring of mixed marriages.  
In the Balkans, there is always a problem with definitions: how people define 
themselves and how they are defined by others. In the table, 10 below are presented 
some of the main characteristics for main nationalities who lived in Yugoslavia. It is, 
nevertheless, almost impossible to answer the question, what makes someone a Serb, or 
a Croat? Croats are Catholics, while Serbs are Orthodox Christians. How it is then 
possible to explain the fact that both Serbs and Croats arrogate themselves Bosnian 
Muslims, as “renegades” of their “nations” who have embraced Islam? Croats speak 
Croatian and Serbs the Serb language. Why do they then understand each other without 
major problems, why did they speak Serbo-Croatian for decades and why are since the 
breakup of the joint state to date, the Croats trying hard to introduce as many new words 
and grammatical rules as possible with the goal to increase their differences with the 
Serbo-Croatian and Serb language? Croats speak the jekavian dialect, and Serbs 
ekavian. Montenegrins, the majority of whom consider themselves Serbs, also speak 
jekavian; the same goes for Bosnian Muslims. The Croats use the Latin alphabet, and 
Serbs the Cyrillic one. In the former Yugoslavia, everyone had to learn Cyrillic in 
Croatia and Latin in Serbia.71 
                                                             
71 KRIZAN, Mojmir. Post Yugoslav States: Joining the European Union by developing political culture. 
In: HADZIC, Miroslav (Ed.). Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia: causes, dynamics and effects. Beograd: 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004, p. 207. 
Bosnina and 
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Slovenia
Inner 
Serbia Vojvodina Kosovo
Montenegrins 0,3 0,2 0,2 61,9 1,3 2,2 1,4
Croats 18,1 74,6 0,2 1,1 3,2 0,5 5,2 0,5
Macedonians 0,1 64,8 0,5 1 0,1
Muslims 41 0,6 2,2 13,9 1 3,1 0,3 3,5
Slovenes 0,5 89,1 0,1 0,2
Serbs 30,7 11,3 2,2 3,5 2,6 84,8 54,8 11,4
Albanians *1 0,1 0,2 21,5 6,2 1,5 0,2 79,9
Hungarians 0,6 0,5 0,1 17,8
Yugoslav* 2 8,1 8,9 0,7 5,6 1,4 4,2 9,1 0,2
Others 1,7 2,5 7,8 0,6 1,3 2,7 8,6 2,4
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Table 10 – The Mosaic of Peoples. Source: Author's calculations, 2017. 
 
If we analyses some basic statistics indicators of Yugoslavian economy right 
before the dissolution, we can see that GDP in the 1990 was $120,100 million, and GDP 
per capita was $3,549 (at current prices). GDP rank was 24th, and GDP growth was 
6.3% neg. Inflation CPI was 164%. Labor force in Yugoslavia at that time was 9.6 
million people and unemployment rate was 16%.  In the same year exports was $ 13.1 
billion, and imports was $ 17.6 billion. Gross external debt was $ 18 billion. When we 
come to public finances in 1991, we see that both public revenues and public expenses 
have the same value $6.4 billion. Main industries were metallurgy, machinery and 
equipment, petroleum, chemicals, textiles, wood processing, food processing, pulp and 
paper, motor vehicles, building materials.72  
If we continue to analyze all republics separately we can notice disparities 
among them (table 11). Slovenia has the best results in all indicators except the 
agricultural production. Croatia, Serbia, Vojvodina province are pretty much the same. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is right behind them while Montenegro, Macedonia and 
Kosovo province have the lowest results. Very huge disparity is recognized between 
Slovenia and Kosovo province. That also can be said if we compare Slovenia and 
Montenegro or Macedonia. This was precisely the reason for many misunderstandings 
among the republics what was explained in the previous chapter.   
 
                                                             
72 OECD. OECD Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia. Paris: OECD Publishing, 1990, p. 86. 
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Table 11 – Disparities between republics 1990 (by percent). Source: 
Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije, 1991. 
 
*Social Product per capita consists of material production plus services linked to 
production 
 
3.2 War years  
 
The former Yugoslavia is known as ‘powder keg’! It has not fallen apart neatly, 
like a ripe orange. An often-asked question is: How was it possible that people 
succumbed to aggressive nationalism and why did violent solutions prevail? After 
Tito’s death, every ethnic group started to believe and still believes “that it was the 
major victim of the communist system and that the rival group itself was the beneficiary 
of it “national” identity has been constructed as a victimized identity and this is still 
going on today! Slovenia and Croatia advocated a confederal or asymmetrical project in 
which in fact there would have been no common state left: separate armies, separate 
currencies. The Serbian government rejected this proposal, finding it unacceptable 
without a redrawing of frontiers between the new countries. Could the other 
communities do the same? The conditions for “nation-building” on an ethnic basis were 
not the same (and thus nation building did not have the same results) in the other 
republics. The fact that the Montenegrins were ethnically very close to the Serbs made it 
easier for them to stay together with Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were 
the most threatened, politically and economically, by Yugoslavia’s fragmentation. It is 
no accident then that their representatives were much more interested than the others in 
finding a compromise that would keep some kind of union together, whatever the cost. 
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Since the real aim in Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia was to build nation-states, this raised 
the problem of “ethnic frontiers.” However, in addition to tension between republics 
there was the problem that Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, was a single-party state. 
There was no organized opposition party that crossed republic lines and could unite 
people once the dominant party had been discredited.73  Who expected something from 
the war and who had the most benefits? The general benefit derived from obtaining an 
ethnically cleansed state, of course, cannot compensate for the immeasurable losses of 
inhabitants who were forced into and then willingly engaged in warfare. This general 
benefit is always used when there is an intention to cover-up a measurable and 
materialized war profit for national military-political elites and their ideological cohorts. 
Political, cultural, media elites, state intellectuals, who are generally of great 
significance in Central and Eastern Europe, play a creative role in the forming of 
different dimensions of national identity. Indeed, the policy with regard to nationalities 
had created local elites in every republic ready to assert their claims to independent 
nationhood. In both Serbia and Croatia, demagogic leaders arose whose appeal to their 
constituents were based on religious and ethnic loyalties that, once unleashed, could not 
be controlled.74 Of course, none of this would be successfully accomplished without 
intervention of International Community and NATO. On the map below is presented 
how Yugoslavia was looked like during the war period.75 
 
                                                             
73 PESIC, Vesna. Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis. Peaceworks, Washington 
DC, n. 8, p. 25, 1996. 
74 HADZIC, Miroslav (Ed.). Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia: causes, dynamics and effects. Beograd: 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004, p.15.  
75 KUNITZ, Stephen J. The Health of Populations: General Theories and Particular Realities. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 153. 
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Map 2 – Former Yugoslavia during the war. Available in  
<https://www.yugolavija+u+ratu+1992+slike&rlz=1C> Access in:  05 Oct. 2017. 
 
In the Yugoslavia region were couple of wars and insurgencies: Ten -Day War 
in Slovenia (1991); Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995); Bosnian War (1992-
1995); Kosovo War (1998-1999); Insurgency in Preševo Valley (1999-2001); 
Insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia (2001). 
After a decade of crisis that affected the whole of the ex-federation, Slovenia, 
the richest republic, had a per capita Social Product more than twice the Yugoslav 
average and seven times as high as Kosovo’s.76``Better last in the city than first in the 
village``, that was the state of mind often expressed in Slovenia. “The city was Europe 
``the village`` was Yugoslavia.77 Slovenia was the first Yugoslav republic to hold free 
elections. In the Slovenian independence referendum, held on 23 December 1990, 
88.5% of all electors (94.8% of those participating) voted for independence, which was 
declared on 25 June 1991. Voters wanted the communists out, and they wanted their 
own independent nation. The most ethnically homogeneous of the Yugoslav nations, 
Slovenia was also the most Western-oriented, prosperous, and geographically isolated 
so secession just made sense. However, that did not mean it would be achieved without 
violence. There was Ten -Day War in Slovenia.78      
                                                             
76 Only Slovenia and Croatia had per capita Social Products above the Yugoslav average (table 11). 
77 SAMARY, Catherine. Yugoslavia Dismembered. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995, p. 56. 
78 After months of stockpiling weapons, Slovenia closed its borders. Belgrade sent in the Yugoslav 
People’s Army to take control of Slovenia’s borders with Italy and Austria, figuring that whoever 
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In April of 1990, a retired general and historian named Franjo Tuđman and his 
highly nationalistic, right-wing party, the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) won 
Croatia’s first free elections.79 He introduced a new constitution, put together largely 
under German advisers’ supervision.  It proclaimed that Croatia was a national state of 
the Croats and other peoples inhabiting it. The legal subtlety automatically left Serbs 
who used to be a state-forming nation in the position of a minority. The 600,000 Serbs 
were living by that time in Croatia. Like the Slovenian reformers, Tuđman and the HDZ 
wanted more autonomy from Yugoslavia. However, Tuđman’s methods were more 
extreme than those of the gently progressive Slovenes were. Tuđman invoked the spirit 
of the Ustaše 80who had ruthlessly run Croatia’s puppet government under the Nazis. 
Discontent with the downgrade, Serbs launched a referendum of their own in August 
1990, during which, however, their response was limited to asserting their right to 
sovereignty and autonomy within Croatia. Secession was not on the agenda, but the 
Croatian government nevertheless resorted to force to prevent the referendum from 
taking place, and the moment marked the onset of the armed conflict in the republic. On 
May 19, 1991, the Croatian administration held a referendum with over 94% of those 
who went to the polling booths opting for immediate secession. The Serbs of Croatia 
did not attend, and Germany promptly ensured the European recognition of the 
independent country. Praising the German unification, we should not forget how the fall 
of the Berlin Wall cast a shadow over other countries and their peoples. Soon after that, 
Sarajevo followed the suit, massive fighting swept across the Balkans, NATO got the 
desired pretext for intervention, and Germany emerged as the key force in the new 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
controlled the borders had a legitimate claim on sovereignty. Fighting broke out around these borders. 
Because the Yugoslav People’s Army was made up of soldiers from all republics, many Slovenian troops 
found themselves fighting their own compatriots. The army had cut off communication between these 
conscripts and the home front, so they did not know what was going on and often did not realize they 
were fighting their friends and neighbors until they were close enough to see them. Slovenian civilians 
bravely entered the fray, blockading the Yugoslav barracks with their own cars and trucks. Most of the 
Yugoslav soldiers now trapped were young and inexperienced, and were terrified of the improvised 
Slovenian militia, even though their own resources were far superior. After 10 days of fighting and fewer 
than a hundred deaths, Belgrade relented. The Slovenes stepped aside and allowed the Yugoslav People’s 
Army to leave with their weapons and to destroy all remaining military installations as they went. When 
the Yugoslav People’s Army cleared out, they left the Slovenes with their freedom.  Available in 
https://www.ricksteves.com/watch-read-listen/read/understanding-yugoslavia Access in: 10 Oct. 2017. 
79 Franjo Tuđman was a Croatian politician and historian. He became the first President of Croatia after it 
independence. 
80 The Ustaše were members of the Croatian Revolutionary Movement better known as a Croatian fascist, 
organization. It started to be active, in its original form, between 1929 and 1945. Its members murdered 
hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies as well as political dissidents in Yugoslavia and organized  
numerous Concentration camps in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II. 
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European geopolitical architecture81  The standoff lasted until 1995, when the now well-
equipped Croatian army retook the Serb-occupied areas in a series of two offensives 
“Lightning” (Blijesak), in the northern part of the country, and “Storm” (Oluja), farther 
south. Some Croats retaliated for earlier ethnic cleansing by doing much of the same to 
Serbs torturing and murdering them, and dynamiting their homes. Croatia quickly 
established the borders that exist today, and the Erdut Agreement 82brought peace to the 
region. But most of the 600,000 Serbs who had once lived in Croatia were forced into 
Serbia, abroad or were killed. While Serbs have long since been legally invited back to 
their ancestral Croatian homes, relatively few have returned afraid of the “welcome” 
they might receive from the Croat neighbors who killed their relatives or blew up their 
houses just two decades ago. 
Macedonia was the poorest and most backward area of Yugoslavia. It is one of 
the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, from which it declared independence in 
the peaceful way without disputes with others. 83An independence referendum was held 
in Macedonia on 8 September 1991. It was approved by 96.4% of votes, with a turnout 
of 75.7%.84 
While violence erupted in Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
suspiciously quiet. Even optimists knew it could not last. At the crossroads of Balkan 
culture, Bosnia-Herzegovina was even more diverse than Croatia; it was populated 
predominantly by Muslim Bosnians 40 %, but also by large numbers of Serbs 31 %, and 
Croats 18 % of the population (presented in the table 9). In the fall of 1991, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s president, Alija Izetbegović,85 began to pursue independence. Bosnia and 
                                                             
81 ISKENDEROV, Pyotr. Balkan Shadow of Berlin Celebration. Nova Srpska Politicka Misao, Nov. 
2009. Available in: <http://www.nspm.rs/nspm-in-english/balkan-shadow-of-berlin-
celebration.html?alphabet=l > Access in: 15 Oct. 2017. 
82 United Nations Peacemaker. Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium (Erdut Agreement). Available in: <https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-erdutagreement95> Access 
in: 20 Oct. 2017. 
83 VLADISAVLJEVIC, Nebojsa. Yugoslavia’s successor states. LSE Research Online, Jun. 2008, p. 22. 
Available in: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5371/1/Yugoslavia%E2%80%99s_successor_states_(LSERO).pdf> 
Access in: 15 Jan. 2018. 
84 US soldiers, under the UN banner, were deployed to monitor the Macedonian northern borders with the 
Republic of Serbia. However, since the authorities in Belgrade did not intervene to prevent Macedonia 
from leaving, nor to protest or act against the arrival of the UN troops, indications were that the new 
country, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, recognizes the Republic of Macedonia and develops 
diplomatic relations with it. As such, it became the only former republic that gained sovereignty without 
the resistance of Yugoslav authorities and the army from Belgrade. In addition, the first President of 
Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, had a good relationship with Belgrade, as well as other former republics.  
85 Alija Izetbegović was a Bosnian politician, lawyer, and philosopher. He became the first President of 
the independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. 
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Herzegovina declared sovereignty in October 1991 and independence from the former 
Yugoslavia on 3 March 1992 after the referendum boycotted by ethnic Serbs. The 
Bosnian Serbs preferred to remain part of an increasingly dominant ethnic group in a 
big country (FRY) rather than become second fiddle in a new, small country (Bosnia-
Herzegovina). Therefore, the Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina created their own 
“state,” called the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its president, 
Radovan Karadžić, enjoyed the semisecret military support of Slobodan Milošević and 
the Yugoslav People’s Army. The stage was set for a bloody secession.86 
After four long years, finally the international community was persuaded to act. 
In the late summer of 1995, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb positions, forcing 
them to relax their siege and come to the negotiating table. The Dayton Peace Accords 
brokered by US diplomats at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio 
finally ended the wars of Yugoslav succession. On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, 
Ohio, the warring parties initialed a peace agreement that ended three years of 
interethnic civil strife (the final agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995  87 
The Dayton Peace Accords retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries 
and created a second tier of government composed of two entities roughly equal in size: 
the predominantly Bosniak-Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the predominantly Bosnian Serb led Republika Srpska (see  map 3).88 
                                                             
86 Bosnia-Herzegovina was torn apart. Even the many mixed families were forced to choose sides. If you 
had a Serb mother and a Croat father, you were expected to pick one ethnicity or the other and your 
brother might choose the opposite. The majority of people, who did not want this war and couldn’t 
comprehend why it was happening, now faced the excruciating realization that their neighbors and friends 
were responsible for looting and burning their houses, and shooting at their loved ones. As families and 
former neighbors trained their guns on each other, proud and beautiful cities such as Mostar and Sarajevo 
were turned to rubble, and people throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina lived in a state of constant terror. 
https://www.ricksteves.com/watch-read-listen/read/understanding-yugoslavia Access in: 10 Oct. 2017. 
 
87 CIA. The World Factbook, 2014-2015, p. 97.  
88 The Dayton peace agreement is a document, which embodies probably the most generous human rights 
provisions known to date in any constitution. The Dayton agreement has stopped the killing. This is its 
greatest achievement, critically important in the short term. While this compromise helped end the war, it 
also created a nation with two independent and redundant governments, further crippling this war-torn 
and impoverished region.  
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Map 3 – The Front Lines and the Dayton Peace Agreement, November 1995. Available in: 
<http://www.blic.rs/dejtonski-sporazum> Access in:  17 Oct. 2017. 
 
*Area marked in green presents Republika Srpska and area marked in brown presents 
Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
If we look at the 20th century up to 1990 and disregard decolonization (where 
the record is more mixed) there are very few cases where a new state emerged out of an 
existing one without this being the result of a world war, a regional war or a civil war: 
Norway from Sweden (1905), Finland from Russia (1917), Singapore from Malaysia 
(1965) and the dissolution of the United Arab Republic (1961).89 If we adopt the 
premise that religious wars are only those wars that are waged about religious disputes 
and unresolved issues, then the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were not religious wars 
because they were not instigated by religious problems. In that way, they differ from 
religious wars of the past. Over four years of war, more than 200,000 people have been 
killed and more than two million have left their homes.  The majority of Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats today think that there was no winner in the war. 
The Yugoslavian war should be understood in the context of the major 
developments that have shaped politics in the Balkans and internationally through the 
1980’s and 1990’s. Prime among these developments are: the process of "economic 
globalization," by which international capital has imposed a neo-liberal agenda on every 
region of the world, and placed much of the Third World and the former socialist 
                                                             
89HAGAN, Wiberg, Why It Had a Bad Prognosis. In: HADZIC, Miroslav (Ed.). Violent Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia: causes, dynamics and effects. Beograd: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004, p. 32 
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countries under the tutelage of the IMF and the World Bank. It was to provoke the crisis 
of state-communism in Central and Eastern Europe. That was in large part activated by 
the adoption "market reforms". Also  it has opened the way for the establishment by the 
US and its European allies of a new global hegemony; the deepening capitalist crisis 
(reflected in the collapse of the Asian economies, and the profit stagnation in Europe), 
which has accelerated the rush of corporate capital to commercially exploit new areas of 
the world and find new sources of cheap labor; and the renewed assertion by the US as a 
global force, as the leading capitalist nation and the prime military defender of the so-
called "free market." The war paves the way for the expansion of "free-market 
capitalism", making the region safe for European and US investment, and it removes 
one of the last obstacles to NATO’s dominance in the Balkans. The destruction of 
Yugoslavia marks the end of the last Central European country to resist NATO’s agenda 
for the region, and the "market reforms" prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF, as 
a condition for the transition of the former socialist countries to capitalism.90A 
perfidious plan had been drawn up to destroy Yugoslavia. The first phase is civil war. 
The second is foreign intervention and the last one is put puppet regimes will be set up 
throughout Yugoslavia. 
There are other advantages the US and EU can draw from this war. Among them 
is the consolidation of the US’s leadership in European affairs, once seemingly 
threatened by the prospect of Europe’s political and monetary union offsetting 
Washington’s influence in world affairs. With this new military intervention in Bosnia 
(after that in Yugoslavia), the US can again position itself as a "European power”, the 
main architect of the new European world order, together with a once again powerful 
Germany eager to reshape the East as its economic backyard. In this context, the defeat 
of Yugoslavia serves to demonstrate that there is no alternative to neoliberal capitalism 
and the futility of resistance to it. That the Yugoslavian Federation was, for 40 years, a 
model example of socialism and multicultural coexistence makes this defeat even more 
crucial. Moreover, the war on Yugoslavia created the conditions for the militarization of 
an area that is rich in mineral resources, such as uranium, silver, lead, zinc, and is 
strategically located at the cross-roads between Eastern, Central Europe and the Middle 
East, thus being one of the world’s most important trade routes (the Danube, which 
                                                             
90 FEDERECI, Silvia; CAFFENTZIS, George. War and globalization in Yugoslavia.  Available in: 
<https://www.thing.net/~oliveworks/federicicaffentzis.html> Access in: 25 Oct. 2017. 
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connects Yugoslavia to several countries, serves the shipping needs of a sizable area of 
Europe)91 
 
3.3 Transition of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY)92 
 
Transition is complex process whereby a country in transition is stimulating 
structural changes with the goal to achieve economic growth and improved social 
wellbeing. Economic transition encompasses the abandonment of the socialist model of 
economic activity, either centrally planned, or self-management-market model, and the 
construction of the standard market model with the domination of private ownership. 
Yugoslav transition began in 1989 by the Law of privatization. In 1990, Marković 
introduced a privatization program. Yugoslav authorities used the term "property 
transformation" when referring to the process of transforming public ownership into 
private hands. Until that time in Yugoslavia private business were possible only in the 
frame of independent landowners and craftsmen shops. Until 1994, Yugoslavia 
maintained in part the economic system created during the Tito era, in which major 
industries were state-owned, factories self-managed, and unemployed workers and 
farmers received subsidies. In July of 1994 the Serbian National Assembly passed "a 
law on the revaluation of privatized assets, which halted the privatization process; so 
that by the late 1990’s, "the private sector accounted for only some 15%-20% of the 
business sector. Similarly, the Yugoslavian agricultural sector in the late 1990s still 
operated according to the system inherited from the Tito’s period.93 
The economic performance of all transition economies of former Yugoslavia 
have been worse than in Central Europe and the Baltic countries. The war has 
undoubtedly had an important negative effect; but it has surely not been the only factor. 
The lack of political consensus and weak institutions have played a major role. All the 
post-communist transition countries are characterized by: unsustainable external 
deficits; dangerously high levels of unemployment; large and often unsustainable fiscal 
deficits; low and spasmodic growth; rapid de-industrialization; low credibility of the 
                                                             
91 FEDERECI, Silvia; CAFFENTZIS, George. War and globalization in Yugoslavia.  Available in: 
<https://www.thing.net/~oliveworks/federicicaffentzis.html> Access in: 25 Oct. 2017. 
92 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY was a federal state constructed by the republics of Serbia 
and Montenegro. It existed from 1992 to 2003.  
93 Ibid.  
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banking sector and the financial system in general; slow and/or inefficient (indeed 
corrupt, in many cases) privatization; weak economic institutions and rules.94 
 
3.3.1 First transitional years 
 
As it shown in the first chapter in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic became president of 
the Republic of Serbia and his ultranationalist calls for Serbian domination was one of 
the reasons for Yugoslavian breakup. After the separation of others, the remaining 
republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in April 1992. 
The breakup of the Yugoslav market in 1991, beginning of wars and misguided 
economic policy resulted in a very bad economic situation. The trademark of the new 
policy was the elimination of the relatively liberal foreign trade regime upon the 
introduction of the foreign trade sanctions from May 1992 in a highly restrictive 
manner: licenses and quotas were reintroduced. 95 The sanctions had a major impact on 
the Yugoslav economy and Yugoslav society, with Serbia the hardest hit, its GDP 
dropping from $24 billion in 1990 to below $10 billion in 1993, and $8.66 billion in 
2000. The inflation, despite the constant price freezes, in December 1993 and January 
1994 broke the world record for the period after World War II. The implementation of 
sanctions corresponded with the emergence of an underground economy. Although 
there was no legal import of cigarettes during the sanctions, a market of low-quality and 
fake cigarettes, alcohol appeared.  
The main goal of economic policy was the provision of sufficient quantities of 
basic foodstuffs for the population (bread, oil, milk, sugar), regardless of whether it was 
a profitable business or not. The financial sector fared just like the real sector so it is no 
wonder that in the period 1994-2000 dinar lost 97% of its value, while banks were 
completely destroyed.96  The existing banks experienced widespread closing. Fraudulent 
                                                             
94 GLIGOROV, V, et al. Reconstruction and European Integration. The wiiw Balkan Observatory 
Working Papers |001|, Oct. 1999, p. 17. 
95 This move was even extremely stupid, because it was precisely the freedom of trade, and in particular, 
of imports that could have been the best defense from international sanctions. 
96 Banks, including the central bank, were placed under control and their task was to supply the 
enterprises and state trading companies with the necessary amounts of dinars and foreign currency. 
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banks were opened by opportunistic criminals. They attracted people with extraordinary 
interest rates. Many people who fell because of pyramid banks and even more some 
were left homeless. According to the Dayton Peace Accord, the foreign trade sanctions 
against Serbia were suspended at the end of 1995, but the financial sanctions were 
retained (the membership of the FRY in the IMF and the World Bank was not renewed, 
the ban on investment was introduced, etc. 
Wages and pensions were reduced to 5-10-20 German marks a month, and 
production practically ceased in the autumn and winter of 1993/94, because any sale of 
goods was unprofitable. In those few war years reforms regressed in all respects. Most 
of the economy was transferred to the semi-war system: it practically became a single 
company, whose management board was the Government of Serbia, while company 
managers were obedient executors. 97 Poverty was at its highest in 1993, with 39 
percent of the population lived on less than $2 per day. Poverty levels rose again when 
the sanctions were re-implemented in 1998. An estimated 200,000 people emigrated 
from Serbia in the 1990s, 20 percent of whom had a higher education. Serb refugees 
from Croatia and Bosnia have crowded into the Serbia and Montenegro (around 400 
000).  
Milosevic became president of the FRY in 1997. In 1998, an ethnic Albanian 
insurgency in the formerly autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo provoked a Serbian 
counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in disputes of ethnic Albanians living in 
Kosovo. The Milosevic government's rejection of a proposed international settlement 
led to NATO's bombing of Serbia in the spring of 1999. Serbian military and police 
forces withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999, and the UN Security Council authorized an 
interim UN administration and a NATO-led security force in Kosovo.98 NATO 
bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Serbia known as the`` Angel of 
Mercy ``or NATO aggression (in FRY) was the final phase of the war in Kosovo and 
Metohija, which lasted from 24 March to 10 June, 1999. Three fifths of NATO targets 
were civilian objects, 89 industrial plants were destroyed or damaged, as well 120 
                                                             
97 This was ensured by personnel policy. If that was insufficient, there were other instruments: financial 
sanctions against the company via the control over banks; criminal prosecution of the manager for 
violating an unrealistic law (on the ban on foreign currency trading, for example); sending various 
inspections to the company; mistreatment by utilities, unfounded transfer of funds from the company 
accounts, etc. 
98 CIA. The World Factbook, 2010, p. 598.  
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energetics, 128 state objects and 357 infrastructural objects. NATO bombing caused 
damage in tens billions of dollars, 2,500 dead and 6,000 injured civilians.99 
The real goal of the bombing Federal Republic Yugoslavia had nothing to do 
with concern for the Kosovar Albanians. The actual cause was that Serbia did not 
conduct the market, social and economic reforms, which means that it was the last 
European oases that failed to, comply with neoliberal programs administered by the US 
and it had to be removed. In other words, the report by the World Bank demands the 
redefinition of the role of the state and of its place in the new international division of 
labor. The prerogatives of the state should be limited only to those functions that serve 
globalization processes. In all other domains, it should be rolled back, clearing the 
ground for non-governmental actors, among which transnational corporations play the 
leading role. The state is supposed to become an agent of globalization: the protectionist 
state and its autarkic economy are outdated and it should be replaced with a neo-liberal 
state: one of the ways in which new standards, linked to global processes of economic 
integration, are imposed. These are imposed, of course, not by platonic prescriptions 
only, but through effective and maniacal economic and political pressures.100  
At the end of first decade of transition, FRY Yugoslavia had significant, very 
large trade and current account deficits, which are unsustainable (see table 12). That 
was the case in the most of transition countries in the Balkans. In the longer run, the 
initial trade and current account deficits can be sustained if they are eventually going to 
be financed from increases in exports of goods and services. Otherwise, either imports 
will fuel consumption or production for import-substitution and the deficits will 
accumulate beyond the levels of sustainability. Therefore, the external deficits by 
themselves are not an indication of a problem, however if they are not instruments of 
growth and development they will breed instability and crisis. In the Balkans, the 
transition economies seem to be running these kinds of unsustainable external deficits 
and have already gone through one or more exchange rate or banking crises or both. As 
we can see from the table below, there is one exception – Slovenia.101 
                                                             
99Available in: <http://www.zlocininadsrbima.com/Clanci.aspx?Clanak=%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%88> 
Access in: 02 Feb. 2018. 
100 Available in: <http://www.99posto.org/srpski/srbija-u-kandama-neoliberalizma> Access in: 15 Feb. 
2018. 
101 GLIGOROV, V, et al. Reconstruction and European Integration. The wiiw Balkan Observatory 
Working Papers |001|, Oct. 1999, p. 13-14 
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Country GDP Industrial 
production 
Consumer 
Price Index  
Unemployment Current 
account  
FRY Yugoslavia 52 46 30 27 -8 
Slovenia 104 76 8 15 0 
Croatia 78 57 6 19 -7 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
40 9 16 40 -50 
FYR Macedonia 71 47 1 35 -8 
 
Table 12  – Basic macroeconomic indicators of transition ex-Yugoslav countries (1999). Source: 
National statistics and WIIW Database. 
 
Notes: GDP and industrial production are presented as indices where 1989=100. In 
some cases, retail prices are used instead of CPI. Current account is presented as percentage of 
GDP. 
All transition economies in the Balkans had significant, high or very high 
unemployment rates. FRY is not an exception. These range from about 15% in Slovenia, 
19% in Croatia. 35% in FYR Macedonia to about 40% in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In FRY 
Yugoslavia was 27% in the 1999. Employment is decreasing and unemployment is 
increasing practically everywhere. This is a consequence of the process of de-
industrialization that had been going on in the entire region.  More important; is the fact 
that the process of the closing down of industrial firms and enterprises in the region 
leads to an increase in employment in the shadow economy what will be further 
explained in this chapter.  The duration of unemployment was very long. According to 
the labor force survey, in 1998 the average duration of waiting for a job was 47.2 
months, and about 4/5 of the unemployed waited for employment for more than one 
year. 
 
3.3.2 Beginning of the new millennium 
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In the 2000, Serbia lived in a multiparty system, but with a great advantage of 
the ruling party based on the full control over government media, repression levers, 
judiciary, financial system, etc. The position of the Serbian authorities was burdened by 
two problems related to the stability and character of the state, Montenegro and Kosovo. 
The Montenegrin authorities began already in 1997, under the guise of democratization, 
to sever the ties with Serbia, gradually taking over the federal areas of competence. 
Since June 1999 Kosovo and Metohia has only nominally been part of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia, while in reality it is a protectorate of the international community.102 
On the eve of 5 October 2000, the public opinion among Serbians had decisively 
swung against their president. The transition began gradually in early 2000, spearheaded 
by Otpor, a nonviolent, student-based opposition movement, and aided by similar 
groups. As anti-Milošević sentiments gained momentum, opposing political parties 
banded together behind one candidate, Vojislav Koštunica.103 Public support for 
Koštunica mounted, and when Milošević called an early election in September 2000, he 
was soundly defeated. Though Milošević tried to claim that the election results were 
invalid, determined Serbs streamed into their capital, marched on their parliament, and 
like the Czechs and Slovaks a decade before. This moment is known as The October 5th 
Revolution.  In 2001, Milošević was arrested and sent to The Hague, in the Netherlands, 
to stand trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). Milošević served as his own attorney as his trial wore on for five years, 
frequently delayed due to his health problems. Then, on March 11, 2006 as his trial was 
coming to a close Milošević was found dead in his cell. Milosevic’s death, like his life, 
was controversial. It was a heart attack. His supporters alleged that Milošević had been 
denied suitable medical care; some speculated that he had been poisoned, and others 
suspected that he had intentionally worsened his heart condition to avoid the completion 
of his trial.104 
The New Government formed in January 25, 2001 was faced with the very 
difficult situation. The economy was destroyed, and the state was excluded from all 
international organizations. The most important part of its territory (Kosovo and 
                                                             
102 MIJATOVIC, B, et al. Four years of transition in Serbia. Center for Liberal Democratic Studies, 
2005, p. 15  
103 Vojislav Koštunica was the last president of FRY from 2000 to 2003.  He is one of the founders and 
the first president of the Democratic Party of Serbia. 
104 Available in: https://www.ricksteves.com/watch-read-listen/read/understanding-yugoslavia Access in: 
09 Jan. 2018. 
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Metohia) was under the foreign protectorate. The damages due to NATO bombing 
totaled over EUR 20 billion.105 The Kosovo crisis has had a significant economic 
impact on neighboring countries and on the region as a whole. This has manifested itself 
principally in three ways: (1) costs of refugees and other costs directly connected with 
the war, (2) losses in income and output due to falls in foreign trade, consumption and 
investment, and (3) stability and development costs. 106 There were around 70% non-
repaired railways, roads, schools, hospitals. The inflation was 113%. The foreign 
exchange reserves amounted to around USD 300 million. The internal debts totaled to 
EUR 15 billion. 
There were unsolved relations at the Federal State of Yugoslavia level   
outstanding liabilities to the citizens like children's allowances were not paid off for two 
years; farmer’s pensions for three years; compensation for the unemployed for two and 
half years. Overall debt for the unpaid pensions and other social benefits- totaled EUR 
230 million. The average salary amounted to around EUR 40 (7.7 times less than 
in1990), and average pension amounted around EUR 35 (5 times less than in the 1990). 
Sixty-five percent of the families were with the income per household member lower 
than needed to survive.  There were still around 400,000 refugees from the ex-Yugoslav 
Republics, primarily Serbs internally displaced Serbs from K&M. It was very corrupted 
state with strong conjunction between the state and the police leaders and the mafia, 
with the alienated centers of power. All in all one of the poorest countries in Europe.107 
In 2003, the FRY became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a loose 
federation of the two republics. In May 2006, Montenegro invoked its right under the 
Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro to hold a referendum on independence 
from the state union. The vote for severing ties with Serbia barely exceeded 55% the 
threshold set by the EU allowing Montenegro to formally restore its independence on 3 
                                                             
105 ZIVKOVIC, Zoran. Transition in Serbia – Achievements and  Challenges. London School of 
Economics, Jan. 2004. Available in: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-
archive/publicEvents/pdf/20040123Zivkovic.pdf> Access in: 27 Jan. 2018. 
106 GLIGOROV, V, et al. Reconstruction and European Integration. The wiiw Balkan Observatory 
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June 2006.108 Montenegro is the sixth country to emerge from the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. 
Two years after Montenegro separation, on Sunday, February 17, 2008, 
Kosovo’s provisional government unilaterally declared its independence as the 
“Republic of Kosovo.” The US, UK, France, Germany, and several other countries 
quickly recognized the new republic. Serbia opposed the move, and was backed by 
several countries involved in their own internal disputes with would-be breakaway 
regions.109 The Yugoslav crisis concluded in the place where it began: the Serbian 
province of Kosovo. Serbs point out that independent Kosovo quickly became a very 
close ally of the US, allowing one of Europe's biggest military bases Camp Bondsteel to 
be built in their territory. The new Kosovo government carefully stated that it would 
protect the rights of its minorities, including Serbs. However, the Serbs deeply believe 
that losing Kosovo would also mean losing their grip on their own history and culture. 
They also fear for the safety of the Serb minority there.110 Kosovo is the seventh 
country to emerge from the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
Transitions of various countries differ in many elements, but also have certain 
similarities. Two of them are a significant reduction of production in the first years of 
transition and a sharp increase in poverty. The decline in production is mostly caused by 
the collapse of the old coordination mechanism before the new one was built and the 
elimination of companies, which do not stand a chance in the market, while the increase 
in poverty is a consequence of a decrease in income, increase in inequality and slow 
                                                             
108  The referendum was controversial. The voters met the l threshold requirement of 55%. The European 
Union set the approval immediately without further checking irregularities. 
109 Russia (areas of Georgia), China (Taiwan), and Spain (Catalunya, the Basque Country, and others). 
110 The problem of Kosovo and Metohia dates back many years but so far nobody has found the right 
solution for it. The results achieved by the International Community that took over responsibility for 
solving this problem as of June 10, 1999, are also disastrous. Despite the presence of the international 
armed forces, police forces and administration, more than 200,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians were 
expelled from Kosovo and Metohia, and more than 1,300 Serbs were killed, about 1200 people being 
reported as missing. Several thousands of houses have been burnt down, more than hundred churches 
demolished, many Serbian graveyards violated and destroyed.  Serbs that have stayed in Kosovo live in 
ghettos, their safety being less than minimum, deprived of their rights to circulate freely, to work and 
educate themselves. Not only their basic human rights are jeopardized daily but also their physical 
existence their life is in danger and all that is happening in front of numerous members of International 
Forces responsible to create conditions for normal life of all citizens of Kosovo and Metohia. At the same 
time, Kosovo and Metohia is the most criminalized part of Europe, and the Albanian mafia is one of the 
most spread criminal group on our continent. In sexual trafficking and drugs trafficking, they have a 
monopolist position in most European cities, including London. The International Community has been 
tolerating this situation without fulfilling any of the serious obligations assumed under the Security 
Council Resolution No. 1244. 
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building of efficient social security mechanisms. In Serbia, the evolution of production 
and poverty during this phase of reforms went differently: production was increasing, 
while poverty was decreasing, which can be interpreted as specificities of local 
transition.  Let us look at the possible reasons. There are several reasons for the absence 
of decline in production, or for its increase. First, Serbia did not have a radical break in 
the coordination mechanism unlike the vast majority of countries in transition, i.e. in 
2000; it did not shift from a central planning system to a market system, since it was 
already in the market system, which, although deformed by the socialist government 
and party, was still a market system. The liberalization of prices, foreign trade and 
business overall at the end of 2000 and at the beginning of 2001 merely abolished much 
unnecessary regulation. Second, macroeconomic stabilization also brought 
improvement of the business environment and enabled growth. Third, the considerable 
inflow of external financial support (3.2 billion euros in the period October 2000 – end 
2004) did foster domestic production, although considerable part of it was transferred to 
imports. Fourth, after the victory of the democratic forces the last sanctions against 
Serbia, the financial ones, were also lifted that also generated a positive effect on 
economic activity. 111 In other words, the beginning of actual transition did not bring 
any reasons for production decline, but on the contrary, for its increase.  
Unlike some other countries in transition (such as Poland) where the private 
sector very soon became the main driver of economic progress, the new private sector in 
Serbia was growing well, but was not that strong. The weak banking sector was the 
crucial lessen factor for the private sector development in Serbia. International financial 
institutions, in particular the IMF,112 were carried out restructuring and privatization. 
Specialized bank founded by foreign banks and several credit lines from abroad and 
have been very useful in the creation and growth of small private companies, but it was 
not sufficient. Slow transition was the consequence not only of regulatory, economic 
and political weaknesses, but also political causes (the issues of the state’s borders, 
Hague Tribunal, etc.)  
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112 This international financial organization practically produces an assessment whether Serbia’s 
economic reforms are successful or not, which has a direct impact on the country’s credit worthiness, as 
well as on the investment rating of the country, and that is the key danger. 
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3.4 Labor market transition  
 
During the first years of transition, all transition economies in the Balkans have 
significant, high or very high unemployment rates. It is usual for the employment to be 
one of the first victims of structural changes. Employment is decreasing and 
unemployment is increasing practically everywhere.113 Serbia was no an exception. 
There were four basic categories on the Serbian labor market during this period: 
1) the formally employed, 2) the redundant, 3) those active in the grey economy and 4) 
the (formally) unemployed. There are overlaps between these categories: part of the 
employed in the formal economy is also active in the grey one, and part of them are 
redundant; part of the formally unemployed is also active in the grey sector. The causes 
of such overlaps are numerous, as for example, many of those employed in the formal 
economy have an interest to work in the grey economy as well to increase their 
otherwise modest income, and there are opportunities for it because many companies 
did not operate at full capacity or not at all. Because of the weaknesses of official 
statistics, there were dilemmas related to the basic labor market figures employment and 
unemployment, average wage. They depended on the definitions used and the 
methodology of calculation. 
The total employment fell by 200,000 from 1991 to 2000, i.e. from 2.2 to 2.0 
million. The basic contribution to the adverse employment trends came from the sector 
of state and socially owned companies (including mixed), where employment dropped 
by more than half a million, from 2.1 to 1.6 million.114 The private sector had a positive 
employment dynamics, but the opportunities for a faster development of this sector and 
greater employment by the same were not utilized. It increased employment by more 
than 300,000, but did not manage to make up for the fall in the state/socially owned 
sector. The private sector avoided high taxes and contributions hiring employees 
without registering them, which reduced the growth of formal employment.115 Almost 
half of all of the jobs are still held outside the private sector. The share of private sector 
employment in Serbia in 2005 was still small; only 57% of total employment belongs to 
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114 Available in: <http://www.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Default.aspx> Access in: 05 Dec. 2017. 
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the private sector. The share in state-owned enterprises is 25% and 13% are in socially 
owned enterprises, with the remaining 5% in mixed enterprises, cooperatives, or 
enterprises of unknown ownership.116 
The reasons for such dynamics of employment lie in the economic activity 
trends. The decrease in the domestic product of the formal sector was accompanied by a 
decrease in employment, although at a slower pace. This difference in the speed of 
decline caused a large rise in the number of surplus employees (hidden unemployment), 
i.e. those employees who did not contribute to the production of goods or services. Such 
processes are the result of the government policy of preventing employee layoffs, i.e. 
transferring the social policy from the state to companies. 
Meanwhile, registered unemployment was on the rise. It increased between 1991 
and 2000 from 522,000 to 723,000.117 These figures hardly reflected true employment 
trends, since the registering with the labor market completely lost the character it should 
have: namely, many of the unemployed who were actually looking for a job stopped 
registering with employment bureaus since there was no hope that they would find a job 
that way. On the other hand, those who were not really looking for a job were registered 
to obtain benefits the status of the formally unemployed entailed (health insurance, child 
allowance, etc.) 
 
3.4.1 Labor Relations in the 90s  
 
During the 1990s, certain labor legislation reforms were introduced (labor 
relations laws were passed in 1991 and 1996), but they mostly involved formal 
adjustment to market economy in little or least important domains. For instance, 
collective bargaining was introduced, but it was controlled by the state. These changes 
of the labor legislation were a part of a very slow transition from the socialist towards 
the market system.  
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Available in: 
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The hiring of employees faced considerable procedural and formal requirements. 
First, as a rule, the vacancy had to be filled by means of public announcement, with all 
the accompanying procedures (selection committee, supervisory body, etc.), which 
complicated and lengthened the procedure. Secondly, for each position there was, in 
accordance with the legal requirements, a job plan with the necessary qualifications, 
which significantly and frequently narrowed unnecessarily the scope of candidates for 
hiring. In the system, which is becoming a market system, the obstacles to free 
recruitment of employees by owners or managers selected by them become 
counterproductive and impedes a normal and inexpensive flow of staff expansion or 
renewal. 
Firing for economic reasons was almost a mission impossible. First, although the 
law provided for the possibility of dismissing employees due to organizational, 
economic or technological reasons, during the most part of the nineties, a decree was in 
force banning employee layoffs during the UN sanctions against Serbia, with the so-
called forced leaves to which were sent employees for whom there was no work; 
besides, there was a direct legal ban on dismissing certain categories of employees 
(veterans etc.) Secondly, the political atmosphere during this decade was completely 
against the layoffs, which, due to the domination of party state over economy, 
automatically meant that company directors completely avoided layoffs. In other words, 
even when it was possible, there were no layoffs for fear of government reaction. And, 
thirdly, the costs of possible layoff, stipulated in the Law on Labor Relations, were 
exceptionally high, and amounted to 24-36 employee wages, in the form of a single 
redundancy pay. What was even more unfavorable, those high costs of the adjusting of 
the labor force to the necessary level were supposed to be borne by the companies 
which, as a rule, were in a bad situation and which were supposed to be saved by 
restructuring, including the reduction of employee number, from the impending 
bankruptcy. The only way of labor force reduction was the natural outflow due to 
retirement or the employee’s leaving his/her job willingly, which for most of the 
companies was too slow a process.118 
Collective bargaining was contemplated as an unavoidable and centralized 
system. Unavoidable, because the obligation of collective bargaining is stipulated, 
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although it goes against the logic of collective bargaining and against the rules of the 
International Labor Organization on the freedom of collective bargaining. Centralized, 
because there was an applicable rule that everybody had to comply with the provisions 
of the “higher” collective bargaining agreement, even if they did not conclude “their 
own” collective bargaining agreement. In other words, it was sufficient that the all-
powerful Government of Serbia conclude the republic collective bargaining agreement 
with its faithful political allies, the Independent Trade Union and the Chamber of Trade 
and Industry of Serbia and that all companies were obliged to apply it, regardless of 
whether it suited them or what they thought of it. The main victim of the system of 
collective bargaining designed in such a manner was the setting of wages, which was, 
thus, transferred from companies to collective agreements.119 The party state tolerated 
such company behavior since in this manner it got propaganda points as a declared 
protector of employee interests, but since it also laid down high taxes and contributions 
on the minimum base of such unrealistically determined wages.  
All the reasons written above affected the companies’ behavior: instead of legal 
employment there was mass grey employment or employment through youth 
employment cooperatives, by means of service contracts, temporary work and similar 
legal and illegal techniques of avoiding full employment. That is how restrictive 
legislation produced its opposite the shift of employment from formal to grey and quasi-
formal arrangements. Socially and state owned companies in Serbia in the 1990s were 
increasingly turning into welfare centers for employees, and were less and less 
production and profit centers. The basic division was into the employed and the 
unemployed: the employed had jobs and the accompanying benefits, while the 
unemployed were pushed to the margins, with very bleak prospects.120 Among the latter 
prevailed the young and educated. They responded on that seeking for the better living 
conditions by emigrating.  
                                                             
119 The basic price of labor”, as the minimum price for the simplest work, as well as the prices of labor for 
other employee categories were most often set at a level much higher than the market one, and most often 
could not be paid out, since companies could not bear such high labor costs. 
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in the period of receiving the compensation. The cash compensation amounted to 70% of their net wages 
in the last month of employment, and the period in which they received payments lasted up to 24 months, 
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become entitled under the law to old-age pension. Of course, the other unemployed persons (i.e. those 
who were looking for their first job and those who voluntarily terminated employment) did not have such 
favorable rights. 
90 
 
Serbia end up the 20 century as a country with a legal anomy, or lawlessness, so 
the chaos in economic life was an inevitable consequence. Practically no one respected 
the laws, partially because they could not be enforced and because the insistence on 
their enforcement would stall the economic life, and partially because that favored 
certain individuals from the ruling regime at the expense of other subjects. This created 
a situation in which nothing was safe. The state was used as an instrument for amassing 
wealth, many did not live by their work or entrepreneurship, but like parasites, at 
someone else’s expense.121 
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3.4.2 Legislative Changes 2001-2005 
 
The new Labor Law was passed in December 2001. It was an important step on 
the reform path and was passed after an exciting political struggle, and belongs to the 
category of laws common in market and transitional economies. While the 1996 Labor 
Relations Law set, the minimum wage in a simple way at 35% of the average wage the 
2001 Labor Law stipulated that it be determined according to the cost of living, needs, 
labor market situations and development of Serbia. Such flexible criteria turned the 
system of setting the minimum wage into constant haggling, where the trade unions 
demand as much as possible, the government offers less, and the final outcome is 
somewhere in between. A witness to the above is the ratio of minimum to average wage 
in Serbia: from 35% towards the end of 2001, through 43% in January 2002, to 47% in 
January 2005. 
Up to 2001, both general and special agreements directly bound all employers. 
The Employment Law was passed in 2003.122  The improvement in comparison to the 
previous solutions was the fact that the general collective bargaining agreement (for the 
whole of Serbia) and the social collective bargaining agreement (for a smaller territory 
or a group) bind only those employers who are the members of the association, which 
signed these agreements and not everybody else as well. 
Two leading trade unions in Serbia were displeased with the 2001 Labor Law 
and in the following period led a tough propaganda campaign against it, claiming that 
the pendulum swung too much to the employer’s side to the detriment of employees, 
and that it needs balancing out. The Law was adopted, after the disallowed text 
corrections and repeated vote in the Parliament in March 2005. The novelty in this law 
is the chapter on additional employee rights during the bankruptcy procedure. The 
employees who have claims against the company in which they worked, and which is 
under bankruptcy, gained the opportunity to collect part of their claims outside and prior 
to the bankruptcy proceedings itself. Their claims are taken over by the newly 
established Solidarity Fund, who pays them in advance. Who finances it? The Republic 
of Serbia budget. It was not clear why the taxpayers, which definitely include some 
poor people, should finance the payment of private claims of private persons against 
                                                             
122 It was supposed to provide a necessary level of protection from unemployment and to ensure that the 
active employment measures are implemented through the National Employment Service. 
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private companies. 123 There are no big changes in collective bargaining. All participants 
are still obligated to negotiate, but they do not have to form an arbitration body, so there 
is no obligation to have a collective agreement and the whole deal may fail. The novelty 
was that the minister, for justified reasons, exempt some employers or associations from 
the application of the collective agreements in the part related to wages. 
 
3.4.3 Chief Labour Market Indicators 
 
Official data indicate that in 2003 there were 1,987,000 employees, and around 
995,000 unemployed persons, and that the unemployment rate has reached the 
unbelievable 33.4 percent. Alternative research (LFS, 2003) indicates that the number of 
employed persons is higher by almost a million people, while unemployment is lower 
by one third; consequently, the unemployment rate stands at about 18.5 percent. Formal 
employment during the period 2000-2004124 did not plummet, but was mostly stagnant, 
with slight decline in the last few years (see graph).  
 
 
Graph 5 – Employment in Serbia, 2000-2004. Sources: Labor Force 
Survey, Republic Statistics Office of Serbia various years.  
 
                                                             
123 MIJATOVIC, B, et al. Four years of transition in Serbia. Center for Liberal Democratic 
Studies, 2005, p. 320. 
124 Employment trends are displayed based on two sources of data: Labor Force Survey and regular 
statistics. The differences between them are not great, neither in level nor in trend. 
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Apart from those who are formally employed, there were many other individuals 
who worked and earned money, such as farmers, participants in the grey economy, 
temporarily active, etc. They numbered about 1 million, which means that those who 
work and are “employed” according to the definition of the International Labor 
Organization number about 3 million (2 million of the formally employed and 1 million 
of others).125 
Informal employment is important both to the economy and to the welfare of 
many households; however, it is also significantly correlated with low earnings, 
poverty, and vulnerability. On the one hand, informal employment, in Serbia as 
elsewhere, is the main source of labor market flexibility as well as providing an 
important safety net. On the other hand, it seems to be the “employer of last resort” and 
is associated with low productivity, low earnings, and a lack of protection. There is a 
high incidence of poverty among workers employed in the informal sector: those who 
had their principal job in the informal sector (30 % of all workers in 2002), had a 
poverty rate higher than average by one-third.126 
During the years under observation, all relevant rates were edging down the rate 
of participation (share of the employed and the unemployed in the working age 
population), rate of activity (share of the employed and the unemployed in the 
population aged 15 or above) and rate of employment (share of the employed in the 
population aged 15 or above). 127 There were two reasons: 1) gradual reduction of 
employment and increase of unemployment: 2) gradual passivation of the unemployed, 
i.e. the abandoning of the status of the unemployed on the part of those who lost hope 
that they would ever find a job. Those trends match the processes in other countries in 
transition too, but in Serbia, the values are (were) higher in the previous years owing to 
the delay in transition and/or company restructuring. The movements in the rate of 
employment in five-year age cohorts we can see from graph 6 presented below. 
 
                                                             
125 See Labor Force Survey, Republic Statistics Office (RZS), various year 
126 WORLD Bank, Serbia: Labor Market Assessment, Report No. 36576-YU, September 2006, p. 33. 
Available in: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPSOCPRO/Resources/SerbiaLMAReport36576YU.
pdf> Access in: 18 Dec. 2017. 
127 In 2004, the methodology of Labor Force Surveys was changed. 
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Graph 6 – Employment rates (in %). Available in: <http: 
http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.aspx?pKey=2> Access in: 27 Jan. 
2018.  
 
It can be seen that the employment rate between the ages of 30 and 49, when it is 
maximal, reaches only about three quarters. This means that every fourth inhabitant of 
Serbia from these most productive cohorts does not work, which is certainly too many. 
There is a considerable difference between men and women: while the rate of 
employment of men in the above cohorts exceeds 80%, in women it barely exceeds 
60%. Similarly, the overall rate of employment for men for the ages 15-64 is 63.2% and 
for women it is 44.1%. 
Serbia had a very low share of flexible employment forms (part-time, temporary 
employment). It was about 1% of total employment. It was not good because flexible 
forms could be an important channel for the employment of women and youth, who are 
particularly threatened by unemployment. The share of self-employed in the total 
number of employees was also very low about 5% and much lower than in the advanced 
countries in transition (over 10%) and the developed countries (OECD about 15%). 
The employment in the grey economy was very high. For example in 2002, the 
ratio between employment in formal and grey economy was 70 to 30% according to the 
Standard of Living Survey128. Such a high percentage of those active in the grey 
economy speaks of the failure of the state to reduce grey economy. State could do that 
through milder fiscal policy, liberalization of economic regulations, and control 
mechanisms (repression) but unfortunately, in Serbia it was not a case.  
                                                             
128  See: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Republic of Serbia Government, 2003. 
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Beside fictitious employment, unemployment was an acute problem of the 
Serbian economy. That was predominantly a consequence of slow job creation, poor 
business environment, and in particular to strict regulations on protection of 
employment. Those strict regulations were adopted despite warnings from strategic 
investors that such legislation would only undermine chances for employment growth.  
In addition, job creation was also slowed down by relatively high unit labor costs, 
which are for the most part a result of the pressure on wages exerted by insiders, i.e. 
workers in state owned enterprises or privatized companies. Overall, more attention was 
paid to the preservation of the existing jobs, than to creation of new opportunities for 
employment.  
As it shown in the graph below the first years of this transition wave in Serbia 
were characterized by a noticeable growth of unemployment.  
 
 
Graph 7– Unemployment in Serbia, 2000-2004. Sources: LFS and Serbia 
National Employment Service (NES) various years. 
 
As may be seen, two relevant source of data on the level of unemployment in 
Serbia give different results. It is usually considered that the NES, data overestimate the 
actual unemployment, since there exist strong incentives for the individuals who work 
in the informal sector, i.e. who are not jobless, to register with the National 
Employment Service: health care, right to various welfare benefits, etc. On the other 
hand, one may say that the Labor Force Survey data underestimate unemployment, 
since even those people who work only one hour per week are considered employed. It 
would probably be the most accurate to consider these two measures of unemployment 
the bottom and top limit of actual unemployment in Serbia. The unemployment rates in 
Serbia 2000-2004 provided by National Employment Service are shown in the table 13. 
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  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
NES* 25,6 26,8 29,0 31,7 31,7 
 
Table 13 – Unemployment rates in Serbia 2000-2004. Source: Serbia National 
Employment Service (NES) various years.  
  
*The rate was calculated as the ratio between the number of the unemployed and the 
sum of employed and the unemployed  
**The rate was calculated as the ratio of the unemployed and the active population  
Education is generally associated with better outcomes. According to the LFS, in 
2002 women experienced a somewhat higher than average rate of employment (14% 
compared to men 9%), and the people with secondary education, including technical 
(14%). The lowest unemployment rates are among those who have no education (3%) 
and those with a university degree (6%).  Individuals with college education or higher 
have the highest labor force participation and employment rates and the lowest 
unemployment rates.  
Although young people everywhere tend to have problems making the transition 
into the labor market, their situation in Serbia has been particularly difficult. They have 
been facing serious problems. The unemployment rate for youth in 2005 was 48%. 
Furthermore, new entrants account for almost half of total unemployment, and 78% of 
the youth unemployed are new entrants. Labor market problems are especially pressing 
for young women. Educational attainment does not reduce this unemployment rate. 
Among women between 15 and 24, the unemployment rate is 52%. When young people 
do find jobs, it is more often in the informal sector than in the formal sector. Among the 
poorly educated, the experience is similar: less than 15% of those with primary 
education incomplete and around 9% of youth with primary school completed were 
employed in 2005. 129 Some of the reasons of low youth employment in this period are 
                                                             
129 WORLD Bank, Serbia: Labor Market Assessment, Report No. 36576-YU, Sep. 2006, p. 38-39. 
Available in: 
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some young people did not look for work because they were still in school; in 2005, this 
reason was reported by 87% of youth not in the labor force. The second reason was 
many young people looking for work experience difficulties finding a job.130 
The unemployment problem is exacerbated by the fact that, once many workers 
become unemployed, they remain without work for very long period. The duration of 
unemployment was very long: in 2002, it reached 47 months on average (table 14). 
 
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Under 1 18,2 26,6 25,7 24,7 
1-3 32,2 27,5 31,9 33,6 
3-8 31,6 27,1 25,5 25,0 
Over 8 18,0 18,7 16,9 16,8 
 
Table 14 – Unemployed by length of unemployment (in %). Source: LFS, various years 
 
In 2003, unemployment is still a long-term situation: three quarters of the jobless 
have not had a job for over a year, and 1 in 6 has been unemployed for more than 8 
years. In OECD countries, these ratios were quite the opposite: about three quarters of 
the jobless have not had a job for less than a year. The flexibility of the labor market 
there is much stronger, as are the chances of the unemployed to find a new job fast. In 
2005, 79% of all unemployed workers had been without work for at least one year. 
There are various reasons for such situation. One is the lack of new job opportunities. 
This is especially happening in lagging parts of the country. Some of the long-term 
unemployed lost their jobs through enterprise restructuring and are able to survive 
because of enhanced severance payments, extended unemployment benefits, and other 
forms of support. Many of the long-term unemployed did not have the required 
education or skills even where opportunities exist. Willingness or ability to move to 
more dynamic parts of the country may also was a problem.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPSOCPRO/Resources/SerbiaLMAReport36576YU.
pdf> Access in: 18 Dec. 2017. 
130 Given the importance of education for future labor market performance, this could be a positive factor. 
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During the transition period, average nominal wage in Serbia grew very fast. 
Very soon after 2000, the population was again able to finance the minimum 
consumer’s basket out of one average wage. Generous initial foreign donations, policy 
of dinar appreciation and subsidizing domestic aggregate demand, were key instruments 
to achieve that. International financiers, led by the World Bank and the EU, agreed with 
the rise of the individual income for two reasons: first, to pull the production by the 
increase in domestic demand, and, secondly, so that the general public better accepts the 
transition. That is why they were ready to provide the appropriate financial support to 
Serbia.131 The living standards of the population were additionally improved through a 
substantial inflow of private remittances, which largely contributed to the high growth 
of consumer goods imports and had a substantial impact on the widening of the 
country’s trade deficit.132 
When the nominal growth is adjusted for the cost of living index it can be seen 
that even the real growth of wages was high between 2001 and 2004 (graph 8) with the 
explosion in 2002. 
 
     
 
 
                                                             
131 Siromaštvo i reforma institucija podrške siromašnima (Poverty and the Reform of the Institutions 
Supporting the Poor), Ministry for Social Affairs and CLDS, 2003, p. 69. Available in: 
<http://www.clds.rs/pdf-s/siromastvo.pdf> Access in: 28 Feb. 2018. 
132 Practically every year imports of household appliances were doubled, but for TV sets they were tripled 
every year, and for washing machines increased five times every year.  
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  Graph 8 –  Wage trends – real growth. Available in : 
<http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.aspx?pKey=2> Access 
in :  28 Feb. 2018. 
 
The accelerated pace of the wages in 2001 and 2002 by 16.4 and exceptionally 
high 47.2 percent respectively was the consequence of certain production activation, 
but, even more so, a significant inflow from the funds from abroad in the form of aid, 
loans and privatization proceeds. 
Real wage growth of more than 20 percent a year, which happened in Serbia, has 
not been seen in any transition economy. In other transition economies, was established 
a very clear mechanism, in which productivity growth was “pulling” growth in the gross 
domestic product, while real wages were growing at a much slower pace. Thus, almost 
no real wage growth (a mere 0.84 percent a year) accompanied high productivity growth 
in Hungary of almost 15 percent a year all the while to 2000, in Romania and Bulgaria 
productivity growth was accompanied by a drop in real wages (by 3 and 7 percent, 
respectively), while the countries which are considered the most “generous”, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states and Slovenia, registered wage increases of less than 
5 percent a year.133 As it demonstrated in the table 15, in almost all countries faster, 
wage growth was “paid” by a higher unemployment rate. 
 
 
 
Country  Productivity GDP Wages 
Bulgaria 5,5 0,7 -6,6 
Czech Rep. 6,7 2 5,1 
Estonia ... 2,5 4,8 
Hungary 14,6 3,4 0,8 
                                                             
133 POPOVIC, Danica. Economic Activity and Macroeconomic Policies. In: MIJATOVIC, B, et al. Four 
years of transition in Serbia, Center for Liberal Democratic Studies, 2005, p. 59  
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Latvia ... 0,9 4,8 
Lithuania ... -1,7 3,1 
Poland 11,3 6 6,8 
Romania 7,9 0,6 -2,2 
Slovakia 5,8 4,2 1,6 
Slovenia 8 4,8 4,9 
Serbia 5,5 4,7 19,8 
 
Table 15 – Growth in gross domestic product, productivity and real wages in transition 
countries, 2003, in percentage. Source: POPOVIC, Danica. Economic Activity and 
Macroeconomic Policies. In: MIJATOVIC, B, et al. Four years of transition in Serbia, Center 
for Liberal Democratic Studies, 2005, p. 60 
 
Expressed in euros, wages in late 2004, due to high appreciation of the dinar, 
were as many as four times higher than in late 2000: from €80 (October 2000), gross 
wages reached the level of €320 in December 2004.  Thus exceeded the level of average 
gross wages in Bulgaria (€230) and Romania (€210). 134 Yet, relative to the average 
wage in Serbia of DM752 (€380) in December 1990, when the number of employees 
was also much larger, thus total household incomes as well, the perception of poverty in 
Serbia is much higher than one can possibly realize on the basis of available statistics.135 
In parallel to high real wage growth and significant widening of wage scales, in 
Serbia not every one in six employees in the socially owned sector received any wage at 
all.136 Data for 2005 show that more than 190,000 employees, or every one in six 
employees in the socially owned sector, are either not paid wages or their wages are 
paid with enormous delays, in some case as long as several years (see table 16).  
                                                             
134 POPOVIC, Danica. Economic Activity and Macroeconomic Policies. In: MIJATOVIC, B. et al. Four 
years of transition in Serbia, Center for Liberal Democratic Studies, 2005, p. 58. 
135 The average wage in December 1990 amounted to DM752, to reach its absolute minimum of DM21 in 
December 1993. In the period 1994 -1998, the average wage amounted to around DM 170, in the course 
of 1999 it fell to DM80, which was its level also just before the beginning of transition. 
136 In Serbia the state was main owner of capital and a main employer. One of the ways to “buy” social 
peace, was overstaffing and there is great reluctance to lay off redundant workers. One of the ways to 
align expenditures with the level of activity was to accumulate wage arrears. 
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Table 16 – Employees to whom wages have not been paid 2005. Source: SSO, 
Communiqué, n.129, Jun. 2005 
 
Understanding labor market trends requires good data but unfortunately, in 
Serbia, there are many problems regarding the long-term data available. There is a lack 
of comparable (and reliable) data over time, even since the post-Milosevic transition. 
The LFS data have been available since 1995; the survey has had quality issues that 
have only improved beginning in 2004 when the methodology was brought into line 
with Eurostat definitions. This change in methodology implies a break in the long-term 
trend results from before 2004 cannot be properly compared with results since.137   
From all presented the above, some conclusions can be drawn:  a large number 
of workers were obviously employed in the gray economy, employment in private 
sector was greater than registered, and the total wage bill in Serbia was higher than 
statistics could register.  The transition countries that have had some success in terms of 
labor market performance have generally gone through a lengthy two-stage process. In 
the initial stage, the labor market situation is dominated by substantial job destruction as 
the state sector is downsized. Productivity and even output may increase but, inevitably, 
unemployment remains high and even rises during this stage. This difficult process, 
however, is necessary in setting the pre-conditions for the second stage where growth is 
led by a dynamic private sector where new firms are being started and existing ones are 
expanding. A number of the Central and Eastern European countries that embarked on a 
complete and permanent reform in the early 1990s are well along in this process.138  
                                                             
137 WORLD Bank, Serbia: Labor Market Assessment, Report No. 36576-YU, September 2006, p. 4 
Available in: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPSOCPRO/Resources/SerbiaLMAReport36576YU.
pdf> Access in: 04 Mar. 2018. 
138 WORLD Bank, Serbia: Labor Market Assessment, Report No. 36576-YU, September 2006, p. 14. 
Available in: 
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Because of political events, and others reasons mentioned above in the text Serbia did 
not achieve the same success as those countries. Serbia had and still has a lot of 
catching up to do. It is evident that there was unemployment problem in Serbia in 
presented period. The number of unemployed increased and number of employed 
decreased. Serbia belonged to the most unfavorable group of countries in transition, 
while it exceeds by far OECD and EU countries. 
 
3.5 Accession to the European Union 
 
The European Union is an economic and political union of 28 member states. It 
has a population of over 500 million. The founding members of the bloc were Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, who signed the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957 to set up the EU's predecessor. First called the "European Economic 
Community", the bloc replaced the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
continental economic alliance forged in the aftermath of World War II. The Maastricht 
Treaty established the European Union under its current name in 1993. Germany is its 
most populous member and France is the largest by land mass. The primacy of large 
and rich countries remains undisputed even on the level of informal agreements and 
inter-state pacts that precede formal decisions in EU bodies. The official and the 
nonofficial candidates for EU membership are much weaker than its strongest members 
such as France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain not only economically but also in 
respect to civil, economic and political culture, which is the consequence of 45 years of 
Communism, as well as of more ancient Central European and Eastern European 
traditions.   
The strongest impetus to reforms not only in Serbia, but in the whole 
Southeastern Europe as well, has been the EU accession process. The EU has developed 
a policy to support the gradual integration of these countries with the Union. Slovenia 
joined in 2004. Croatia started accession talks on 3 October 2005 and joined on 1 July 
2013. Four former Yugoslavian countries, as well as Kosovo, are waiting in the wings 
to join the European Union. They can join the EU one day, if they meet the criteria. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPSOCPRO/Resources/SerbiaLMAReport36576YU.
pdf> Access in: 05 Aug. 2017. 
103 
 
order to become a member state, a country must meet the so-called Copenhagen Criteria 
of functional market economy, efficient protection of civil rights and the rule of law in 
general and political stability, which all implies the harmonization of the candidate 
country’s legislation and practice with the European Union. In this way, a country 
aspiring to the EU membership is forced to gradually change its legislation towards 
reforms and improve the functioning of its institutions. Serbia, Montenegro, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania are official candidates. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate countries. On the map below is 
presented current situation of Western Balkan countries in its process of integration in 
EU.139  
 
 
Map 4 – Western Balkans and the EU. Source: European Commission.  
 
Under Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, any European country 
that respects the set of values spelled out in its Article 2 (human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, rule of law and respect of human rights, including the rights of 
minorities) and which has committed itself to promoting them may apply for accession 
to. The analytical review stage of legislation begins with the so-called explanatory 
screening within which the European Commission presents to the candidate country the 
                                                             
139 “After Croatia’s accession to the EU, in July 2013, the next Western Balkan accession cannot expect 
to happen until, at least, 2020. Things, however, have been worsening. Several years ago, the year 2020 
was considered the most pessimistic possible date; it is now the most optimistic one, and important for 
only one or two countries. Before Croatia, the average period from application for membership to 
accession was 10 years. It took Croatia, as the most advanced country in the region, 13 years. CEE 
countries became EU members a decade and a half after their exit from communism, Croatia almost a 
quarter of a century after, and it will take other WB countries at least three or more decades - twice as 
much time as CEE countries.” Text available in: <http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-
graz.at/biepag/node/122> Access in:  08 Aug. 2017. 
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EU acquis communautaire divided into negotiating chapters, while the level of 
conformity of the candidate country's legal system with the legal system of the EU is 
assessed through the so-called bilateral screening. Then, the discrepancies between the 
two legal systems and measures designed to overcome them are being identified, based 
on which an implementation Action Plan is being drafted and its timescale defined. 
Following the completion of bilateral screening meetings, the European Commission 
presents its Screening Report to the Member States, containing recommendations on the 
opening of negotiations for a particular chapter, and, possibly opening benchmarks. 
Concretely, the screening process for the Republic of Serbia lasted from September 
2013 to late March 2015. Representatives of the European Commission have underlined 
that they are pleased with the screenings, for they demonstrated a high level of 
preparedness and commitment of the Serbian administration to the entire process, and to 
reforms.140  
Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 
April 2008. By means of this Agreement, the Republic of Serbia and the European 
Union have entered for the first time a stage of relations regulated by an all-embracing 
agreement, whereby Serbian EU membership prospects have been reaffirmed.141 Serbia 
submitted its application for EU membership in December 2009 and was granted 
candidate status in March 2012 after Belgrade and Pristina reached an agreement on 
Kosovo’s regional representation. Serbia's EU prospects improved after the arrest on 26 
May 2011 of Europe's most wanted war crimes suspect, Gen Ratko Mladic. The former 
Bosnian Serb commander had been on the run for 16 years.142 That was not welcomed 
among the majority of Serbs. Acknowledging Serbia’s progress towards normalizing 
relations with Kosovo, in the June 2013 meeting of the European Council endorsed the 
Commission’s recommendation to open accession negotiations with Serbia. The EU-
Serbia SAA entered into force in September 2013, and accession negotiations with 
Serbia were formally opened on 21 January 2014. The first two chapters, including the 
one on normalization of relations with Kosovo, were opened in December 2015. A 
                                                             
140 Available in: <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/themes/public-consultation-on-the-eu-strategy-for-the-
adriatic-and-ionian-region > Access in: 09 Aug. 2017. 
141Available in: 
<http://www.shanghai.mfa.gov.rs/newstext.php?subaction=showfull&id=1475728783&ucat=19&templat
e=Frontpage3&> Access in: 10 Aug. 2017. 
142 "A great obstacle on the Serbian road to the European Union has been removed". Stefan Fuele, EU 
Enlargement Commissioner, May 2011. Available in: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-
warcrimes-enlargement/eu-says-mladic-arrest-removes-big-obstacle-for-serbia-
idUSTRE74P53520110526> Access in: 15 Aug. 2017.   
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Commission report said the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo had shown "political courage 
and maturity" in tackling difficult issues jointly, as well as a commitment to better 
relations.143 Earlier Belgrade had agreed to allow Kosovo to take part in west Balkan 
regional meetings, despite refusing to recognize its independence.144 Moreover, the two 
sides agreed to control their volatile border jointly.  
EU is Serbia's most important trading and investment partner and, consequently, 
one of the major factors of its economic stability. Citizens of Serbia enjoy visa-free 
travel to the Schengen area, which includes most of the EU. In 2016, Serbia and the 
European Union have marked the anniversary 15 years of development assistance to 
Serbia, by organizing a range of events for the benefit of Serbian citizens. Since 2001, 
Serbia has benefited from more than EUR3 billion in non-refundable grants from EU 
pre-accession funds. Financial assistance has been spent on programs and projects in 
Serbia, which fostered development and concrete reforms and brought benefits to 
citizens in many areas from health and rehabilitation of infrastructure, to environmental 
protection and education.145 
So far, in the course of the negotiating process between the Republic of Serbia 
and the European Union a total of six Inter-Governmental Conferences have been held, 
opening ten negotiating chapters, of which two were provisionally closed at the same 
time. For its part, the Republic of Serbia has intensified its efforts and undertaken all 
necessary measures and activities to meet the basic requirements to prepare the 
remaining chapters for opening as soon as possible.146 In the table below, we can see 
milestones of Serbian and EU relations during this long-term   process.  
                                                             
143 A majority of Serbs see Kosovo as the "cradle of the nation", and would not accept the possibility of 
losing it to the majority Albanian population.  
144 “Serbia cannot accept that it is legal that one part of your territory can claim independence without 
your agreement. Tomorrow this might reoccur in some other part of the world. Take for example 
Catalonia in Spain. They want to repeat this example of Kosovo, unilateral and without any agreement 
from Madrid. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, told me that the US had been 
investing in the independence of Kosovo for about 20 years. I asked her how this could be possible, 
because at that time the US were supporting the sovereignty of Serbia. She said: Yes, we are actually 
supporting the sovereignty of Serbia, but without Kosovo. And I said: Well, the Russian Foreign Minister 
Lavrov said the same thing to me. He said that Russia respects the sovereignty of Ukraine, but without 
Crimea. So what can we do?  I only hope that the EU will survive until we enter.” Ivica Dačić , Serbian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs , Jun.  2015. Available in: <http://www.dw.com/en/serbia-foreign-minister-
ivica-dacic-i-hope-the-eu-will-survive-until-were-ready-to-join/a-19539484> Access in: 22 Aug. 2017. 
145 Available in: <https://europa.rs/tag/serbia-eu-15-years-partnership/?lang=en> Access in: 22 Aug. 
2017. 
146 Available in: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/serbia/> Access in: 02 Sep. 
2017. 
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Table 17  – Milestones in EU – Serbia Relations. Available in: <http://europa.rs/?lang=sr-
Cyrl> Access in: 02 Sep. 2017. 
 
In the next planning period, the EU expects the Republic of Serbia to ensure full 
implementation of the key reforms and legislation, particularly in judicial reform, the 
fight against corruption and organized crime, public administration reform, 
independence of institutions, media reform, non-discrimination and protection of 
minorities. Particular importance is attached to the harmonization of the dynamic of the 
Serbia opens another two chapters at the Sixth Intergovernmental Conference in 
Luxembourg: Chapter 7 – Intellectual Property and Chapter 29 – Customs Union.
20/06/2017
The third Intergovernmental Conference sees the opening of further negotiating chapters: 
23 – dealing with judiciary reform and fundamental rights and 24 – dealing with justice, 
freedom and security
18/07/2016
The fourth Intergovernmental Conference sees the opening of another two negotiating 
chapters: 5 – dealing with public procurement and 25 – dealing with science and research 
which was closed immediately
Serbia opens two chapters at the Intergovernmental Conference: Chapter 20 – Enterprise 
and Industrial Policy – and Chapter 26 – Education and Culture. The latter was 
provisionally closed the same day
13/12/2016
27/02/2017
Council adopted the negotiating framework with Serbia and agreed to hold the 1st 
Intergovernmental Conference with Serbia in January 2014
1st EU-Serbia Intergovernmental Conference held
The second Intergovernmental Conference on Serbia’s EU accession sees the opening of 
two out of 35 negotiating chapters. The negotiations were opened on Chapter 32, dealing 
with financial control and Chapter 35 (other issues)
17/12/2013
21/01/2014
14/12/2015
Serbia replies to Commission questionnaire
European Commission delivers its Opinion on Serbia’s EU membership application, 
granting candidate status based on one key priority.
European Council confirms Serbia as a candidate country
European Council endorsed the Commission’s recommendation to open negotiations with 
Serbia
Entry into force of the EU-Serbia Stabilization and Association Agreement
31/01/2011
14/10/2011
01/03/2012
28/06/2013
01/09/2013
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and Interim agreement on trade and trade-
related issues are signed in Luxembourg
Visa requirement lifted for Serbs travelling to Schengen countries
Serbia applies for EU membership
EU members decide to start SAA ratification process
29/04/2008
19/12/2009
22/12/2009
14/06/2010
SAA with Serbia is initialled
Agreements on visa facilitation and readmission enter into force
Council adopts revised European partnership for Serbia
07/11/2007
01/01/2008
18/02/2008
01/10/2004 Council conclusions open up a process for a Stabilization and Association Agreement
01/10/2005 Negotiations launched for Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAA negotiations called off, because Serbia’s co-operation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has not improved
: SAA negotiations resume, after Serbia commits to cooperating fully with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
03/05/2006
13/06/2007
01/06/2000
 Feira European Council states all SAP countries are “potential candidates” for EU 
membership
01/06/2003
At the Thessaloniki European Council summit, the Stabilization and Association Process 
(SAP) is confirmed as EU policy for the Western Balkans
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negotiating process, i.e. a uniform progress on all chapters. This particularly refers to 
Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, freedom and 
security) where progress must follow the dynamic of other chapters. The above-stated 
procedure will also apply to issues within Chapter 35 (normalization of relations with 
Kosovo) labeled as one of the toughest in the negotiations with the EU.147 Serbia has 
made a significant improvement on its path towards EU membership but for sure, it will 
not join the EU until at least 2020. EU membership is the foremost strategic foreign 
policy priority of the Republic of Serbia. 
The prevention of further wars in Southeastern Europe can be viewed as an 
essential component of any future European identity. ‘Joining Europe’ in this part of the 
world has a powerful symbolic significance. New "independent" countries have a vital 
need to re-establish communication among themselves at every level. Economic 
recovery progressive integration of all post-communist countries in the European 
system poses great challenges. We often hear that the Yugoslav region’s communities 
have never coexisted except when an “outside” yoke (an empire, the Serbian monarchy, 
the Titoist regime) was imposed on them.  The world economic crisis is spreading two-
tier societies everywhere, or even writing off whole countries. Therefore, it is not a 
matter of copying a model that worked somewhere else. We can only anticipate that the 
importance of frontiers will be inversely proportional to the extension of individual and 
collective democratic rights, and that the importance of frontiers will also diminish as 
gaps in living standards decrease. EU should be accepted as “one’s own” political 
community and not as a more or less foreign master without enough consideration for 
the specific needs and desires of one’s own “people’’. There are no easy or simple 
solutions. The post-Yugoslav states now must find the way out of the vicious circle of 
several outstanding and mutually connected problems: unresolved status issues and 
bilateral disputes inherited from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, harsh economic crises, 
and the EU enlargement fatigue coupled with accession fatigue at home 
The European Union conducts a very active policy in the area of labor market 
for years. One of the priority objectives for the Union, as a whole and for each of its 
individual members, is the reduction of unemployment, especially of the most 
vulnerable groups. This is also its primary socio-economic and political challenge. 
                                                             
147 Available in: <http://www.shanghai.mfa.gov.rs/news.php> Access in:  21 Sep. 2018. 
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However, if viewed by some member states and their regions within the European 
Union, it is obvious that this problem is not acute everywhere to the same extent. In the 
area of labor relations, not only in Serbia but also in other countries, social and political 
considerations are opposed to economic ones and the result is a trade-off between job 
security and level of employment, i.e. the higher the security the lower the employment, 
and vice versa. Therefore, the accession process may be considered as the best chance 
for encouraging reforms, or also as an instrument with which the reform enthusiasm can 
be maintained in the best way and for the longest time. Simply put, the EU membership 
was a carrot used to award reform efforts and the people’s patience.  
The Serbian Government has placed priority on employment in terms of both 
fighting poverty and underpinning economic growth. Creating more and better jobs is 
an explicit priority for the Government, as reflected in the Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
A National Strategy of Employment, based on a vision of convergence with Europe and 
eventual accession to the EU, has been approved. The basic idea of the process of 
integration into the European Union is the establishment of a common market and the 
acceptance of European values in general. This, inter alia, should contribute to the 
increased mobility of capital (state borders are not recognized as a great problem 
anymore), but also the other factors of production, such as labor mobility. General 
economic theory tells us that in a market-oriented economy increased mobility of 
production factors (capital, labor, ideas) contribute to increase in overall social 
efficiency. However, it is difficult to give an explicit answer if these assumptions were 
realized in practice in all situations. The studies that were conducted in many countries 
showed that in each country there are parts of the territory (regions) which have 
recorded worse results over a longer period of time, as measured by almost all major 
economic indicators, including the level and rate of (un)employment, compared to the 
national average. This fact, of course, adversely affects the overall socio-economic 
development of a particular country. If the mobility of production factors has not been 
developed at the national level, it is unlikely that it will significantly increase the spread 
of the integration process; consequently, the benefit from the integration processes will 
be lower than expected.148 
                                                             
148 RADOVANOVIC, Veljko; MAKSIMOVIC, Marijana. Labour market and (un)employment in the 
European Union and Serbia – Regional Aspects. Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijic” Sasa, v. 60, n. 
2, 2010, p. 59-60.  
109 
 
The prevention of further wars in Southeastern Europe can be viewed as an 
essential component of any future European identity. ‘Joining Europe’ in this part of the 
world has a powerful symbolic significance. New "independent" countries have a vital 
need to re-establish communication among themselves at every level. Economic 
recovery progressive integration of all post-communist countries in the European 
system poses great challenges. We often hear that the Yugoslav region’s communities 
have never coexisted except when an “outside” yoke (an empire, the Serbian monarchy, 
the Titoist regime) was imposed on them.  The world economic crisis is spreading two-
tier societies everywhere, or even writing off whole countries. Therefore, it is not a 
matter of copying a model that worked somewhere else. We can only anticipate that the 
importance of frontiers will be inversely proportional to the extension of individual and 
collective democratic rights, and that the importance of frontiers will also diminish as 
gaps in living standards decrease. EU should be accepted as “one’s own” political 
community and not as a more or less foreign master without enough consideration for 
the specific needs and desires of one’s own “people’’. There are no easy or simple 
solutions. The post-Yugoslav states now must find the way out of the vicious circle of 
several outstanding and mutually connected problems: unresolved status issues and 
bilateral disputes inherited from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, harsh economic crises, 
and the EU enlargement fatigue coupled with accession fatigue at home. 
 
3.6 Summary of the chapter  
 
The 1990s were the years of crisis in every respect not only economic but also 
political. The break-up of Yugoslavia brought with it wars in which Serbia did not 
formally participate, but its material and financial engagement was clearly visible. UN 
trade and economic sanctions were an additional burden. If one adds to it the negative 
effects of the administrative socialist economic system, the result is a very unfavorable 
picture of economic and social trends during this decade like sharp decline of the 
domestic product, real value of wages, pensions and all personal income, through 
plummeting employment and growing unemployment, to the flourishing grey economy, 
criminalization of economic life and the society as a whole, etc. In order to preserve 
social peace, resources were diverted from the productive to the non-productive sector. 
Social and state ownership has become a place of corruption and plunder. It was a true 
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example of waste and money abuse. Funds are focused not only on current income, but 
also on account of existing capital and new external borrowing. The inevitable 
consequences of institutional weaknesses and legal anomia were uncertainties in 
business, general distrust and the loss of small financial resources resulting from a deep 
economic crisis. Economic sanctions and wars have only made a significant 
contribution to it.  
Serbia entered the transition with 10-year delay, as a destroyed and deeply 
criminalized country. Since the latest stage of reform began in late 2001, job losses have 
been large, as Serbia has embarked on a program of restructuring and privatization.  
Privatization was from the beginning a euphemism for industrial policy. Privatization 
began, but by the end of the decade less than five percent of capital was privatized; 
prices were still under government control; legal labor, capital, money or foreign 
currency markets were stifled or did not exist; companies were more like welfare 
centers than profit centers, etc. An even greater failure of economic power in Serbia was 
the illusion that privatization was the missing link for the release of the entrepreneurial 
potential, fresh inspiration and new enthusiasm, which would recover the economy and 
eliminate the presence of structural weaknesses in the industry. Inherited structural 
problems from the past and sudden liberalization of the market, followed by a sharp real 
appreciation of the national currency, are among the reasons for the poor recovery of 
industrial production and its stagnant trend in the first decade of the new millennium. 
Serbia became highly dependent on capital imports, making it sensitive to turbulence in 
the global financial market. It was not possible for the out-of-date state-owned economy 
to meet the competition demands of the world market. Trust in state institutions was 
very bad. Population managed to survive thanks to the black market. 
One of the results of late transition was a weak labor market performance 
especially when judged by the standards of the more successful transition countries. 
Some significant reforms have been introduced to modernize the labor market and move 
away from the traditional employment system. In 2001, a new Labor Act was passed. It 
has modernized many aspects of labor market regulation and many characteristics of the 
old employment model have been eliminated. It was revised in 2005, which brought 
labor market regulations in line with EU standards. These reforms were a good basis for 
the transition of the Serbian economy, but labor market trends were not favorable. 
Employment has slowed down or at best stagnated, while unemployment is rising. The 
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investment environment in Serbia was generally unattractive, and the expansion of the 
sector of new enterprises was modest, with negative effects on employment. The fact is, 
unfortunately, corporate restructuring, including a reduction in workforce. To prepare 
for EU membership and meet its obligation for alignment with the EU's legal 
framework, Serbia has had to undertake reforms to shift away from its centralized social 
policy model. 
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4 SERBIAN LABOR MARKET, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL 
CONDITIONS  
 
The first part of this chapter explains the situation of the Serbian labor market 
today. Current labor market indicators are not the most favorable. There are many 
concerns and more challenges are on the horizon. According to the new estimates 
presented in this chapter, only 2016, only 54.3% of the working age population are 
employed. This is below the employment rate of many countries in the region and well 
below the employment rate of EU members. Despite relatively strong economic growth 
in recent years, employment seems to be falling. This loss of work is mostly due to 
company restructuring. The unemployment rate in 2015 was almost 17.9%, which is 
among the highest in the region. Moreover, about 80% of unemployed workers have 
been out of work for more than a year. Young people have particularly bad labor market 
outcomes. Almost half (43.2%) of the workforce between 15 and 24 years old was 
unemployed in 2015. The situation on the labor market is a significant determinant of 
economic well-being. High unemployment, the presence of the informal sector or 
otherwise a "bad job" is largely in correlation with the poor. 
The most vulnerable to the crisis were people with secondary and lower levels of 
education, as well as those aged 15 to 30, followed by those aged over 50. These three 
categories of labour have the least chance of finding a job, as discrimination based on 
age persists in the labour market, as well as on the grounds of gender, marital status, 
disability and ethnicity. There is a general problem of exclusion from the labor market 
groups including the Roma, refugees, and internally displaced persons.149  
In the second part of this chapter is explained how are industrial relations in 
Serbia nowadays. It has been marked by top-to-bottom development. The role of central 
bodies of industrial relations actors has remained the most important. This is even more 
pronounced given the dominant role of the government in tripartite negotiations; 
because of diminishing union strength in recent years, as well as the existence of a 
single representative and relatively weak employers’ organization. Only the legitimacy 
of government has remained undisputed. On the union scene, the situation is not great. 
There is a trend of gradually weakening the overall strength and density of the trade 
                                                             
149 DOKMANOVIC, Mirjana. Serbia: Social Inclusion Needs Socially Responsible Governance. 
European Social Watch Report 2010, 2010. Available in: < 
http://www.socialwatch.eu/wcm/Serbia.html> Access in: 06 Mar. 2018. 
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unions. This was particularly reflected in the private sector. Due to the economic crisis, 
all unions lost their membership. The focus over the past few years has been the 
struggle for representativeness at the national level. There have been major changes in 
the leadership of some of the major confederations. 
The last part of this chapter analyses social conditions in Serbia.  In the specific 
context of Europe, Serbia is still very poor country. It GDP per capita has still not 
recovered its 1990 GDP per capita. In 2016 was 5.348,29 USD. According to the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), nine percent of Serbians are living in poverty 
in the 2016. Additionally, a concerning 25 percent of Serbians are on the verge of 
poverty. 
In the last thirty years, Serbia has transformed itself from a relatively egalitarian 
society with a functional social support network into a society in which inequalities are 
expressed. This stratification increasingly shapes the Serbian political scene and puts 
enormous pressure on our new democracy. Political parties are increasingly using 
employment bureaus. The power of clientelism is growing, as every opportunity to find 
a job outside the client-related places becomes more limited, and the free expression of 
democratic will is threatened. This is particularly pronounced in poor areas. There, the 
power of controlling political parties is the most important. 
Serbia has begun to develop an institutional framework for its social inclusion 
policy. This is prematurely going on as part of the preparations for joining the European 
Union. In 2009, the Government established the Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction 
Unit, and at the beginning of 2010, the Working Group on Social Inclusion. As 
presented at the end of the previous chapter, Serbia expects to approach EU membership 
by the opening of the first negotiating chapters of acquis by the end of 2015. The social 
dimension, an integral part of the enlargement process, is mainly covered in Chapter 19 
(Social Policy and Employment) acquis. Serbia has to deal with the main issues of 
social policy in order to achieve compliance with the common basic social standards of 
the EU condition for successful participation in the single market. 
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4.1 Overview of the situation at Serbian labour market  
 
The problem of (un)employment is one of the most current socio-economic 
problems of the modern world. Understanding Serbia’s (un)employment situation 
requires a multi-sectoral perspective that includes both economic and social factors. 
Although output growth has been reasonably good since reforms began, it has not been 
strong enough to generate net employment gains; however, this “jobless” growth is 
typical of countries in the early years of transition.  Serbia has made clear progress in 
recent years in improving the laws and regulations that define its business climate but it 
still lags behind in international comparisons.150 Despite varying interpretations and 
assessments of indicators in the labour market situation, the Serbian economy has 
extremely high rates of unemployment and, analogously, relatively low employment 
rates in relation to employment potential. The unemployment rate in Serbia is one of the 
highest in the region and in Europe. High unemployment rates are mainly a 
consequence of the transition process and all other difficulties through which the 
economy and society of Serbia passes through for more than two decades. In addition, 
the transition of large public companies is not completed yet, so there is a real danger 
that the privatization of public sector, which is being announced now, will cause a great 
share of people currently employed in these companies to lose their jobs.151 Labor 
market indicators for Serbia are much lower than the average EU labor market 
indicators. The employment rate falls considerably below the 2020 Lisbon Strategy 
goal, which envisages a 75% employment rate.  According to the LFS (Labor Force 
Survey), one-third of adult Serbs do not participate in the workforce; only one-half are 
employed; and over one-fifth of those who are active are unemployed.  
Serbia has been experiencing a negative population growth rate since 1990 and it 
has one of the highest proportion of elderly people (over 65) at around 17 percent. The 
working age population has been declining and this has been compounded further by an 
increase in economic inactivity among those in the working age. The National 
                                                             
150 WORLD Bank, Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia: An Agenda for Economic growth and 
Employment, Report No. 29258-YU, Dec.  2004, p. 92 Available in: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSERBIA/Resources/SerbiaEconomicMemorandum.pdf> Access 
in: 12 Oct. 2017. 
151 RADOVANOVIC, Veljko; MAKSIMOVIC, Marijana. Labour market and (un)employment in the 
European Union and Serbia – Regional Aspects. Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijic” Sasa, v. 60, n. 
2, 2010, p. 63. 
115 
 
Employment Strategy for 2011-2020 attributes the low labor market participation rate 
mainly to the low activity of women, youth (15-24) and elderly persons (55-64). Hence, 
increasing employment opportunities for women and youth particularly have been 
important policy areas.  Employment outcomes are considerably worse for women than 
for men. The employment rate for women in 2015 was 41%, about 20 points below the 
rate for men and way below the Lisbon target of 67% for female employment. At the 
same time, women are much more likely than men to be unemployed (27% vs. 18%). 
The unemployment problem is exacerbated by the fact that, once many workers become 
unemployed, they remain without work for very long periods. Unemployment is 
dominated by long-term joblessness; in 2015, 79% of all unemployed workers had been 
without work for at least one year. The rate for the man was 10,6 and for the woman 
12,2. Women also earn about 15% less than men after adjusting for other factors 
affecting wages.152  
Almost one-half of all of the jobs are still outside the private sector. The share of 
private sector employment in Serbia is still small accounting for only 57% of total 
employment. The remainder is largely in the state sector and in socially owned 
enterprises. The informal sector accounts for an important share of employment. 
Workers in this sector tend to be relatively poorly paid and do not easily move into 
formal-sector jobs. According to the 2015 LFS, 43% of all workers and 27% of wage-
earners were informal, using the definition adopted for this thesis.153 The poorly 
educated and young people are significantly overrepresented in the informal sector 
relative to the formal sector. Even once other factors are taken into account, wages for 
informal sector workers are 20% below those in the formal sector. There is a high 
incidence of poverty among workers in informal jobs.  
Part-time employment has been stable in the past several years at around 7 
percent and temporary employment slightly decreased its share of total employment 
(from 13 percent in 2011 to 11 percent in 2014). The largest portion of the poor in 
Serbia (67.6 per cent) live in households where at least one member is employed. Child 
Labor exists, but there are no exact data on its prevalence. Data on employment 
                                                             
152Available in: <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---
program/documents/genericdocument/wcms_562110.pdf> Access in: 14 Oct. 2017.  
153 This definition of informality includes: (1) self-employed individuals who have not completed 
postsecondary education; (2) household helpers; and (3) wage earners and owners in private firms with 
less than 10 employees. All wage earners in the state- and socially-owned sectors are considered formal. 
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disaggregated by national origin or by refugee and internally displaced status is largely 
unavailable in Serbia. Employment rates of Gypsies and internally displaced persons are 
between 5 to 10 percent lower than overall employment. Workers belonging to these 
population groups are also more likely to be engaged in work in the informal economy. 
The overall employment rate of workers with disabilities remains very low.  
Within each country, there are parts of the territory (regions) that are, in the long 
period of time, far behind in the level of employment, recording higher unemployment 
rates than the national average. One of the reasons for this phenomenon lies in the fact 
that the labor market has many characteristics compared to markets of goods and 
capital, making this market imperfect. Therefore, in conducting the regional policy, both 
at European Union level and within many individual countries, a special significance is 
given to finding adequate mechanisms and instruments that will contribute to better 
functioning of labor markets, and therefore, achieving more harmonious regional 
development. The labor market in Serbia is characterized by very sharp differences in 
almost all levels of territorial aggregation. They are more pronounced among rural than 
in urban areas, south and southeast in relation to the northern parts of the country, and a 
marked concentration of labor resources, both in scope and in quality in large university 
centers. In addition, most areas of our country are facing significant demographic and 
social problems especially in areas where high economic growth was based on the 
industries that could not cope with all the tough competition in world markets during 
the transition process. There is a number of people working in „the gray zone “. How 
big is that number, it is very difficult to assess objectively, but even so, the employment 
rate is very low?  
The gap in rates of (un)employment in Serbia is especially pronounced in the 
Capital and developed regions with a favorable geographical position on the one hand, 
and the rest of the country on the other side.  The cause of this should be sought 
primarily in the fact that prescribed measures of economic policy in the domain of labor 
market work, which are directed towards more uniform regional development and both 
created and implemented by officials of the competent authorities and institutions in our 
country, are quite confusing, incomplete and inefficient. Much more attention is paid to 
the policy of directing capital to areas that are faced with the problem of high 
unemployment, than the use of different instruments and mechanisms in the sphere of 
the labor market. Labour mobility, both between regions and between occupations, is 
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disturbingly low. On the other hand, infrastructural facilities as a prerequisite for 
development, which were used once, today are financially and with personnel 
unacceptably neglected. They still lack a qualified workforce for the modern industrial 
production, entrepreneurial initiatives and numerous other specific skills required by 
modern way of doing business, market-oriented economy and the increasingly keen 
competition. Without an educated and skilled workforce, high expectations of changes 
in production structure are not realistic, because the change in the structure initiate 
changes the character of demand for labor, both regionally and professionally. However, 
global analysis of any economic indicators at the country level, including employment 
rates and unemployment, lose its true meaning because it hides many of intraregional 
conflicts. It is not only the specificity of Serbia. On the contrary, the experience of many 
countries in transition showed that the economic restructuring and uncritical application 
of the neoliberal model of the economy have resulted in a tendency of increasing the 
disproportion in all spheres of economic life, and consequently in the domain of the 
labor market.154 
 
4.1.1 Labor market trends  
 
According to the National Employment Service (NES) data (based on formal 
employment statistics collected from the Republican Statistics Bureau, RSB), 2,028,854 
people were employed in Serbia in 2016 (annual average, excluding farmers), or less 
than 2% in 2015, which 1,453,659 persons (or 71.6 percent) were employed with 
companies, whereas the number of private entrepreneurs and those employed with them 
amounted to 575,195 (28.4 percent). The impact of the 2008 economic crisis was very 
severe in terms of job losses. Between 2008 and 2016, the level of employment 
decreased by more than 540,000 units,155 mostly in the private sector, while 
employment in state-owned enterprises remained fairly stable. In the graph 9 is 
presented labour force participation of Serbia in 2016.  
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European Union and Serbia – Regional Aspects. Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijic” Sasa, v. 60, n. 
2, 2010, p. 69 
155 Available in: <http://www.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Default.aspx> Access in: 17 Oct. 2017. 
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Graph 9 – Labour force participation rate of Serbia in 2016. Source: Republic 
Statistical Office (RSO), Labour Force Survey, Belgrade, 2017.  
 
Serbia's Labour Force Participation Rate increased to 54.3 % in Jun 2016. 
Serbia's Labour Force Participation Rate is updated quarterly, available from Mar 2014 
to Jun 2017, with an average rate of 52.1 %. The data reached the all-time high of 54.3 
% in Jun 2016 and a record low of 50.8 % in Mar 2015. For women this number was 
43, 1% and for man 60, 1%.156 
The structure of employment in Serbia by occupation reveals that 56, 2 per cent 
of workers are employed in the service sector, 24, 4 per cent are employed in industry 
and 19, 4 per cent in agriculture (see graph 10). In the last decade, there has been a 
significant decline in employment in agriculture. 
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Graph 10 –   Labour force by occupation 2015. Available in:   
<http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/G2016/pdf/G20162019.pdf> 
Access in: 01 Nov. 2017. 
 
Given the recent increase in service sector employment, there is growing 
attention to promoting women’s employment in the ICT sectors, which remain male 
dominated.  Apart from regular employment, increasing attention is being paid on 
women’s entrepreneurship. Currently, men are almost twice as likely to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities as women (71 percent for men and 29 percent women). Hence, 
the low representation of women among company owners cannot be said to be 
indicative of failure or underperformance of female enterprises, but it is most likely an 
indication of factors such as family obligations, traditional values, and limited access to 
credit.157 
Unemployment remains one of the key long-term problems of economic policy 
in Serbia. Data from the 2015 Labour Force Survey (LFS) noted that there were 
approximately 692,000 unemployed people in Serbia, i.e. 26,000 less than in 2014. 
53.9% of them women. As we can see from the table below total unemployment rate 
was 23, 6% in 2011 and in 2015 was 17, 9% (see table 18). It is decreasing but still is on 
very high level comparing with other EU members.  
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Unemployment 
rate-total 
23,6 24,6 23,0 19,9 17,9 
Unemployment 
rate (15-64age 
category ) 
22,9 23,9 22,1 19,2 17,6 
 
Table 18 – Unemployment Rate of the Working Age Population 2011-2015. 
Source: 2011-2015 annual Labour Force Surveys. 
 
No other EU member state has a higher unemployment rate than Serbia. In the 
table below, we can see that only three European countries have a higher unemployment 
                                                             
157 Republic Statistical Office (RSO), Labour Force Survey, Belgrade, 2017. Available in: 
<www.stat.gov.rs> Access in: 02 Nov. 2017. 
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rate than Serbia and all three were once part of the former SFR Yugoslavia: The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo.  
 
 
Table 19  Unemployment rates (persons aged 15–64), 2008–2015 (% of labour force). Source: 
Eurostat. 
 
 (*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with 
UNSCR1244 and the ICJ Opinion on The Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 
** For Kosovo datas for 2010 and 2011 are not available  
Serbia`s unemployment rate in 2015 was 17, 6 percent. In 2016 decreased to 13, 
1 percent. Unemployment rate in the same year for man was 13 percent and woman 13, 
1 percent (see graph 11).  
7,0 9,5 9,6 10,4 10,8 10,2 9,4
16,8 19,7 19,7 19,7 19,5 18,0 17,5
33,8 32,0 31,4 31,0 29,0 28,0 26,1
13,0 14,0 14,0 13,4 15,9 17,5 17,1
13,6 19,2 22,9 23,9 22,1 19,2 17,6
9,8 10,8 8,8 8,2 8,8 9,9 10,3
23,5 27,3 27,6 28,2 27,6 27,6 27,9
47,5 ** ** 30,9 30,0 35,3 32,9
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Graph 11 – Unemployment rate of Serbia in 2016. Source: Republic Statistical 
Office (RSO), Labour Force Survey, Belgrade, 2017. 
 
The absolute drop in employment until 2015, and its stagnation at a considerably 
low level according to LFS, gives rise to the concern as is evident in Serbia’s economy, 
that it is unable to transform economic growth into employment growth. Serbia’s 
relatively poor initiative in creating jobs is, however, typical of states in the early stages 
of transition. Higher rates of formal unemployment compared with the corresponding 
rates defined by the ILO can be attributed to two factors  firstly, there is a considerable 
number of  informally employed or self-employed people who are not included in 
formal employment statistics; secondly, a large number of informally employed, 
working-age people who are not part of the labor force have been registered as 
unemployed in order to gain social benefits and health insurance to which unemployed 
persons are entitle to. 
Youth unemployment is a global problem. Although young people everywhere 
tend to have problems making the transition into the labor market, their situation in 
Serbia is particularly difficult. The European Union in its strategies insists that every 
young person should have practical entrepreneurial experience before the end of his or 
her compulsory education. They are connected, informed, and ready for business. Who 
are these young people? In Serbia situation is very different. Serbia’s youth faces 
serious problems entering the labor market. Participation and employment rates are low. 
About one-half of those young people who are interested in working cannot find a job. 
Educational attainment does not reduce this unemployment rate.  When young people 
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do find jobs, it is more often in the informal sector than in the formal sector. In the 
tables below are presented participation of young people out of the work in Serbia in 
2015, and youth unemployment rate in Serbia and neighboring countries. In both cases, 
as we can see, indicators for Serbia are not good.158 Table 18 provides data of youth 
unemployment rate in EU28 and former Yugoslavian countries. In EU 28 youth 
unemployment rate in 2015 was 20, 4%. As with the EU-28, youth unemployment rates 
tended to be about twice as high as overall unemployment rates. In absolute terms, 
Slovenia was the only country to record a youth unemployment rate (15.43%) that was 
lower than the EU-28 average.  Although it is a member of EU, Croatia had a very high 
youth unemployment rate (31, 3%).  In Serbia was also very high 43, 2%. More than 
one third of those aged less than 25 years old in the labour force were without work in 
Montenegro, a share that rose to more than two fifths in Serbia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, exceeded half of all young persons in the labour 
force in Kosovo, and was above three fifths in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The numbers in 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina are worrying. Youth unemployment there was 62.3%. 
      
2015 
EU28 20,4 
SLOVENIA 15,3 
CROATIA 31,3 
SERBIA 43,2 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC 
OF MACEDONIA 
47,3 
MONTENEGRO 37,6 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 62,3 
KOSOVO 57,7 
Table 20 – Youth unemployment rate in EU28 and former 
Yugoslav countries in 2015. Source: Eurostat 
 
The policy challenges of youth employment and unemployment in these 
countries finds that many young people are idle that is, neither in employment nor in 
training and that young women, in particular, have a weak attachment to the labor 
market. Gender differences in youth unemployment are apparent, but differ across 
                                                             
158 Available in: <http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/trazite-posao/svi-poslovi> Access in: 30 Oct. 2017.  
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countries. Historically, the incidence of unemployment has been higher for young 
women than for men in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, a pattern which 
was also evident in Croatia.  
The position of youth on the labour market and active employment policy 
measures in Serbia can be described as: a) youth belong to the category of vulnerable 
groups in the labour market; b) difficult entry into the world of work; c) easier access to 
the temporary and poorly paid jobs, which they hardly leave; d) decreased quality of 
employment as adults ; e) have not acquired the necessary knowledge and skills for a 
permanent job; f) loss of skills, motivation for work and learning in a position to easily 
remain without work.  On a positive note, youth unemployment rates fell faster than the 
overall unemployment those countries in recent years. However, the share of long-term 
unemployed in the labor force is highest among the youth cohort, which indicates that 
there are significant risks of skills degradation of young people and subsequent labor 
market challenges later in their career. The labor market outcomes of youth are 
especially closely linked to the business cycle, leading to higher job losses during 
downturns, but which also benefit more during economic booms. This is partially 
explained by the fact that youth employment represents a more flexible segment of the 
labor market, with a higher share of temporary contracts and informal employment.159 
The long-term unemployment rate in the EU-28 was 4.5 % of the labour force in 
2015; rates were identical among men and women (see Table 21). In 2015 more than 70 
percent of the unemployed in the enlargement countries were out of work for more than 
a year on average. The long-term unemployment rates for men in the enlargement 
countries were considerably higher than in the EU-28, ranging from just over one tenth 
(10.6 %) of the male labour force in Serbia to more than one fifth in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (20.1 %), Bosnia and Herzegovina (21.2 %) and 
Kosovo (22.6 %). Long-term unemployment rates for women were generally at a 
similar level to male rates in most of the enlargement countries, especially in Serbia and 
Montenegro. The female share was higher in every country except Montenegro.  
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Country  Man Women 
EU-28 4,5 4,5 
Serbia  10,6 12,2 
Montenegro  13,6 13,3 
FYRM 20,1 22,1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   21,2 25,2 
Kosovo  22,6 27,6 
 
Table 21 – Long-term unemployment rates (persons aged 15–74) 
by sex, 2015 (% of labour force). Source: Jobs Gateway Database, 
based on data provided by national statistical offices and Eurostat. 
 
The analysis of the impact of growth on employment indicates that the jobs 
challenge in Serbia is structural, and growth alone at least at current growth levels will 
not be sufficient to create enough jobs. No significant impact of growth on employment 
was observed in the aftermath of the financial crisis in Serbia, and the impact of growth 
on unemployment is small. Serbia has not yet returned to a situation where economic 
growth will translate into significant jobs growth; the transition to modern market 
economies is not yet complete, and many structural issues remain to be addressed. On 
the labor supply side, there is a need to strengthen employment policies and the 
effectiveness of intermediation in the labor market Serbia and other Western Balkan 
countries have embarked on a journey to model their public employment services (PES) 
and active labor market programs (ALMPs) after good practices in EU countries. This 
means that active labor market programs ranging from training to start-up support, wage 
subsidies, and public works need to be better designed and targeted. This applies 
especially for the most vulnerable and the youth, as the latter represent a profitable 
investment from a fiscal perspective. Furthermore, the potential of private providers to 
intermediate and implement programs needs be tapped into. On the labor demand side, 
there is a need to further strengthen competitiveness, while also enabling new segments 
in the labor market to flourish. Most countries have made great strides towards better 
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investment climates, but more needs to be done to change the growth model of the 
Western Balkans from one that relies on domestic consumption to one that relies on 
exports and investments160. However, the high level of informal employment, even 
outside agriculture, indicates that it is also necessary to unlock the potential of certain 
segments in the labor market that do not currently operate in the formal sector. This 
requires deregulation and tax reforms to foster a new labor market that also allows for 
flexible, low-paying part-time jobs atypical and sometimes precarious jobs, but jobs that 
might be more accessible for the most vulnerable groups, such as the low-educated, as 
well as women seeking part-time opportunities.  
Higher regional disparities, negative demographic trends (low birth rate, ageing 
population, 'brain drain', depopulation of rural areas and shift to major towns) are other 
downsides. All these issues have been addressed in the National Employment Strategy 
2011-20. The 2014 National Employment Action Plan (NEAP) is the main instrument 
for implementing an active employment policy. It focuses attention on the most 
vulnerable groups on the labour market: women, youth, elderly, Roma, low-skilled 
individuals, and persons with disabilities. As part of a wider reform package, Serbia 
amended its Labour Law in July 2014. The changes affect short- term employment, 
annual vacation, paid leave, salary increases, rights to pay and benefits, compensation of 
work-related expenses, redundancy pay, termination of employment, penalties for 
workplace violations, etc. These amendments, intended to increase labour market 
flexibility and improve clarity on certain matters, have provoked protests, with trade 
unions arguing that they restrict labour rights and give employers more bargaining 
power. The pension system has also been reviewed, to take account of the demographic 
and economic situation and to ensure long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Disability Insurance was amended in July 2014. Despite recognising Serbia's efforts to 
update its relevant legislation, the 2014 Commission progress report assessed advance 
in the area as limited. The Ombudsman's 2014 report criticised the adoption of nearly all 
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laws in urgent procedures, without public debate or proper consultation with the social 
partners.161 
An increase in the quantity and quality of the data is an important step towards 
strengthening our knowledge on the Serbian labor market but better data and more 
research are still needed. The data should be easily accessible not only to policy makers 
and academics, but also to the general public, including journalists and advocacy 
groups. The data should inspire more research on how Serbia can overcome their many 
labor market challenges.  
 
4.1.2 Wages and gender wage gap  
 
The latest research of the Centre for Economic Research of the Institute of 
Social Science has shown that 2-3% of the Serbian population (around 250,000 people 
altogether) is extremely rich. An additional 10% live decently, whereas all the rest can 
be regarded as poor under all relevant European and global standards. Although social 
changes have been anticipated since the October revolution in 2000, these figures show 
that, in total, little has changed. Some Serbian university professors claim `` the prime 
prerequisite for democracy is the existence of a stable middle class. The consequence is 
that even the extremely wealthy and the extremely poor are not within a defined class. 
The former has become rich overnight, and therefore are prone to lose their property as 
quickly, whereas the latter sometimes find ways to overcome their poverty outside the 
official system, such as in the black market. Many people, who officially live on 
minimal wages working in nearly closed-up factories, manage quite well in flea markets 
or small-scale smuggling business.162 Facts confirm these claims. Wages in the 
Republic of Serbia are at rather low level, especially when compared with the wages in 
the neighboring countries. The average net wage in January 2016 amounted to RSD 
39,197 (317EUR) or gross wage RSD 54,447 (441EUR), while the minimum net 
income for the reference month is RSD 21,160 (171EUR) and 28,683 RSD (233EUR) 
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gross. Monthly salaries of doctors, judges or university professors are still around 550 
EUR.163 The recently-announced implementation of an extra-profit tax is expected to 
reduce the wealth of many formerly untouchable magnates. Ratio of the average net 
wage and net minimum wage in January 2016 was 53.99%. In relation to the average 
wage, the minimum wage was set at a high level. Given that collective agreements 
(enterprise and sectorial) use the national minimum wage as the basis for wage setting 
increase in the levels of the minimum wage has an impact on total labour cost. The 
economic downturn and stagnation currently affecting Serbian businesses (lack of 
market demand, low product price, weak chargeability of products, illiquidity, high 
production costs) means that employers often cannot cope with the increase of the 
minimum wage, hence leading to reduction in staff, irregular payment of wages, 
irregular payment of contributions for compulsory social insurance. It is not rare that for 
these reasons employers do not comply with the provisions of collective agreements, 
and often the employees themselves agree to work for less than minimum wage to 
ensure they retain jobs. Moreover, the constantly crisis has further highlighted many 
structural weaknesses in terms of collective bargaining, minimum wages and other 
mechanisms related to the determination of wages.  In addition, the period since 2000 
has been marked by a gradual but constant decline of trade unions’ strength that 
reflected in the reduction of the coverage of workers and employees by collective 
agreements what will be explained in the next section.  
Women make up 51.3 per cent of the total population of the Republic of Serbia. 
Broken down by age, within the adult and older population the number of women is 
higher, while in the younger population men are numerically dominant. Wage 
differentials between men and women in Serbia are still high. In Serbia, the difference 
between the average hourly wages of women and men is 15–16 per cent. This gap is 
lower than the observed level in the EU, where women continued to earn an average of 
17.6 per cent less than men.  In addition, the gender gap in Serbia is still among the 
lowest among the transition countries.164 The relatively small gender wage gap in Serbia 
(smaller than in Western European economies) have been attributed to the fact that 
female workers in Serbia on average have better characteristics (e.g. education levels) 
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than male workers. If men had the same characteristics as women, the wage differentials 
would have been larger. According to the data of the Statistical Office, October 2016, 
the wages of employed women were lower by € 200 for the same job and qualification. 
The biggest pay gap is among employed women with higher education; secondary 
school educated women earned € 100 euro less in wages than men. The lowest gap was 
among nonqualified workers. The lowest wages belonged to single mothers and married 
mothers with children who are preschoolers. The Law on Ministries from April 2014 
dismantled the previous Directorate for Gender Equality. The new Ministry of Labour, 
Employment, and Social Policy include issues on gender equality but sector data does 
not exist in 2016. 165  
 
4.2 Industrial relations  
 
Industrial relations are regulated by the comprehensive body of labour 
legislation, which is the Labour Code, adopted in 2005. Almost the entire body of 
labour legislation has been rewritten since 2001 in order to support the transition to a 
market economy, but also with a view to complying with the relevant requirements and 
regulations of European Union and standards of the International Labour Organization 
(see 3.4.2 Legislative Changes 2001-2005).  Freedom of organization is guaranteed by 
the law, and industrial relations actors are defined as autonomous, democratic and 
independent organizations formed with the aim of pursuing the genuine goals of their 
respective members. The Labour Code recognizes two types of workers’ organizations: 
trade unions and workers’ councils. An employers’ association may be established by 
employers who employ a minimum of 10% of the total number of employees in a 
specific industry or territorial unit.166 Trade unions are defined by law as autonomous, 
democratic and independent organizations of employees, based on freedom of 
membership, that represent, advocate, promote and protect professional, labour, 
economic, social, cultural and other individual and collective interests of employees. 
The influence of trade unions depends on the size of their membership, since only 
representative trade unions may be involved in collective bargaining. Also, the size of a 
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trade union can be relevant for the scope of a potential strike, organized by a trade union 
within a company.167   
Historically, industrial relations in Serbia have been marked by top-to-bottom 
development. More recently, despite the consolidation of several nationwide union 
confederations and employers’ organizations, and despite the shift towards sectoral and 
company-level bargaining over pay and working conditions, the role of central bodies of 
industrial relations actors has remained the most important. This is even more 
pronounced given the dominant role of the government in tripartite negotiations; on 
account of diminishing union strength in recent years, as well as the existence of a 
single representative and relatively weak employers’ organization, only the legitimacy 
of government has remained undisputed.168 There is a secular trend towards a gradual 
weakening of overall union strength and density, especially in the private sector. Since 
2001 the only representative employers’ organization has been the Serbian Association 
of Employers; however, it has been weakened by repeated internal strife and other 
problems.  
Data show that in Serbia today political parties have more members than unions, 
as workers tend to think that political parties will more so solve their problems through 
political deals and laws than the unions can. By some estimates, the political parties 
have more than one million members while trade unions have less than 750,000 
members, most of them in the public sector. Mistrust in the trade unions, which has 
been occurring for years, has lately become even more visible, both in the public and 
private sector. Many private entrepreneurs, especially foreign investors, oppose union 
organization and workers agree because they struggle for survival and are afraid of 
dismissal and potential reprisals for union involvement. According to independent 
unions there are more than one hundred individual charges against private companies 
which have prevented union organizing and some of them have ended in court. New 
employers blackmail workers if they think they are union members, threatening loss of 
their jobs. This is contrary to the ILO conventions and should be sanctioned, however 
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national legislation does not provide for those mechanisms.169 The Serbian Association 
of Employers, as the main employer representative, has been weakened by repeated 
internal strife and other problems. The asymmetry in power and legitimacy of the 
industrial relations actors makes it very difficult to coordinate industrial relations 
effectively in Serbia. Therefore, it has never been possible to conclude a full-blown 
tripartite agreement in the form of a social pact, despite repeated attempts to do so. The 
most important levels of collective bargaining for the setting of pay are different for the 
public and private sectors in the public sector it is intermediate (sectorial) level while in 
the private sector bargaining is largely decentralized to the company level and the 
coverage rate is very low. 170 Determination of the minimum wage has been fully 
centralized within the Social and Economic Council and the minimum wage is binding 
for the whole economy, including sole proprietorships and employees outside the 
corporate sector. Working time was determined centrally. The coverage rate of 
collective agreements can be estimated at slightly over 50 per cent. Collective 
agreements are in principle voluntary instruments. However, according to the Labour 
Code, collective agreements can be extended by the decision of the Minister of Labour 
and Social Policy to all relevant entities at the national or branch level.  The Labour 
Code stipulates that the Labour Minister confirms the representativeness of unions at 
the national level at the proposal of a tripartite commission, and the required minimum 
is that the union concerned must represent 15% of the total number of employees in the 
country. This is a rather tall order, since apart from conventional employment this 
definition also includes sole-proprietorships and their employees and union membership 
outside the corporate sector is virtually non-existent. 
 
4.2.1 Collective bargaining system  
 
The national level of collective bargaining remains de facto the most important. 
The entire public sector (approximately one-third of total dependent employment) has 
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nearly full coverage of sectoral agreements.  Sectoral level is an important but not 
dominant form of collective bargaining in the public sector, which accounts for the 
majority of union members.  Company level is a weak level, dominant in the private 
sector, which is characterized by low union density and a low incidence of collective 
bargaining and collective agreements. Only two branches in the private sector 
(agriculture and construction) have branch agreements, but with incomplete coverage. 
Therefore, the coverage rate of collective agreements can be estimated at slightly over 
60 percent in the public sector and around 25 per cent in the private sector.  However, 
throughout the country the involvement of union and employer organization leadership 
remains high at all levels, including company levels. The actual mechanism of 
collective bargaining is still very centralized, whereby the heads of all organizations 
represented at the Social and Economic Council (two trade unions, the Serbian 
Association of Employers and the Ministry of Labour, due to the Minister’s role in 
providing extended application) are heavily involved in collective bargaining, even 
though it mostly takes place on the branch level. There are some new collective 
agreements in the public sector in 2015, such as for Railways and Post.171  
 
Table 22 – Levels of collective bargaining summarized. Source: Eurofond 2012. 
 
Redundancies are important at the company level, and despite the rules within 
the Labour Code for handling them, there is considerable variation in how companies 
make redundancies, because of the case-by-case privatization methods (sales and 
tenders), which took place in Serbia. In principle, in situations where multinational 
companies were involved (such as Phillip Morris and US Steel), more generous 
schemes were applied, in the general atmosphere of cooperation rather than conflict 
with trade unions. In general, issues of training and lifelong learning are not given much 
attention in branch and company collective agreements, other than repeating general 
prescriptions from the Labour Code and general collective agreement. There is no 
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explicit mention of the lifelong learning concept. There is no mention of gender equality 
in collective agreements as gender equality issues have not yet been recognized as a 
matter relevant for collective agreements.172 
 
4.2.2 Industrial Conflicts, mediation, arbitration and tripartite concertation  
 
Strikes are frequent in Serbia but no consolidated data are available. While 
strikes in the public sector can in principle be measured, the picture is blurrier with 
strikes and other forms of industrial action in the private sector. Therefore, it is 
sometimes difficult to categorize industrial actions by workers whose firms are 
effectively closed. Often, actions can include negotiations with the local and central 
governments, including organized trips to Belgrade and mass protests to exert pressure 
on the government, the privatization agency and relevant ministries. The main reasons 
for collective actions are different in the public and private sectors. In the public sector 
they are largely around pay rises. In the private sector, strikes occur mostly as a 
consequence of unsuccessful privatizations and restructuring, and include demands for 
unpaid wages, elimination of wage arrears, severance payments and sometimes the 
scrapping of privatization, restitution of workers’ ownership rights and/or takeover of 
the firm by the government. In the public sector the most important strike in 2010–2011 
was a strike by teachers (primary and secondary) over pay, involving three out of four 
main unions and lasting for several months. In the private sector, strikes and industrial 
action can take many forms (protests, traffic blockades, demonstrations).173 
The Labour Inspectorate is an agency within the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs operating in 30 district offices throughout Serbia. Its goals are to suppress 
informal work, protect employee rights in the workplace, prevent harassment and 
discrimination, and promote health and safety at work. They need to act in cooperation 
with other institutions and authorities. There are no special labour courts; employees 
(and all other citizens) must use the regular courts for grievances related to their 
employment rights. It engages arbiters and mediators, who are mostly judges or labour 
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law professors, and it has managed in many instances to save considerable time and 
money for the parties in disputes. This is particularly relevant for employees, as they 
can seldom sustain a lengthy court procedure for financial reasons.174 
The Republic Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes was set up by 
the Law on Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes in 2004. It is the first 
institutionalized service aimed at the peaceful settlement of individual and collective 
disputes, using external independent arbiters in settlement of labour disputes. In the 
private sector, mechanisms of conflict resolution are more often informal, and include 
political intervention from the local and governmental level, typically with the ministry 
in charge or the Privatization Agency, or both, mediating between the workers and 
employers.175 However, the Republic Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour 
Disputes has achieved very good results in 2015. It has been very successful in 
thousands of individual labour disputes and collective disputes. 
National tripartite policy concertation takes place within the Social and 
Economic Council, defined by the law as an independent legal entity formed to enhance 
the development of social dialogue. It consists of 18 members, six of which are 
representatives of the Government, six of trade unions and six of employers. The social 
actors are burdened with the unresolved issues of representativeness and full legitimacy 
of their constituent members, and the work of the Social and Economic Council has 
frequently been stalled in the past few years. In 2015 it the activity was reduced to only 
minimum wage determination and discussion of various socio-economic issues. The 
Social and Economic Council has not made efforts to develop new measures to cushion 
the impact of the economic and fiscal crisis on the Serbian economy and to support a 
new growth model for the country.176 
 
4.2.3 Workplace representation 
 
Workplace representation provided by trade unions, could amount to 25 per cent 
of the labour force. New legislation, such as the New Law on Criminal Proceedings, 
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violates the right of trade union representatives to represent members who authorize 
them to do so and threatens the very existence of trade unions since workers become 
union members primarily to have their collective and individual rights and interests 
protected. The new Labour Code, as well as actual employers’ behavior in practice has 
created unfavorable conditions for workplace representation. Only 25-30 per cent of 
members pay any subscription (fees/dues) at all or the subscription established in the 
statutes. Membership subscriptions are collected by the employer who can thus exercise 
complete control over union members in the company. The subscriptions are then 
passed on directly to company trade union representatives, who under union statutes, 
can use between 60 per cent and, in extreme circumstances, up to 90 per cent of the 
funds at the local level. The remaining income from membership subscriptions are 
shared between the sectorial body and the umbrella organization (in Serbia the latter 
receives around 5 per cent). 177This means that a sectorial organization has on average a 
mere 10-15 per cent of membership fees at its disposal too little for financing the 
running costs of the organization along with campaigns, activities or the necessary 
expert personnel, not to mention amassing a strike fund for use in the event of a serious 
industrial dispute. As a consequence, sectorial and umbrella organizations continue to 
have limited scope, and the decentralized structure based primarily at the company or 
site level continues to predominate. The minimum number of members required for the 
establishment of a trade union in a company is three employees.  
4.2.4 Trade union density, Trade unions 
 
As in other former communist countries, trade union density until 1990 was 
close to 100%, since it was effectively mandatory for all employees. Since then, and 
especially since 2000, there has been a permanent trend of decline in trade union 
density. In 2015 there were around 2 million employees in Serbia, out of which one 
third were in public sector (where the trade union density rate is 60 present), and the 
private sector where union density is as follows: workers in micro-businesses (from 0-9 
employees) – 5 per cent; from small enterprises (from 10- 49 employees) – 15 present; 
from medium sized businesses (from 250-249 employees) – around 25 per cent; and 
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large businesses (250 employees or more) – 40 per cent. There are about 350,000 in 
self-employed, solo trades but they have low trade union activities. Trade unions 
traditionally organized self-employed workers in some quite specific professions 
characterized by high skills and significant autonomy in the performance of their work, 
such as journalists and performing artists. Another sector with a high representation of 
self-employed workers and where trade unions often have an established representation 
is construction. In transport, especially in road haulage, the situation is more mixed.  In 
addition to these types of workers, in recent years trade unions have tried to extend their 
representation to new groups of workers which are formally self-employed but have a 
less clear-cut professional identity. Beside this category, farmers and the self-employed 
in agriculture are also not covered by trade union activities, which including the 
unemployed and people working in the informal sector, accounts for a total of around 
500,000 workers. In other words, trade union density remains high in the public sector 
and is low in the private corporate sector. 
There are more than 20,000 trade unions in Serbia at all levels, from company to 
national level, and 31 sectorial trade unions belonging to the main confederations. The 
two trade union confederations currently recognized as representative on the national 
level are the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia (CATUS) and the 
United Branch Trade Unions (UGS), both of which participate in the Social and 
Economic Council at the national level. CATUS is the oldest trade union. It was the 
only recognized union confederation during communism and is still the most powerful 
one, claiming a membership of 850,000 (80% of which are due-paying members). 
However, actual numbers are much lower. According to some estimates, it might have 
up to 450,000 members, of whom around 60% pay union dues. CATUS is a member of 
the ITUC (International Trade Union Confederation) and PERC (Pan-European 
Regional Council) and is an observer in the ETUC (European Trade Union 
Confederation).178 
Exist a thesis that labour movement weakness was a common denominator of all 
former ‘communist’ societies. All trade unions have lost membership due to the layoffs 
caused by the economic crisis, there have been changes in the leadership of some of the 
main confederations. The main focus in the past few years has been the struggle for 
                                                             
178 EUROFOND. Serbia: Industrial relations profile. European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, 2012, p. 3.  
136 
 
representativeness at the national level. The difficulties faced by unions are 
demonstrated by the fact that it took three years of negotiation before the first branch 
collective agreement outside the public sector could be signed in December 2010. The 
issue of representativeness causes considerable friction both among the unions and in 
their relations with other social partners. Despite fundamental similarities, the peculiar 
situation in some SEE countries, means there are important differences in comparison 
with Central European countries. Not only is the time dimension of reforms more 
compressed, but also the sequencing of reforms is different. Therefore, the experiences 
of Central European countries although relevant are not sufficient. Trade unions in 
Serbia need to explore further the policies that would best suit itself.179 
 
4.2.5 Employer’s organization density, Employer representation 
 
By far the most relevant employer organization in the recent period has been the 
Serbian Association of Employers (SAE), which remains the only representative 
employer organization at the national level in Serbia and as such belongs to the 
International Organization of Employers (IOE) as a full member. It is also a member of 
the following international organizations: Business Europe; the Union of Black Sea and 
Caspian Confederation of Enterprises (UBCCE); the Union of Mediterranean 
Confederation of Enterprises (Business Med); the Adriatic Regional Employers’ Center 
(AREC).180 In mid-2008 the SAE underwent a major upheaval, which resulted in the 
creation of the Association of Small and Medium-Sized Entrepreneurs (ASME), formed 
by breakaway members of the SAE. The ASME has repeatedly disputed the 
representativeness of the SAE and invested considerable time and energy trying to 
obtain representative status but these attempts have so far not succeeded. However, up 
to this point the SAE remains the only employer organization at the national level in 
Serbia that actively operates and provides services to its membership in return for their 
membership fees. The ASME employer organization does not collect membership fees 
and membership is free of charge.181 
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The legal requirement for representativeness at national level is that an employer 
organization unites at least 10 per cent of all registered employers, and that these 
employers employ at least 15 per cent of the total number of employees in the country. 
In most cases, self-employed workers are regarded as entrepreneurs and (potential) 
employers.   
In 2011 the International Organization of Employers and the International 
Labour Organization jointly warned the Serbian Government against excessive 
involvement in the functioning of employer organizations in Serbia, after the repeated 
collaboration of the Chambers of Commerce of Serbia and Belgrade with newly 
established employer organizations. The SAE recently signed branch collective 
agreements in the construction and agriculture sectors, although its presence and 
membership in these two branches is rather low. The SAE as the main national 
organization of employers, has participated regularly in the activities of the Social and 
Economic Council of the Republic of Serbia and with other employer’s organizations in 
the Business Council founded by the Government in 2012. It is consulted on major 
economic and social issues, proposals and laws.182 
 
4.2.6 Employees’ representation  
 
Workers’ councils may be established at an organization with more than 50 
employees. Article 205 of the Labour Code allows it creation. Employee councils can 
give opinions and take part in decisions on the economic and social rights of employees. 
The regulation of employee representation bodies is codified by law, but its 
implementation in practice through collective agreements is very limited. Works 
councils exist almost exclusively in some multinational firms operating in Serbia who 
have implemented their global practice.183 
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Table 23 – Employee representation at establishment level summarize. 
Source: Eurofond, 2012.  
 
In Serbia, representation of employees in company’s management is not 
common in practice. However, the Act on Public Companies184 stipulates the mandatory 
participation of employees in management. The supervisory board of the public 
company (i.e. a company established by the State or local government) is to have one 
member elected among the employees of the public company. 
Health and safety representatives works in the following way.  The employees 
may elect one or more representatives for matters of occupational health and safety. The 
representatives may form a Committee in case there are at least three elected 
representatives. The employer is obliged to inform the representatives /the Committee) 
on all health and safety related issues. 
 
4.3 Working Conditions  
  
The mandatory legislation sets the minimum terms and conditions of 
employment. More favorable working conditions may be provided by collective 
agreement, work rules and employment agreements. 
The employer is obliged to pay salary at least once a month. Salary structures are 
complicated and consist of the following mandatory elements: basic salary, increased 
salary in certain circumstances (e.g. nighttime work), the performance-based element of 
salary, payable if a performance norm prescribed by an applicable collective 
agreement/work rules/employment agreement is exceeded. A meal allowance and 
annual vacation allowance are also mandatory payments, but the law does not prescribe 
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Works council low
Health and safety committee low
Incidence
Trade Union high
Joint trade union committee low
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the minimum amount. These payments are taxed as salary. The employer is also obliged 
to pay funeral expenses in the event of death of the employee or a member of his or her 
immediate family. The Labour Act guarantees the minimum amount of salary, which is 
determined at the national level, based on parameters set by the Socio-Economic 
Council of Republic of Serbia. Currently, the rate of the minimum salary is RSD 121 
net (approx. EUR 1) per working hour. 185 
Full-time working hours are 40 hours per week. As a rule, the working week 
lasts five days, but the maximum of 40 hours per week, may also be stretched through a 
longer period, depending on the employer’s business needs. The majority of the Serbian 
population gives preference to permanent, full time jobs: 88.6 per cent of the employed 
have permanent jobs and 91.3 per cent work full time. While Serbian women are more 
likely to hold part time jobs than men, the percentage of women engaged in part time 
work in Serbia (10.1 per cent) is significantly lower than the EU-15 countries (35.4 per 
cent). However, both men and women who work part-time in Serbia cite inability to 
find full-time employment as a major reason for working fewer hours, which is different 
from OECD countries, where part-time employment is largely voluntary. Moreover, 
part-time jobs are largely in the informal sector and the majority of people who work in 
less than full time jobs has low education levels and is engaged in unskilled 
occupations. Studies also point out that the unattractiveness of part-time jobs may be 
due to the low level of wages in the country, where employees may not be able to afford 
working part time as associated costs (transportation, meals, and child care) may be too 
high relative to earnings. The National Employment Strategy highlights the need to 
promote part-time work and forms of work carried out outside the employer's premises 
as a form of employment which may best respond to the needs of individuals caring for 
dependents (children and the elderly) and thereby contribute to employment growth 
especially for women, possibly increase the birth rate as a result of better reconciliation 
of work and family life. Work in excess of full-time hours is deemed overtime work it 
may be ordered in exceptional cases only, and triggers a salary increase. Senior 
employees and management are not exempt from the overtime regime. Overtime work 
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may not exceed eight hours per week. An employee cannot work more than 12 hours a 
day including overtime.186 
Maternity leave comprises pregnancy leave and childcare leave. Pregnancy leave 
starts no earlier than 45 days and no later than 28 days prior to the due date and lasts for 
three months from the childbirth. Pregnancy leave is fully paid by the state. Childcare 
leave begins upon expiry of the pregnancy leave. Pregnancy leave and childcare leave 
combined may last for up to 365 days. Childcare leave has the same treatment as 
pregnancy leave and is fully paid (the employer pays the compensation and then obtains 
a refund from the state). An employee cannot be validly terminated while pregnant and 
while on maternity (pregnancy/childcare or special childcare) leave. 
In each calendar year, the employee is entitled to annual leave of a minimum 
duration of 20 working days. The employer has to provide an increase of the statutory 
minimum of 20 working days holiday based on (1) the employee’s contribution to work, 
(2) working conditions, (3) work experience, and (4) the professional qualifications of 
the employee. The employer is free to determine the number of days, which attach to 
each (a minimum of one working day per criterion). The employee is entitled to use 
annual leave after one month of continuous work with the employer. The employee is 
entitled to one-twelfth of his/her total annual leave entitlement for each month of work 
in the calendar year in which: (1) he/she commenced work; or (2) his/her employment is 
terminated. Annual leave may be used at once, if that does not disturb the work process, 
or in two or more instalments. Annual leave may be used in more than two instalments 
only if the employee agrees so. The employer decides on the schedule of annual leave, 
depending on the needs of the work process, with the prior consultation of the 
employee. The entire holiday entitlement must be consumed until 30 June of the 
following year or it is forfeited.187 
 
4.4 Social conditions  
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If we take as a measure international standards Serbia may be relatively wealthy 
but if we compare to other European countries that is not a case (see graph 12). In terms 
of GDP per capita but at the level of actual individual consumption Serbia fall below the 
level of all of the European Union member-states. In addition, Serbia is not on a level 
with other western Balkan standards. It is slightly below Macedonia and Montenegro 
but slightly above Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. 
 
Graph 12 – Volume indices of GDP and AIC per capita, 2016 (EU-28=100). 
Available in: 
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<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc_ppp_ind&lang=en
> Access in: 05 Mar. 2018. 
 
If we look on GDP per capita in Serbia between 1990 and 2017 (graph 13) we 
can see that Serbia has still not recovered its 1990 GDP per capita. 
 
 
 Graph 13 – Serbia GDP per capita PPP, 1990-2015. Available in : 
<https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/gdp-per-capita-ppp> Access in :  05 Mar. 2018. 
 
Serbia was trying to grow in the 2000s, and made a recovery in this decade. But 
when the financial crisis hit, all hopes for rapid convergence with Serbia’s neighbors, 
could be dismissed. As it economic future affably depends on integration with these, 
this made economic growth in Serbia harder to obtain. The result is a Serbia that is still 
poorer than it was in 1990, its peers having long since passed Serbia. 
Even before the ongoing global economic instability, growing income disparities 
have been established in the world, especially in emerging markets and transition 
economies. At the beginning of the transition process, transition countries shared 
remarkably similar low level of inequality. Over the time, the situation has changed 
dramatically and inequality diverged considerably. The general conclusion in literature 
seems to be that transition processes result in increased poverty, and consequently 
increased inequality.188  
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In Serbia, discussing “class” and inequality openly during the communism was 
very strange. During Josip Broz Tito’s egalitarian times, identifying as anything but 
working class invited the risk of being labelled anti-government, a remnant of old 
bourgeoisie. The socialist mantra of equality and meritocracy was somewhat credible. 
The turmoil of past decades has made discussions of inequality and social divisions 
increasingly necessary. Previously middle-class teachers, doctors and other government 
employees were reduced to near-poverty, while many involved in semi-criminal 
networks had connections to ruling parties and amassed significant wealth, becoming 
the new upper crust. Factory closures due to privatization led to the collapse of several 
towns outside Belgrade and created large numbers of people barely able to get by on 
their salaries. Belgrade is the only area that has shown population growth in Serbia; 
good jobs are increasingly concentrated in the capital. Deteriorating social support, state 
healthcare and education further decreased the livelihoods of the worse-off and stunted 
social mobility.189 
The problem of inequality reduction is complex, and it includes social, economic 
and political dimensions, integrating improvements in health, education, economic 
development, legislation and justice. Positive effects of social assistance to the poor are: 
preventing decrease in human capital, preventing crime and providing political support 
for economic reforms during transition. Negative effects are crowding out productive 
investment (money spent for social protection could have been spent in a more 
productive way) and decreasing beneficiaries' motivation to find a job. Somewhat 
delayed, reforms in Serbia in the area of social assistance have been more rapid and 
systematic than in most other transition countries.  
Although Serbian economy still suffers from the inherited problems related to 
demolition of the economy during the 1990s, followed by tremendous impoverishment 
and erosion of social cohesion, comprehensive legislative and strategic frameworks in 
the field of social policy have been developed since the democratic changes of 2000. 
After the Living Standards Measurement Survey undertaken by the World Bank in 
2002, active social policy programmes started, guided by Poverty Reduction Strategy 
adopted in 2003. In order to achieve three main goals of social policy, i.e. self-
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sufficiency, equity and social cohesion, these programmes contain policies for 
improvement of employment opportunities, efficient social protection, better position of 
pensioners and elderly, health care and education with the purpose of poverty 
reduction.190 
In 2015, Serbia's socio-economic situation is once again among the country's 
biggest challenges. To meet its strategic goal of EU integration, the government elected 
in 2014 has committed itself to a comprehensive reform agenda, involving, among other 
things, strict fiscal consolidation measures to reduce the budget deficit and public debt. 
To secure a €1 billion IMF loan, it has adopted an austerity-focused 2015 budget, 
cutting some social-security services and reducing others. The planned privatization of 
state-owned enterprises and the public sector downsizing (likely to continue in 2016-
17), may have some effect on the level of unemployment. Tackling social issues 
effectively requires a healthy economy with a high level of investment, but the 
economic situation in Serbia leaves limited resources for alleviating the social impact of 
reform, making higher social care expenditure appear improbable.191 
         
4.4.1 Social policy in Serbia  
 
Between transition countries, generally speaking, groups of more egalitarian and 
in egalitarian countries in income distribution could be distinguished. Central European 
transition countries tend to have relatively low levels of inequality, while the former 
Soviet republics tend to have relatively higher levels of inequality. West Balkan 
countries, including Serbia, lie somewhere in between those two groups of countries. 
Comparing with other transition countries in the region, social protection expenditures 
in Serbia are at the level of the average social policy spending in the Baltic countries. 
These payments cover three social-protection instruments: social insurance-contributory 
based benefits, social assistance and social services. Expenditures on the first social-
protection instrument, contributory-based benefits, which include pensions and 
unemployment benefits, are very high. There are two reasons for this: a steady tendency 
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of population aging in Serbia, and possibilities for an early retirement during the 
transition process.192 As a result, in Serbia there is a larger number of pension 
beneficiaries than the number of contributing workers, while the unemployment is 
reducing very slowly. Consequently, the pay-as-you-go system is unsustainable.  Yet, 
high budget expenditures for pensions supersede social assistance and reduce spending 
for transition victims and child support. Due to high pension transfers, Serbia spends 
less than two percent of GDP on the second instrument of social protection: social 
assistance. This is an even lower level of spending then in the EU countries, where the 
average is more than 2.5 percent. 
Social assistance is an instrument of social policy used to achieve a more equal 
income distribution, but it should also enable equal access to employment, education 
and health care for the vulnerable groups. More precisely, social protection should not 
only target the poor and provide support for their basic needs, but should also have a 
protective manner. Thus in Serbia it includes benefits for families with children, 
employment programmes, benefits for persons with disabilities, etc. Social assistance is 
an instrument that provides a minimum standard of living, although there are other 
goals added to social assistance, for instance, improvements in education and 
employment. In Serbia there exist over 20 social assistance programmes, directed to 
three groups of objectives: poverty reduction, population growth and assistance for the 
most vulnerable groups. These programmes are legally and administratively separated 
in two groups of public policy instruments: (1) instruments providing social assistance 
for citizens and (2) instruments related to social protection of children. All these 
instruments are related to improvement of material positions of vulnerable groups, 
namely groups mostly exposed to the risk of poverty. They are: unemployed and poorly 
supported, children younger than 14 years of age, elderly (65 years of age and more), 
multimember households (five or more members), refugees, disabled, households 
consisting of only one or two elderly members (particularly in rural regions), rural 
regions of South-eastern and Western Serbia, uneducated individuals. Two well-
designed poverty-target and the most important non-contributory programmes in Serbia 
are Material Support for Low Income Households (MOP) and Child Allowance. 
Material Support for Low Income Households (MOP) is mostly received by the 
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unemployed, persons with poor educational background, and persons with disabilities, 
while employed persons, pensioners and farmers rarely receive it. Minimum income for 
households is defined with respect to the household’s size. MOP in Serbia is less in 
favor of households with a large number of members. It actually marginalizes the 
problems of households with a large number of members, including children. Child 
allowance is the most important instrument of child protection policy. However, the 
share of child allowance in GDP is decreasing year after year, although the intensity of 
other policy instruments for child protection is growing: wage compensation for 
mothers on maternity leave and birth grants.  By new legislative changes, mothers on 
maternity leave receive a share of their own average salary, and therefore this 
instrument is not focused on poorest parts of the society. The analyses show that in 
Serbia, according to the Household Budget Survey, not only the average number of 
children per household is steadily decreasing each year, but also the percentage of 
households without children is growing year after year, from 73.6% in 2010 to 77.6% in 
2014. This fact highlights the importance of child support as an instrument of both 
social and population policy, intending to strengthen incentives for increase of birth 
rate.193 
Active participation in the European Social Inclusion Process is key for the EU 
accession process. As part of its social inclusion efforts, Serbia established a Social 
Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Unit and a Working Group on Social Inclusion. Some 
140 centers for social work, covering 173 municipalities, are estimated to be 
operational. Social welfare services need to be reformed to better support labour market 
participation and social inclusion. The eligibility criteria for granting unemployment 
benefits, for example, are complex, yet there are many fewer beneficiaries than 
expected. The minimum income scheme in Serbia, the Financial Social Assistance 
(FSA), is regulated by the Social Protection Law (2011) and provided for by the central 
budget. Between 2010 and 2014, FSA beneficiaries have increased greatly (67%). In 
this context, a more integrated poverty-reduction and social-inclusion approach is 
needed. The 2015 NEAP introduced a new measure for integrating social assistance 
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beneficiaries in the labour market, by offering a 12-month wage subsidy to private 
employers.194 
These intentions and policy measures are welcomed, but to eliminate poverty 
and social exclusion more attention needs to be paid to the implementation of policies 
than to drafting nice statements and laws. Achieving this goal needs the establishment 
of a socially responsible government and a social welfare state, the development of 
corporate responsibility, and the elimination of corruption and discrimination of any 
kind. Policies driven by big capital, foreign investors and international financial 
institutions seldom benefit the middle class and can undermine the social role of the 
state. The realization of economic and social rights needs real policy change and 
governance in the service of its citizens.195 
 
4.4.2 Poverty in Serbia  
  
Poverty is a very sensitive and challenging issue in many countries. Poverty is a 
rather complex phenomenon combining several dimensions. One of the best approaches 
to define poverty is perhaps just to ask ordinary people how they would define it and list 
what features they perceive as most important. Thus, according to a World Bank study, 
based on people’s perception, and other sources, the following factors matter to 
characterize poverty: basic needs satisfaction, health, disability, access to assets 
property, employment, gender, age, education, geography, ethnicity, discrimination, 
religion, season (for farmers and construction workers), access to public infrastructures 
and services, power and voice, dependency and exploitation, the environment, etc. 
Indeed, the list can be very long. A line is often drawn between absolute poverty, which 
occurs when the so-called ‘basics’ are missing (especially food, in which case poor 
people may suffer from hunger), and relative poverty, when comparing people. This 
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distinction matters when proposing measures for poverty reduction and comparing 
countries.196 
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), nine percent 
of Serbians are living in poverty as of 2016. Additionally, a concerning 25 percent of 
Serbians are on the verge of poverty. However, the Serbia poverty rate has improved 
since 2014, in which one in four people were living below the poverty line. Currently, 
the most vulnerable groups in Serbia are the Roma and youths.197 Thus, the Roma, who 
make up two percent of the Serbian population, makes up a significant percentage of the 
Serbia poverty rate. Poverty among the Roma continues to persist as Serbia’s method 
for inclusion relies wholly on education, despite current statistics. As of 2015, only 8 
percent of Romanis completed high school, due to discrimination and family financial 
difficulties. To adequately address the economic disparity of the Roma, more efforts 
will need to be put towards inclusion. Youth in Serbia are more likely to be on the verge 
of poverty or living in poverty due to unemployment. The UNDP reported that “1 in 8 
children under the age of 14 live in poverty”. As of 2016, 44.2 percent of youths were 
reported as unemployed. This is caused by a gap between the supply and demand of 
skilled labor brought about by Serbia’s flawed educational system. Education in Serbia 
is currently not centered on their economic needs, so youths do not have the required 
skills for available positions.  Educational reforms will need to be made to address 
youth unemployment and poverty.198 
Many external and internal factors, some of which are uncontrollable, heavily 
contribute to poverty in Serbia. In 2014, Serbia’s population and economy took a 
massive hit. In May of that year, flooding caused serious damage within Serbia many 
towns were destroyed and thousands of people displaced. The Serbian government 
estimated the total damage at 1.5 billion euros. The GDP growth rate decreased 4.4 
percent to an alarming negative 1.8 percent. The areas hit hardest by the natural disaster 
small southern towns and rural regions had the highest incidence of poverty before the 
flood. These areas are dependent on smallholder farming and often have less access to 
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education than major cities. In 2014, the southeastern region of Serbia had poverty rates 
close to four times higher than those in Belgrade, the nation’s capital city. 
Unemployment remains a huge problem in Serbia what is already explained in this 
chapter.199 
One of the consequences of Serbian poverty is emigration. Poor social 
conditions and lack of jobs stimulate emigration. Serbs and in general Balkan people 
favor Germany as a destination country. Considering the needs of the German economy, 
there is a positive-sum game between countries in the Balkans and Germany, with 
benefits for both sides (it is explained in the first chapter). The recent waves of refugees 
and asylum seekers from the Middle East may negatively affect the population of the 
Balkan countries, reducing their chance of finding jobs and obtaining residence permits 
in the EU. One more consequence of Serbian poverty is crime. The relationship between 
crime and poverty is quite complex. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), findings show that Serbia was (and could still be) amongst the safest places 
in Europe, despite high levels of poverty. However, as indicated by UNODC, the real 
issue is perhaps organized crime, with roots in the region, and involvement in the 
smuggling of people and drugs between the EU and other regions of the world.200 
Most Balkan countries are lacking resources to address all the needs of poor 
people. In such a context, international assistance can be seen as very relevant, focusing 
on fields that do matter for poverty reduction and containment. However, considering 
the scope and the persistence of poverty, there seems to be a need for reassessing 
transition policies and strategies in the region. EU funded inclusive growth should 
perhaps insist more on the participation of all social groups, especially at local and 
municipal levels, to develop a better sense of belonging and improve the sharing of 
public goods and services. The creation of jobs must also be a top priority to provide 
more incomes to poor families. Furthermore, the rise of inequalities in the region should 
attract more attention, which implies that poverty reduction cannot rely on growth only 
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it should include measures aiming at a fairer redistribution of incomes and wealth, 
without discouraging savings and investments.201 
Government introduce reforms programs to address the Serbia poverty rate and 
to prevent more people from falling into poverty.  They ask and get outside assistance. 
The World Bank and UNDP have a positive outlook for the nation’s economy strategy. 
There is a hope that the Serbia poverty rate will significantly decline by 2030.In 
particular, the inclusive growth component insists on “developing skills, creating 
employment, inclusive participation in the labour market and health and wellbeing”. 
The issue of poverty is not just a matter of income but also the access to services. 
 
4.5 Summary of the chapter  
 
An analysis of employment in Serbia today requires a multispectral perspective. 
This includes economic and social factors. Production growth has been strong since the 
beginning of the reform, but it was not strong enough to generate net wages. This is 
typical for countries in the early years of transition and all major economic 
characteristics were unfavorable: a reduction in economic activity, a reduction in 
employment rates and a high unemployment rate. 
Studying the Serbian market, we can notice a sharp difference in territorial 
segregation. The differences are particularly pronounced between the southern and 
northern parts of the country, rural and urban areas. The lack of timely and adequate 
regional labor market measures in the labor market has resulted in the fact that 
peripheral areas remain practically free of human resources that have entrepreneurial 
initiatives and appropriate qualifications, as well as other characteristics required by 
modern methods of industrial production that can be the drivers of their rapid 
development and progress in future.  
Evidence shows that the challenge in Serbia is structural. The growth itself will 
not be enough to create the number and type of work needed on the labor market. After 
the financial crisis, there is no significant impact of growth on employment. This is in 
complete contrast with the central European countries, where, after the Great Recession, 
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a significant positive relationship prevailed between growth and employment. This 
suggests that Serbia is still not in a position that current economic growth will guarantee 
a return to employment growth. The transition to modern market economies has not yet 
been completed, and many structural issues remain unresolved. 
Due to the multi-year unified political situation, including international isolation, 
growing economic problems and delayed economic reforms, Serbia today has more 
social problems than probably any other country in the region. Therefore, it must 
urgently address key social issues. The rich persuade themselves that they acquired their 
wealth through merit, ignoring the advantages such as education, inheritance and class 
that may have helped to secure it. The poor begin to blame themselves for their failures, 
even when they can do little to change their circumstances. The economic program for 
2015–18 focuses on ensuring economic and financial stability, halting further debt 
accumulation, and creating an environment for economic recovery and growth to foster 
employment and raise living standards. In this process, trade unions could play a more 
constructive role. Unfortunately, trade unions in Serbia face the fundamental question as 
to what will be the impact of painful neo-liberal policies on their fragile democracies, 
weak economies and socially disrupted areas that are the result of long-standing 
conflicts. They seek a solution to prevent these problems from transforming into the 
causes of underdevelopment, social disintegration and poverty. They are looking for 
new policies that better suit the short-term and long-term interests of their members.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Why did Yugoslavia fail? It is a fact that Yugoslav economy was more liberal 
and much more decentralized than those of other communist-controlled states of the 
Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe had, for decades, looked at us from behind with 
inspiration and envy, because of our “communism with a human face.” In addition,  
there is a tendency for Yugoslavia break-up to be ascribed to the specific problems of 
the unique experiment with the self-managed socialist economy. The fact is, however, 
that Yugoslavia with all its institutional peculiarities suffered from exactly the same 
systemic weaknesses as all the other command-type economies, including the semi-
command economies: low economic efficiency, a lack of technological dynamism and 
inability to adapt. Although in many aspects different, the centralized economies of 
other communist-controlled European states did not rely on the free internal circulation 
of capital, commodities and labor; rather, they thrived by the political monopoly of the 
central party-state. When the political monopoly of the party-state was undermined and 
when it finally withered away, a systemic crisis erupted, which hastened the demise of 
communist regimes. Similar to the SFRY, the Soviet and Czechs-Slovak federations 
fragmented along their internal ethnic borders. Still, that was not the end of economic 
fragmentation and decay. These weaknesses became increasingly obvious by increasing 
interdependence and globalization, which intensified in the 1980s and 1990s. Not one 
former communist-controlled country escaped the plummeting of its GNP and per 
capita income; systematic destruction of entire production sectors; massive 
unemployment and general deterioration of living and health standards. 
After the civil war, all new states, with the exception of Slovenia, have been 
severely set back in economic and social terms. The war has perverted the course of 
economic restructuring and transition to the market economy. It has indeed led to a 
widespread criminalization of the economies. War profiteers, in league with corrupt 
politicians, made immense fortunes, while the lot of the majority of the population was 
hopelessness and lived below the poverty line. The wages from official jobs simply 
cannot provide even for essentials. Brain drain has been the personal solution for many 
highly qualified individuals. Those who have stayed behind will continue to be 
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hampered for years to come by the deficiencies of a run-down, vandalized transport and 
energy infrastructure. 
Serbia has experienced a difficult transition from guaranteed full employment to 
a market-based employment model. Transition has been causing major changes in the 
labour market, such as declining employment protection, reductions in public sector 
employment and wage level, rapid unemployment increases, and consequently 
increased inequality and poverty. Even before the ongoing global economic instability, 
growing income disparities have been established in the world, especially in emerging 
markets and transition economies. At the beginning of the transition process, transition 
countries shared remarkably similar low level of inequality. Over the time, the situation 
has changed dramatically and inequality diverged considerably. Especially in Serbia, 
this process did not give good results.   
Today, workers in Serbia suffer from their great depression, but the one imposed 
by adopting a neoliberal economic model. With rising radicalization, workers are 
increasingly reacting to the abusive system of strikes and protests. Despite the strong 
motivation among workers, these actions are often lacking in the path of success, given 
the full support of the trade unions. Indeed, trade unions have recently signed an 
agreement with the government on mass layoffs by civil servants. The free market has 
come to Serbia, with all that implies. There is a saying that the Serbian young people 
pay to get mortgages and loans that will allow them to move out of parental homes 
before they turn 40 years old, and in this way hide behind the type of financial 
responsibility that will see them become voluntary slaves to their companies; living in 
fear of losing their jobs. Unfortunately, no measure can expel the understanding of 
Western forces in Serbia in the near future.  The Serbian government not only hear such 
proposals, but also bring them is a shame. The government has revealed its neglect for 
its citizens. Bourgeois parties in power represent only the narrow interests of their class 
and Western users of the system. It will be a long and terrifying task of the Serbian 
working class to reverse its losses.  
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Recently, Serbia had made clear progress in improving the law, but it is still 
lagging behind in international comparisons. It is necessary to improve the education 
and training system so that it can compete in the future based on a better workforce than 
it currently has. The labor tax system that has been in place since 2001 is a regressive 
system that has raised costs for low-wage labor. The key policy concern is not the 
overall level of taxation but its distribution. Since a high tax wedge on labor income 
hampers job creation, Serbia’s tax system places a large burden on firms and sectors 
employing low-wage labor. This discourages formal hiring in those segments of the 
labor market that are critical for addressing current unemployment and for driving job 
creation in the future. 
In order to improve the status of the most vulnerable, the taxation of the rich 
must be increased. Thus, the protection of their economic and social rights must be 
achieved. Fighting corruption is necessary. This goal cannot be achieved solely by law 
and administrative measures; must be a focus on implementation. 
Agency for International Development has implemented a series of programs in Serbia 
designed to promote interests of the American corporate world. One of the programs is 
known as the "guillotine of regulations". The goal of this program is the rapid 
elimination of one-third of Serbian regulations concerning business. At the beginning of 
the project, the Ministry of Economy invited foreign investors to offer their 
recommendations on what they want to see. The current difficulties are an opportunity 
to tackle long-delayed structural reforms, although the global financial crisis may not be 
particularly suitable for continuing to expand the privatization agenda. The economy of 
Serbia was at one time predominantly based on two forms of public enterprises: socially 
owned firms that were worker managed, and larger state-owned companies. The last 
remaining firms in the former category are scheduled to be completely eliminated by the 
end of this year, while the latter category will take longer to tackle. 
 Further pressures on the labor market can be expected over the next few years 
because of more restructuring of the state- and socially-owned enterprises. In order to 
solve the employment situation, Serbia should adopt a multi-sector jobs agenda. This 
agenda would help to speed up the completion of the restructuring program. It also 
develops the foundations for a dynamic labor market where job creation in the private 
sector is strong. The jobs agenda must be based on a comprehensive approach to 
employment. It requires macroeconomic stability, a business climate that encourages 
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investment, labor market regulations that allow for the mobility of workers from 
declining to growing sectors, an education and training system that can produce a highly 
skilled and flexible workforce, and a social safety net that provides adjustment support 
for workers while creating incentives to find employment.  
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